2002 Venezuelan coup attempt
Attempt to remove President Hugo Chávez from office / From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
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A failed coup d'état on 11 April 2002 saw the president of Venezuela, Hugo Chávez, ousted from office for 47 hours before being restored to power. Chávez was aided in his return to power by popular support and mobilization against the coup by loyal ranks in the military.[2][3]
2002 Venezuelan coup d'état attempt | |||||||
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Top to bottom, left to right: Venezuelan opposition protesters in Chuao on 11 April, chavistas outside of Miraflores Palace protesting Chávez's removal, the Presidential Honor Guard waving the Venezuelan flag above Miraflores following Chávez's return on 13 April, alleged resignation letter of Chávez. | |||||||
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Belligerents | |||||||
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Commanders and leaders | |||||||
Hugo Chávez (President of Venezuela) Diosdado Cabello José Vicente Rangel Nicolás Maduro |
Military high command Pedro Carmona | ||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||
19 dead and 150+ injured[1] (Llaguno Overpass events) |
By early 2002, Chávez's approval rating had dropped to around 30%,[4] with many business, church and media leaders being opposed to Chávez's use of emergency powers to bypass the National Assembly and institute significant government changes, arguing they were increasingly authoritarian.[1][5] Meanwhile, the growing dissatisfaction with Chávez among those in the military due to his aggressive manner and alliances with Cuba and paramilitaries led multiple officers to call on Chávez to resign.[6][7] Demonstrations and counter-demonstrations took place on a weekly basis as the country became increasingly divided.[8] Retired military officers, former politicians, union leaders, and spokespeople for the Catholic Church claimed they had military support to remove Chávez from power,[8] with an April 6 CIA intelligence report warning that plotters would try to exploit social unrest from upcoming opposition demonstrations for his removal.[9] American officials warned Chávez of a likely coup attempt, though Chávez ignored their warnings.[10][11][12]
Tensions worsened on 7 April, when Chávez fired PDVSA President Guaicaipuro Lameda Montero and 5 of the 7 members of the board of directors, mocking each one in national television by name and blowing a referee whistle, as if to expel them from a football match.[13][14] On 9 April, a general strike was called by the trade union organization National Federation of Trade Unions (Confederación de Trabajadores de Venezuela, CTV). The proposed strike was in response to Chávez's appointments to prominent posts in Venezuela's national oil company, PDVSA.[15] Two days later in Caracas, up to one million Venezuelans marched in opposition to Chávez.[16][17] After stopping at its original end point, the march continued towards the presidential palace, Miraflores, where government supporters and Bolivarian Circles were holding their own rally. Upon the opposition's arrival, the two sides confronted each other. A shootout started at the Llaguno Overpass, near the Miraflores Palace, and by that evening 19 people were dead. Chávez ordered the implementation of Plan Ávila, a military plan to mobilize an emergency force to protect the palace in the event of a coup.[9] As the plan had resulted in the killing of hundreds of Venezuelans during the Caracazo, military high command refused and demanded he resign.[18] President Chávez was subsequently arrested by the military.[19][20][21] Chávez's request for asylum in Cuba was denied, and he was ordered to be tried in a Venezuelan court.[15]
Venezuelan Federation of Chambers of Commerce (Fedecámaras) president Pedro Carmona was declared interim president. During his brief rule, the National Assembly and the Supreme Court were both dissolved and the country's 1999 Constitution was declared void, pledged a return to the pre-1999 bicameral parliamentary system, parliamentary elections by December, presidential elections where he would not stand.[22] By the 13th, the coup was on the verge of collapse, as Carmona's attempts to entirely undo Chávez's reforms angered much of the public and key sectors of the military,[23] while parts of the opposition movement also refused to back Carmona.[24][25] In Caracas, Chávez supporters surrounded the presidential palace, seized television stations and demanded his return.[15] Carmona resigned the same night. The pro-Chávez Presidential Guard retook Miraflores without firing a shot, leading to the removal of the Carmona government and the re-installation of Chávez as president.
