Battle of Le Transloy
Battle during the First World War / From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
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The Battle of Le Transloy was the last big attack by the Fourth Army of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) in the 1916 Battle of the Somme in France, during the First World War. The battle was fought in conjunction with attacks by the French Tenth and Sixth armies on the southern flank and the Reserve/5th Army on the northern flank, against Army Group Rupprecht of Bavaria (Heeresgruppe Rupprecht) created on 28 August. General Ferdinand Foch, commander of groupe des armées du nord (GAN, Northern Army Group) and co-ordinator of the armies on the Somme, was unable to continue the sequential attacks of September because persistent rain, mist and fog grounded aircraft, turned the battlefield into a swamp and greatly increased the difficulty of transporting supplies to the front over the roads land devastated since 1 July.
Battle of Le Transloy | |||||||
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Part of The Battle of the Somme of the First World War | |||||||
Battle of the Somme 1 July – 18 November 1916 | |||||||
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Belligerents | |||||||
France | German Empire | ||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||
Douglas Haig Henry Rawlinson Ferdinand Foch Émile Fayolle Joseph Alfred Micheler |
Erich Ludendorff Kronprinz Rupprecht Fritz von Below Max von Gallwitz | ||||||
Strength | |||||||
Fourth Army: 14 divisions Reserve Army: Canadian Corps | |||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||
October: British: 57,722 (Fourth and Reserve Army total) French: 37,626 (Sixth Army and Tenth Army total) | October: 78,500 (1st Army and 2nd Army total) | ||||||
The German armies on the Somme managed a recovery after the string of defeats in September, with fresh divisions to replace exhausted troops and more aircraft, artillery and ammunition diverted from Verdun or stripped from other parts of the Western Front. Command of the German Air Service (Die Fliegertruppen) was centralised and the new Luftstreitkräfte (German Air Force) was able to challenge Anglo-French air superiority with the reinforcements and new, superior, fighter aircraft. The German flyers further reduced the ability of the Anglo-French airmen to support the armies with artillery-observation and contact patrols in the rare periods of clear weather.
The German armies lost much less ground and had fewer casualties in October than in September but the proportion of casualties increased from 78.9 to 82.3 per cent of the Anglo-French total. Rain, fog and mud were lesser problems for the Germans, who had to carry supplies forward over a much narrower beaten zone and were being forced back onto undamaged ground. German bombardments on the few roads between the original front line and the line in October increased the difficulties of the British and French armies; the size and ambition of Anglo-French attacks was reduced progressively to local operations.[lower-alpha 1]
Every soldier endured miserable conditions but the Germans knew that the onset of winter would end the battle, despite the many extra casualties caused by illness. The British and French outnumbered the Germans and could relieve divisions after shorter periods in the line. Severe criticism of General Sir Douglas Haig and General Henry Rawlinson during and since the war for persisting with attacks on October, was challenged in 2009 by William Philpott, who put the British share of the battle into the context of strategic subordination to French wishes, the concept of a general Allied offensive established by Joffre and the continuation of French attacks south of Le Transloy which had to be supported by British operations. In a 2017 publication, Jack Sheldon translated overlooked German material on the ordeal endured by the German armies.
Strategic developments
In September, Foch had managed to organise sequential attacks by the four Anglo-French armies on the Somme, which had captured more ground than any previous month and inflicted the worst monthly casualties on the Germans of the battle.[1][lower-alpha 2] During the Battle of Morval (25–28 September), the French Sixth Army (General Émile Fayolle) had crossed the Péronne–Bapaume road around Bouchavesnes, the Fourth Army (General Henry Rawlinson) had taken Morval, Lesbœufs and Gueudecourt in the centre and the Reserve Army (Lieutenant-General Hubert Gough), which became the Fifth Army on 30 October, had captured most of Thiepval Ridge on the left flank. On 29 September, General Sir Douglas Haig instructed the Fourth Army to plan operations to advance towards Bapaume, reaching Le Transloy on the right and Loupart Wood north of the Albert–Bapaume road on the left. The Reserve Army was to extend the attacks of the Fourth Army by making converging attacks on the Ancre valley after the Battle of Thiepval Ridge (26–28 September), by attacking northwards towards Loupart Wood, Irles and Miraumont on the south bank.[2]