On January 15, 2004, during a speech before the National Assembly, Chávez would afterwards admit that he deliberately provoked a crisis with his actions, declaring that "what happened with PDVSA was necessary" and "when I grabbed the whistle in an Aló Presidente and started to fire people, I was provoking the crisis".[26][27]
Hugo Chávez was first elected president in 1998. One of his campaign promises was to convene a new constitutional convention,[28] and on 15 December 1999 he put the new Constitution of Venezuela to the voters in a referendum. Following the 1999 constitutional referendum, Chávez was reelected in 2000 under the terms of the new constitution. Following these elections, Chávez had gained control of all formerly independent institutions of the Venezuelan government.[29] The popularity of Chávez then dropped due to his clashes with multiple social groups he had alienated and his close ties with controversial world leaders such as Mohammad Khatami, Saddam Hussein, Muammar Gaddafi and especially Fidel Castro.[1]
"Come out to the street and look at me! The more dirt you throw at me, the more I'll throw at you. That is who I am."
Hugo Chávez, 2001[30]
Chávez used a strategy of polarization in Venezuela, a "them against us" situation, in order to single out those who stood in the way of his progress.[30] He would insult and use name calling against original supporters that would question him; the media, business leaders, the Catholic Church and the middle class.[30] Such "words spawned hatred and polarization" with Chávez, "a master of language and communication", creating his own reality among Venezuelans.[30] Nelson says that what hurt Chávez's popularity the most was his relationship with Fidel Castro and Cuba, with Chávez attempting to make Venezuela in Cuba's image.[1] Venezuela became Cuba's largest trade partner while Chávez, following Castro's example, consolidated the country's bicameral legislature into a single National Assembly that gave him more power[31] and created community groups of loyal supporters allegedly trained as paramilitaries.[1] Such actions created great fear among Venezuelans who felt like they were tricked and that Chávez had dictatorial goals.[1]
Opposition to the Chávez government was then particularly strong, with some of those who were previously in the government before the election of Chávez.[32][33] The independent media became the primary check on Chávez after he had taken control of most of the Venezuelan government, with the Venezuelan media acting like other forms of media in Latin America at the time that demanded accountability for governmental abuses and exposing corruption.[29] The opposition was worried with Chávez because they believed his rewriting Venezuela's constitution were signs that Chávez was trying to maintain power through authoritarianism.[33] In early 2002, there were also increasing signs of discontent in the military; in February four military officials, including a general and a rear admiral, publicly called on Chávez to resign. On 7 February 2002 Venezuela Air Force Colonel Pedro Vicente Soto and National Reserve Captain Pedro Flores Rivero led a rally protesting the Chávez government's practices denounced as undemocratic and authoritarian. Rear Admiral Carlos Molina Tamayo said on television that if Chávez did not resign, he should be impeached.[citation needed]
Chávez's opposition originated from the response to the "cubanization" of Venezuela when mothers realized that the new textbooks in Venezuela were really Cuban books filled with revolutionary propaganda and with different covers causing them to protest.[1] By the summer months of 2001, the opposition groups grew quickly from concerned mothers to labor unions, business interests, church groups, and right and leftwing political parties, who felt that they were being isolated.[1][34] At the same time, groups supporting Chávez became organized, especially among the poor, with their passion for Chávez bordering idolatry since he gave them hope and feeling of being valuable.[1]
The 49 Laws
Between 2001 and 2003, multiple chavistas started opposing Chávez as well.[35] On 28 July 2001, Pedro Carmona defeats Alberto Cudemus, a businessman close to Chavism, in the elections for President of Fedecámaras.[36] On August 4, Carmona coincides with Chavez at the Venezuelan Military Academy, where the anniversary of the National Guard was being celebrated. According to Carmona, Chávez told he no longer wanted conflicts with Fedecámaras, and they plan a meeting on 22 August at the Miraflores Presidential Palace.[37] At the meeting, Carmona proposes to Chávez a plan to lower unemployment, at that time at 17%, improving conditions in order to increase private investment up to 20% of the GDP in five years, while the latter responds with a plan to strengthen the public sector.[38] A dialogue table was then created between Fedecámaras and the government, the latter represented by Jorge Giordani, Minister of Planning. The meetings did not bring results, despite the fact that they took place once a week and that Chávez was present in one of them. The government continued to elaborate 49 controversial laws without sharing their content with Fedecámaras or its agrarian equivalent, Fedenaga, which its critics argued violated Articles 206 and 211 of the Constitution.[39][40]
On 13 November, Chavez decrees the 49 laws under the enabling law granted to him by the National Assembly in November 2000, a legal instrument which allowed him to legislate without the approval of the legislative power. Although originally two thirds of the Assembly were controlled by Chavismo, the situation had changed due to the fact that some deputies had become dissident and it was unlikely that Chávez would be able to obtain another enabling law, reason for which Chávez approved the laws the day before his special power expired.[1][41][42][43] The laws included the Organic Hydrocarbons Law, the Fishing Law, the Special Law of Cooperative Associations and the General Ports Law, and included the rearrangement of public ministries and government major laws change, but the Land and Agrarian Development Law was the most controversial.[42][43]
The laws "marked a turning point in public sentiment toward the president" with both Chávez supporters and critics outraged at the changes.[41] The two decrees in particular sparked protest: a law aimed at strengthening government control over the oil company PDVSA and a more controversial land reform law, which included provisions for the expropriation of "idle" lands.[41] Though the government stated that it would provide the previous owners with compensation at the going market rates, the land laws introduced by Chávez were so vaguely worded that the government could legally expropriate any property it wished to take.[41] While some of the land was genuinely given to the vulnerable, much of it was used in a system of patronage for party members loyal to Chávez.[41]
McCaughan described the 49 laws as the "plus ultra non", the "point of no return for Chávez's troubled relations with business, church and media leaders".[44] For the opposition, such dramatic changes to the government proved to them that Chávez was a "dictator-in-training".[1][5] On 10 December 2001, a national strike shut down 90% of the economy and was the largest strike in Venezuela's history, bigger than the strike that assisted with ending the dictatorship of Marcos Pérez Jiménez in 1958.[41] By January 2002, protests involving hundreds of thousands of Venezuelans opposing Chávez became common in Venezuela.[1]
Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA)
In March 2002, Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA), the state oil company that acted autonomously and accounted for 70% of Venezuela's foreign revenue, was targeted by Chávez out of fear of the oppositions ability to call national strikes and was to receive strict control from the government.[1] Chávez's attempts to end the functional independence of PDVSA were met with strong resistance from PDVSA officials and managers.[citation needed]
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Chávez firing PDVSA executives in national television and blowing a referee whistle, as if to expel them from a football match, 7 April 2002 |
On 7 April, Chávez fired the President of PDVSA, Brigadier-General Guaicaipuro Lameda Montero and replaced him with a former Communist Party militant, in addition to firing another 5 of the 7 members of the PDVSA board of directors on his Aló Presidente program, mocking each worker by name and used a referee whistle, as if to expel them from a soccer match.[13][14] Such actions by Chávez caused further opposition developments with a series of walkouts and work slowdowns followed.[45]
The Washington Times then noted that Chávez had "choked off foreign investment by doubling the royalty payments oil companies must pay to the government and by restricting corporate ownership on some oil projects to 49 percent", and had "alienated workers at his country's state-owned oil company, Petroleos de Venezuela, by replacing long-serving professionals with his supporters".[46] By early 2002, Chávez's approval rating dropped to around 30%.[4] This action, according to The Los Angeles Times, "united all the anti-Chávez forces", bringing together union leader Carlos Ortega, head of the Confederation of Workers of Venezuela (Confederación de Trabajadores de Venezuela, CTV for short in Spanish), with Pedro Carmona Estanga, head of Venezuela's main business federation, Fedecámaras, in a call for an "indefinite general strike" in support of oil workers.[13]
Military