On 28 August, the Chief of the General Staff General Erich von Falkenhayn simplified the German command structure on the Western Front by establishing two army groups. Armeegruppe Gallwitz–Somme was dissolved and General Max von Gallwitz reverted to the command of the 2nd Army.[3] Heeresgruppe Kronprinz Rupprecht controlled the 6th, 1st and 2nd armies, from the Belgian coast to the boundary of Gruppe Deutscher Kronprinz, south of the Somme. The emergency in Russia caused by the Brusilov Offensive, the entry of Rumania into the war and French counter-attacks at Verdun put further strain on the German army. Falkenhayn had been sacked from Oberste Heeresleitung (OHL) on 29 August and replaced by ield Marshal Paul von Hindenburg and General Erich Ludendorff.[4] This Third OHL ordered an end to attacks at Verdun and the despatch of troops to Rumania and the Somme front.[5] Colonel Fritz von Loßberg, Chief of Staff of the 2nd Army, was also able to establish Ablösungsdivisionen (relief divisions) 6.2–9.3 mi (10–15 km) behind the battlefield, ready to replace tired divisions.[6]
German counter-attacks became bigger and more frequent, making the Anglo-French advance slower and more costly.[6] After the Anglo-French attacks in mid-September, a comprehensive relief of the front-line divisions had been possible.[7] On 5 September, proposals for a shorter line to be built in France were ordered from the commanders of the western armies, who met Hindenburg and Ludendorff at Cambrai on 8 September; the new leadership announced that no reserves were available for offensive operations, except those planned for Rumania. Ludendorff condemned the policy of holding ground regardless of its tactical value and advocated holding front-line positions with the minimum of troops and to recapture lost positions by counter-attacks.[5] On 21 September, after the battle of Flers–Courcelette (15–22 September), Hindenburg ordered that the Somme front was to have priority in the west for troops. During September, the Germans had sent another thirteen fresh divisions to the British sector and scraped up troops wherever they could be found. The German artillery had fired 213 train-loads of field artillery shells and 217 train-loads of heavy artillery ammunition, yet the début of the tank, the defeat at Thiepval (26–28 September) and the 130,000 casualties suffered by the armies on the Somme in September, had been severe blows to German morale.[8]
Tactical developments
German artillery on the Somme slowly improved in its effect, when Gallwitz centralised counter-battery fire and used aircraft reinforcements for artillery observation, which increased the accuracy and efficiency of bombardments.[9] The 2nd Army had been starved of reinforcements in mid-August, to replace exhausted divisions in the 1st Army and plans for a counter-stroke had been abandoned for lack of troops. Reinforcements for the Somme front in September began to reduce the German inferiority in guns and aircraft. Field artillery reduced its barrage frontage from 400–200 yd (370–180 m) per battery and increased its accuracy by using one air artillery flight (Artillerieflieger-Abteilung) per division.[5] As the Germans had been pushed out of their original defences, Loßberg established new positions based on principles of depth, dispersal and camouflage, rather than continuous lines of trenches. Rigid defence of the front-line continued but with as few soldiers as possible, relying on the firepower of machine-guns firing from behind the front-line and from the flanks. The area behind the front-line was defended by support and reserve units, dispersed on reverse slopes, undulations and in any other cover that could be found, so that they could open machine-gun fire by surprise, from unseen positions and then counter-attack swiftly, before French and British infantry could consolidate captured ground.[10]
The largest German counter-attacks of the Somme battle took place from 20 to 23 September, from the Somme north to St Pierre Vaast Wood and were destroyed by French artillery fire.[11] Rather than pack troops into the front-line, local, corps and army reserves were held back, in lines about 2,000 yd (1.1 mi; 1.8 km) apart, able to make progressively stronger counter-attacks.[10] Trenches were still dug but were no longer intended to be fought from, being used for shelter during quiet periods, for the movement of reinforcements and supplies and as rallying points and decoys. Before an attack, the garrison tried to move forwards into shell-holes, to avoid Allied artillery-fire and to surprise attacking infantry with machine-gun fire.[10] Opposite the French, the Germans dug new defences on a reverse slope from the Tortille stream at Allaines to the west end of St Pierre Vaast Wood and from there to Morval. Riegel I Stellung, the fourth German position, was dug from Sailly Saillissel to Morval and Bapaume, along the Péronne–Bapaume road. French agents also reported new construction 22 mi (35 km) to the east. Ludendorff created fifteen "new" divisions by combing-out troops at depots and by removing regiments from existing divisions; the new 212th, 213th and 214th divisions replaced worn out divisions opposite the French Tenth and Sixth armies.[12]
Anglo-French plan