The existing military grew wary of Chávez due to his relationship with Fidel Castro and the Colombian guerrilla group FARC that they were previously taught "were the greatest threat to their country".[47] The military felt that after fighting against Castro's influence, guerilla groups and attempts to overthrow previous Venezuelan governments to expand his revolutionary presence since the 1960s, that they had finally lost when Chávez came to power.[47] Chávez promoted guerilla fighters into the Venezuelan military and forced the wary existing military servicemen to assist them.[47] One of the more controversial actions that created discontent within the military was when Chávez forced them to assist the FARC with setting up camps in Venezuelan territories, providing ammunition to fight the Colombian government, supplying ID cards so they could move freely through Venezuela and sending members of Bolivarian Circles to their camps to receive guerilla training.[47] The most controversial steps taken by Chávez was ordering the existing military to work with the Cuban military, with the Venezuelan military and intelligence agencies forced to open their bases, files and hard drives for their Cuban counterparts creating a sense of being betrayed by Chávez.[47]
The "long-simmering resentment in the military"[attribution needed] was articulated publicly by four high-level officers, including Air Force Gen. Roman Gomez Ruiz, who called on Chávez to "resign peacefully and take responsibility for your failure".[13] Chávez responded by declaring these officers traitors, ordering their arrest, and forcing their resignations.[13] The Chicago Tribune later reported that although the Venezuelan general public was unaware of it, the country's oil industry was approaching the end of a six-week work slowdown and Chávez's government and oil executives had agreed that members of an oil board picked by Chávez would resign. "But labor and business leaders, who had joined in secret with dissident military officers in an effort to oust Chávez, decided that the moment had come to press on", the newspaper maintained.[48] "The middle-class intellectuals and professionals who had at first delighted in Chávez's talk of restoring 'national honor'", Sandra Hernandez later observed in The Los Angeles Times, "watched in dismay as Chávez's supporters formed 'Bolivarian circles', muscle groups that intimidated government opponents with threats of physical harm". During the year or so preceding the coup, Chávez "essentially thumbed his nose" at his opponents, claimed a political consultant.[13] Many opponents of Chávez felt that his behavior was self-destructive and that he would end up "los[ing] power through constitutional means via the Supreme Court or the parliament".[49] Nonetheless, according to The New York Times, "discontented military officers had been meeting among themselves and with business leaders for almost a year to discuss ways to oust Mr. Chávez".[50] These military officers "said they would pick the leader", one officer[who?] said, because "They did not want to be called a military junta, but they wanted to make sure that at least one military person was on the transitional board."[50]
Advanced planning
Details surrounding a potential coup were openly discussed in Venezuela for months before the attempted ousting,[12] with groups of former politicians, retired military officers, union leaders, and spokespeople for the Catholic Church claiming they had support within the military for a possible coup.[8] "The rumors of a coup to oust Chávez", noted The Miami Herald, "were being whispered, if not shouted, for months before the revolt".[34] Writing about the run-up to the coup, Letta Tayler of Newsweek observed that "[o]ne of the few certainties" about it was "that military, business, union and civic leaders had been plotting Chávez's downfall for nearly two years".[51]
The Guardian reported that as early as 18 March 2002 that "Chávez was saying that he was aware of a plot" to overthrow him, and that in the days before 11 April, "the political temperature was approaching boiling point", with oil workers striking "in protest at Chávez's appointments to their board" and the media accelerating its criticisms of the regime.[52] The Chicago Tribune reported that there had been rumors in Caracas "for weeks" about a coup, with military figures like Navy Vice Adm. Carlos Molina and Air Force Col. Pedro Soto "building support ... in the armed forces" for a coup.[48] Hernandez claimed that in early April, "the coming coup ... was an open secret".[53] On 9 April, retired Gen. Manuel Andara Clavier, one of many retired military officials who opposed Chávez, reportedly told her, "The table is set. ... Everything is set for the military to let the president know he can't push this country to spill blood."[53]
U.S. knowledge and warnings
The United States learned of details about a potential coup in late-2001 due to the nature of Venezuelan individuals openly plotting to overthrow President Chávez. Generals who opposed Chavez notified U.S. officials of the impending coup, with one official noting they were not seeking U.S. approval but rather simply providing advanced knowledge.[13] In March 2002 only days after United States Ambassador to Venezuela Charles Shapiro began his duties in Venezuela and just weeks before the coup attempt, Shapiro met with a trade union organization. Ambassador Shapiro later said that, during this meeting, the group openly shared their desire to be part of the coup, with Shapiro informing them that the United States would not support such actions and that governmental change should only occur electorally.[12]
On April 6, the C.I.A. completed a report titled, "Conditions Ripening for Coup Attempt," writing, "Dissident military factions, including some disgruntled senior officers and a group of radical junior officers, are stepping up efforts to organize a coup against President Chavez, possibly as early as this month."[9] The report additionally explained how the coup was expected to happen: "To provoke military action, the plotters may try to exploit unrest stemming from opposition demonstrations slated for later this month."[9]
The United States embassy in Venezuela later stated that it had informed Chávez of a possible coup, though Chávez ignored their warnings.[10] The United States government recognized Pedro Carmona as new President within hours of the coup and considered that Chávez had "resigned".[12]
Government preparations
On 7 April, the same day that President Chávez fired the PDVSA officials, Chávez met with his cabinet and high level military officials and began the meeting calling the actions by the opposition "treasonous" and asked those gathered how to counteract such actions. Soon discussions arose on how to defend Miraflores Palace. There were recommendations declaring a state of emergency, beginning the censorship of television and declaring martial law. Chávez then began to discuss Plan Ávila with Manuel Rosendo, the head of the Unified Command of the National Armed Forces, and how to implement it, though the military command did not accept it.[54]
The Tactical Command, headed by Cilia Flores, Guillermo García Ponce [es] and Freddy Bernal (mayor of the Libertador Municipality), then shared plans of using the Bolivarian Circles as a paramilitary force to end marches and also defend Chávez by organizing them into brigades. Another plan was to have the National Guard raid the offices of PDVSA in Chuao and occupy the company by force. They also discussed launching a disinformation propaganda campaign on public and private television and having government loyalists fill the highways with their vehicles and then present the images on TV as if people were busy working like any other day. In another plan to end the strike, Gastón Parra, the president of PDVSA, suggested to give bonuses to PDVSA employees who chose not to participate in the strike.[54]
In a 9 April discussion between Finance Minister General Francisco Usón and General Jacinto Pérez, Pérez believed that the Bolivarian Revolution was in a crisis and needed to "rejuvenate itself". Pérez then stated that the Bolivarian Revolution need had to be "purified with blood", which concerned Usón since Pérez "had the president's ear".[54] Both discussions outraged generals since they believed that the Venezuelan government was proposing violence against the public with General Rosendo stating that it seemed that "Chávez actually wanted a confrontation, that he had picked the fight with PDVSA in order to precipitate a crisis".[54][55]
Shortly before the coup attempt, Alí Rodríguez Araque, a former guerrilla and Chávez ally then serving in Vienna as the General Secretary of OPEC, allegedly heard of a potential oil embargo against the United States by Iraq and Libya, over US support for Israel. Rodríguez Araque told Chávez that the United States could prod a coup to prevent any threat of an embargo. The advice led Chávez to declare that he would not join such an embargo, and to secretly hide several hundred troops in Miraflores' underground corridors, commanded by José Baduel.[56]
Strikes
On 10 December, the opposition organised a one-day general strike, which was substantially effective. Newspapers, workplaces, schools and the stock exchange closed, although shops in poorer neighborhoods remained open.[citation needed] On 5 April 2002, the PDVSA opposition to Chávez moved to shut down the company. Thousands of opposition PDVSA employees, and two of the five main export terminals were paralyzed. On 6 April the Confederación de Trabajadores de Venezuela (CTV) trade union federation announced a 24-hour general strike for 9 April, to support the PDVSA protestors. It was joined the following day by Venezuelan Federation of Chambers of Commerce, headed by Pedro Carmona and Fedepetrol, the country's largest blue-collar petroleum union.[57] On 7 April, during the transmission of the television program Aló Presidente, started naming the PDVSA executives that announced the strike, mockingly blew a referee whistle, and proceeded to announce their dismissal. He fired seven executives forced another 12 into retirement.[58][59] Tensions continued to escalate through March and early April.[60]