Fayolle planned attacks to capture Sailly-Saillisel, a twin village to the north-west of St Pierre Vaast wood, followed by outflanking attacks to the north and south, avoiding a frontal attack. Fayolle expected to be ready to attack Sailly-Saillisel by 7–8 October but if an attack towards Rocquigny could begin earlier, the Fourth Army was to attack to cover the French left flank. Sailly-Saillisel was along the Péronne–Bapaume road and Saillisel lay at right angles on the east side, along the Moislains–St Pierre Vaast road and overlooked a shallow valley to the north towards Le Transloy. The difficulties of movement in the rear, wet weather in October and the terrain channelled the attacks of the Sixth Army into a gap between St Pierre Vaast Wood and the Fourth Army boundary. At the end of September, the Sixth Army took over the Fourth Army front at Morval, which widened the attack front to about 2.5 mi (4 km). The French XXXII Corps, which held the front from Rancourt to Frégicourt, was to attack the Saillisels and I Corps to the left would attack eastwards from Morval, to capture Bukovina and Jata-Jezov trenches in the German fourth position in front of the Péronne–Bapaume road, then capture the north end of the Saillisels and reach Rocquigny.[13]
The British Fourth, Reserve and Third armies were to be ready by 12 October, the Fourth Army to attack towards Le Transloy, Beaulencourt, the ridge beyond the Thilloy–Warlencourt valley to Loupart Wood (about a mile east of Irles). Before the main attack, the Fourth Army was to advance north-eastwards, to capture a spur west of Le Transloy and Beaulencourt and north to the edge of the Thilloy–Warlencourt valley. Haig thought that if there was normal autumn weather, the objectives could be achieved but some restrictions on artillery ammunition consumption were imposed and more aircraft were requested from England. An attack on 1 October was to advance the left flank, capture Eaucourt and part of the Flers line (also known as the Le Sars line) up to Le Sars.[14] The Reserve Army was to advance towards Puisieux, as the right flank met the attacks from the south bank at Miraumont, enveloping German troops in the upper Ancre valley. The Third Army was to provide a flank guard north of the Reserve Army, by occupying a spur south of Gommecourt. Operations were to begin by 12 October, after the Fourth Army had attacked towards Le Transloy and Beaulencourt and the French Sixth Army had attacked Sailly-Saillisel. The French Tenth Army south of the Somme was to attack on 10 October, north of Chaulnes.[2]
Fourth Army
The attack was to be conducted by III Corps and the New Zealand Division of XV Corps on the right flank, which was to advance its left, pivoting from a point in the Gird trenches, 1,500 yd (1,400 m) east of Eaucourt. On 29 September, a day of rain and bright spells, the 6th Division and the Guards Division in XIV Corps on the right flank, took unopposed, some trenches east of Lesbœufs at 5:30 a.m. A company of the 8th Battalion York and Lancaster Regiment of the 23rd Division captured Destrémont Farm and gained contact with the 2nd Canadian Division (II Corps) on the right flank of the Reserve Army later on; a battalion of the 47th (1/2nd London) Division began to bomb its way up Flers Trench during the evening. On 30 September, the day was dull but dry; the battalion pushed the Germans back beyond Flers Switch Trench and a New Zealand battalion kept pace along Flers Support Trench.[15]
German preparations
The Germans had built new defensive lines during the battle and the first two were called the Riegel I Stellung/Allainesstellung (Switch Trench I Position/Allaines Line), a double line of trenches and barbed-wire several miles further back, as a new second line of defence along the ridge north of the Ancre valley, from Essarts to Bucquoy, west of Achiet le Petit, Loupart Wood, south of Grévillers, west of Bapaume to Le Transloy and Sailly-Saillisel. On the reverse slope of that ridge, the Riegel II Stellung/Arminstellung (Switch Trench II Position/Armin Line) ran from Ablainzevelle to west of Logeast Wood, west of Achiet le Grand, the western outskirts of Bapaume, to Rocquigny, Le Mesnil en Arrousaise to Vaux Wood. Riegel III Stellung branched from Riegel II Stellung at Achiet le Grand and ran clockwise around Bapaume, then south to Beugny, Ytres, Nurlu and Templeux la Fosse.[16] The first two German reserve lines had various British titles (Loupart/Bapaume/le Transloy/Bihucourt lines) and the third line was known as the Beugny–Ytres Switch.[17]
From 25 September to the beginning of October, Rupprecht relieved the 6th Bavarian Division, 50th Reserve Division and the 52nd Reserve Division with the 7th Reserve Division, 6th Bavarian Reserve Division and 18th Reserve Division opposite the Fourth Army, part of thirteen fresh divisions installed opposite the British.[18] From 30 September – 13 October, the six divisions from Le Transloy to the Ancre river were relieved by seven fresh divisions, two of which were then relieved by the 6th Division, 2nd Bavarian Division, 19th Reserve Division, 28th Reserve Division, 24th Division, 40th Division, 4th Ersatz Division, 5th Ersatz Division and Marinekorps-Flandern from the Belgian coast.[8] From 24 October – 10 November, the seven divisions from Le Transloy to the Ancre were relieved, as was one of the fresh divisions, by the 38th Division, 222nd Division, Bavarian Ersatz Division, 4th Guard Division, 58th Division, 1st Guards Reserve Division, 23rd Reserve Division and the 24th Reserve Division; in mid-November, the Marine Brigade reinforced the Guard Reserve Corps near Warlencourt.[19]