Days after the firing of PDVSA heads, on 9 April, the general strike was moderately successful and oil production slowed. Newspapers were not published and television stations cancelled regular programming and commercials to run continuous coverage of the strike, including the stations' own opposition ads. The strike organizers declared it a success, which the government disputed, and in an effort to show its version of events, ordered a series of cadenas (mandatory government broadcasts), showing daily life continuing (over 30 cadenas on 8 and 9 April[61]). On the evening of 9 April, the strike was extended for another 24 hours.[citation needed]
On 10 April, the strike was less effective, with many schools and businesses re-opening. As with the previous day, television provided continuous coverage, and the government intervened with cadenas – but this time the networks split the screen, showing the cadena on one side and their coverage of the strike on the other. On the evening of 10 April, Fedecámaras and CTV held televised news conference announcing that the strike would be extended indefinitely, unanimously voted for a "coordinating committee for democracy and liberty" in order to "rescue Venezuela's freedom".[62] The opposition then called for a march to the PDVSA headquarters the following day.[60] In the National Assembly, those close to Chávez stated that Chávez wanted "moderation", though if an unlimited general strike were to occur from the opposition, an "unspecified 'violence will occur'".[62] Brigadier General Néstor González appeared on television to demand Chávez's resignation and to issue an ultimatum.[citation needed]
11 April march
The crisis that triggered the coup came when "workers and business leaders", infuriated by Chávez's "meddling in the state oil company", as the Chicago Tribune put it, joined in "calling for a general strike that cut exports" in support of striking oil workers.[6] The strike began, according to The Washington Post, "as a managerial protest at the state-run oil company, but evolved into a broad effort supported by the country's largest business and labor groups to force Chávez from power."[63] After days of general strikes and protests involving thousands of Venezuelans, on 10 April, a speech was held at the CTV headquarters, where CTV and Fedecámaras held speeches that involved a Brigadier General denouncing Chávez's alleged involvement with FARC, and the announcement of a march the next day with the possibility of an indefinite strike.[64] The march on 11 April was to begin at 9:00am, starting at Parque del Este and ending at the PDVSA headquarters.[64]
On 11 April, just hours before an operation to take over the PDVSA by force was to begin, General Rosendo, knowing the consequences of such an action, talked Chávez out of the plan.[65] Later that day, hundreds of thousands to millions of Venezuelans marched to the PDVSA headquarters later that day to protest against the recent dismissal of the management board.[16][66] Once at the headquarters, those present at the rally began to chant "To Miraflores! To Miraflores! To Miraflores!", in reference to the Miraflores Presidential Palace.[67][68] In response, Carlos Ortega declared: "This human river is now going to Miraflores to ask for your resignation", referring to Chávez.[68] The National Guard would later repress the concentration in Chuao and, equipped with firearms, would confront the demonstrators in the vicinity of the Miraflores Palace.[69][53]
Close to Miraflores, a line of police and National Guard held the marchers for a time, before the marchers pressed.[70] Chavistas belonging to Bolivarian Circles, some with that had military training in Cuba, were also stationed outside of Miraflores. The Circles had been positioned outside of the palace throughout the week during the unrest.[71] Government officials used the hours it took for the march to travel eight kilometres (5 mi) to the palace to call on loyalists to gather at Miraflores. National Assembly Deputy Juan Barreto told loyalists through the media covering the situation, "The call is to Miraflores! Everyone to Miraflores to defend your revolution! Don't let them through!"[71] A crowd of government supporters, in close but smaller numbers to the anti-Chavez marchers, quickly arrived from shanty towns.[72] Some government supporters, who began to gather then, were armed with Molotov cocktails, rocks, sticks, chains, baseball bats, and metal pipes, and were ignored by the Venezuelan National Guard stationed to defend Chávez.[73] According to General Rosendo, Defense Minister José Vicente Rangel ordered Freddy Bernal to prepare the Bolivarian Circles to attack the opposition demonstration.[74]
"Rosendo, we are going to direct the operations from here [Miraflores] ... Plan Ávila ... And I have my rifle ready to put lead in anyone who tries to stop this revolution that has cost me so much."
At about 12:00pm, Chávez knew the march was on its way and he called for the implementation of a military plan to occupy key locations in the city. Plan Ávila, as it was known, existed to mobilize an emergency force to protect the palace and prevent a coup.[72] The plan was first used by Carlos Andrés Pérez during the Caracazo, resulting in the killings of hundreds and possibly thousands of Venezuelans.[18] This caused discomfort among some in the military, since they knew that Chávez was violating the constitution he helped create by ordering High Command to have the military control civilians.[18]
Llaguno Overpass events
By 12:30 pm, thousands of government supporters were gathered around the palace blocking all routes to Miraflores except for the Llaguno Overpass, which was where the Bolivarian Circles had gathered to overlook the route.[18] As the march turned a corner and began to approach the Miraflores at about 2:00 pm, the National Guard fired about twelve tear gas canisters from behind the palace walls and the protesters fled back down the road.[70] The protesters made it closer to Miraflores and the Presidential Guard responded with more tear gas. About 20 gas canisters caused panic and a dispersion of the demonstrators to areas surrounding the palace.[70]
Since other routes were blocked by the National Guard, many marchers began to head down Baralt Avenue in order to reach Miraflores.[75] On Baralt Avenue, near the Llaguno Overpass as the march inched closer hundreds of Chávez supporters gathered and began throwing large rocks, Molotov cocktails and even tear gas at the demonstrators.[75][76][77] Upon arrival of the marchers at Miraflores, the opposing sides were initially separated by two forces: the National Guard loyal to Chávez and the Metropolitan Police controlled by former Caracas mayor Alfredo Peña, a former Chávez supporter who had joined the opposition.[72] As marchers and Chavistas clashed, the Metropolitan Police attempted to separate both sides from further confrontation with two trucks with water cannons.[75]
Trying to regain the initiative, Chávez spoke in a lengthy broadcast on the successes of his administration while calling for peace, but the networks decided to split the screen, showing the violence outside the palace, with the audio from the speech appearing disrupted.[78] A few minutes after the speech concluded, gunfire erupted again and the march began to disperse slightly.[79] As the demonstrators marched closer to the Llaguno Overpass, they could see Chavistas heavily armed, some with pistols.[79] Police began to disperse the Chavista gunmen returning fire and few demonstrators began to follow behind them with pings of gunfire heard on the police armored vehicles, though the marchers fled shortly after as the violence grew.[79] According to medical staff at the Vargas Hospital, the first to arrive at the hospital were opposition marchers.[80] According to surgeons, the marchers had been shot in the back with handgun fire while fleeing and others were severely injured from 7.62×51mm NATO military rounds from Fal rifles, standard equipment of the National Guard defending Chávez.[80] Later after police responded to pro-Chávez shooting, Chávez supporters then began being seen injured in the hospitals.[80] As a result of the confrontations, 19 were left dead,[46] most killed between 3:20 pm and 3:55 pm, and over 150 injured.[81]
"The killings at the anti-Chávez demonstration rocked the country", The New York Times reported on 20 April, "reviving memories of the violent events in 1989, known as the Caracazo, in which hundreds were killed by government forces. Venezuelans across the political spectrum swore that such violence would never take place again."[50]