Psychological state of holding a proposition or premise to be true

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Belief</span>

Belief

<p>A <b>belief</b> is a subjective <a href="/en/Attitude_(psychology)" title="Attitude (psychology)" class="wl">attitude</a> that something or <a href="/en/Proposition" title="Proposition" class="wl">proposition</a> is <a href="/en/Truth" title="Truth" class="wl">true</a>.<span class="mw-ref reference" id="cite_ref-1"><a href="#cite_note-1" style="counter-reset: mw-Ref 1;"><span class="mw-reflink-text">[1]</span></a></span> In <a href="/en/Epistemology" title="Epistemology" class="wl">epistemology</a>, philosophers use the term "belief" to refer to attitudes about the world which can be either <a href="/en/Truth_value" title="Truth value" class="wl">true or false</a>.<span class="mw-ref reference" id="cite_ref-SEP_Belief_2-0"><a href="#cite_note-SEP_Belief-2" style="counter-reset: mw-Ref 2;"><span class="mw-reflink-text">[2]</span></a></span> To believe something is to take it to be true; for instance, to believe that snow is white is comparable to accepting the truth of the <a href="/en/Proposition" title="Proposition" class="wl">proposition</a> "snow is white". However, holding a belief does not require active <a href="/en/Introspection" title="Introspection" class="wl">introspection</a>. For example, few carefully consider whether or not the sun will rise tomorrow, simply assuming that it will. Moreover, beliefs need not be <i>occurrent</i> (e.g. a person actively thinking "snow is white"), but can instead be <i>dispositional</i> (e.g. a person who if asked about the color of snow would assert "snow is white").<span class="mw-ref reference" id="cite_ref-SEP_Belief_2-1"><a href="#cite_note-SEP_Belief-2" style="counter-reset: mw-Ref 2;"><span class="mw-reflink-text">[2]</span></a></span></p>

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.sidebar-content-with-subgroup{padding:0.1em 0.4em 0.2em}.mw-parser-output .sidebar-above,.mw-parser-output .sidebar-below{padding:0.3em 0.8em;font-weight:bold}.mw-parser-output .sidebar-collapse .sidebar-above,.mw-parser-output .sidebar-collapse .sidebar-below{border-top:1px solid #aaa;border-bottom:1px solid #aaa}.mw-parser-output .sidebar-navbar{text-align:right;font-size:115%;padding:0 0.4em 0.4em}.mw-parser-output .sidebar-list-title{padding:0 0.4em;text-align:left;font-weight:bold;line-height:1.6em;font-size:105%}.mw-parser-output .sidebar-list-title-c{padding:0 0.4em;text-align:center;margin:0 3.3em}@media(max-width:720px){body.mediawiki .mw-parser-output .sidebar{width:100%!important;clear:both;float:none!important;margin-left:0!important;margin-right:0!important}}</style><table class="sidebar sidebar-collapse nomobile nowraplinks"><tbody><tr><td class="sidebar-pretitle">Part of a series on</td></tr><tr><th class="sidebar-title-with-pretitle"><a href="/en/Epistemology" title="Epistemology" class="wl">Epistemology</a></th></tr><tr><td class="sidebar-above notheme" style="padding:0.15em 0.15em 0.25em; display:block; background-color: #efefef;">
<div class="hlist ">
<ul><li><a href="/en/Category:Epistemology" title="Category:Epistemology" class="wl">Category</a></li>
<li><a href="/en/Index_of_epistemology_articles" title="Index of epistemology articles" class="wl">Index</a></li>
<li><a href="/en/Outline_of_epistemology" title="Outline of epistemology" class="wl">Outline</a></li></ul>
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<p><b>Core concepts</b></p>
<ul><li><a href="/en/Belief" title="Belief" class="wl">Belief</a></li>
<li><a href="/en/Justification_(epistemology)" title="Justification (epistemology)" class="wl">Justification</a></li>
<li><a href="/en/Knowledge" title="Knowledge" class="wl">Knowledge</a></li>
<li><a href="/en/Truth" title="Truth" class="wl">Truth</a></li></ul></td>
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<p><b>Distinctions</b></p>
<ul><li><a href="/en/A_priori_and_a_posteriori" title="A priori and a posteriori" class="wl"><i>A priori</i> vs. <i>A posteriori</i></a></li>
<li><a href="/en/Analytic–synthetic_distinction" title="Analytic–synthetic distinction" class="wl">Analytic vs. synthetic</a></li></ul></td>
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<hr>
<p><b>Schools of thought</b></p>
<ul><li><a href="/en/Empiricism" title="Empiricism" class="wl">Empiricism</a></li>
<li><a href="/en/Naturalized_epistemology" title="Naturalized epistemology" class="wl">Naturalism</a></li>
<li><a href="/en/Pragmatism" title="Pragmatism" class="wl">Pragmatism</a></li>
<li><a href="/en/Rationalism" title="Rationalism" class="wl">Rationalism</a></li>
<li><a href="/en/Relativism" title="Relativism" class="wl">Relativism</a></li>
<li><a href="/en/Philosophical_skepticism" title="Philosophical skepticism" class="wl">Skepticism</a></li></ul></td>
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<p><b>Topics and views</b></p>
<ul><li><a href="/en/Certainty" title="Certainty" class="wl">Certainty</a></li>
<li><a href="/en/Coherentism" title="Coherentism" class="wl">Coherentism</a></li>
<li><a href="/en/Contextualism" title="Contextualism" class="wl">Contextualism</a></li>
<li><a href="/en/Dogmatism" title="Dogmatism" class="mw-redirect wl">Dogmatism</a></li>
<li><a href="/en/Experience" title="Experience" class="wl">Experience</a></li>
<li><a href="/en/Fallibilism" title="Fallibilism" class="wl">Fallibilism</a></li>
<li><a href="/en/Foundationalism" title="Foundationalism" class="wl">Foundationalism</a></li>
<li><a href="/en/Problem_of_induction" title="Problem of induction" class="wl">Induction</a></li>
<li><a href="/en/Infallibilism" title="Infallibilism" class="wl">Infallibilism</a></li>
<li><a href="/en/Infinitism" title="Infinitism" class="wl">Infinitism</a></li>
<li><a href="/en/Perspectivism" title="Perspectivism" class="wl">Perspectivism</a></li>
<li><a href="/en/Rationality" title="Rationality" class="wl">Rationality</a></li>
<li><a href="/en/Reason" title="Reason" class="wl">Reason</a></li>
<li><a href="/en/Solipsism" title="Solipsism" class="wl">Solipsism</a></li></ul></td>
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<p><b>Specialized domains of inquiry</b></p>
<ul><li><a href="/en/Applied_epistemology" title="Applied epistemology" class="wl">Applied epistemology</a></li>
<li><a href="/en/Evolutionary_epistemology" title="Evolutionary epistemology" class="wl">Evolutionary epistemology</a></li>
<li><a href="/en/Feminist_epistemology" title="Feminist epistemology" class="wl">Feminist epistemology</a></li>
<li><a href="/en/Formal_epistemology" title="Formal epistemology" class="wl">Formal epistemology</a></li>
<li><a href="/en/Metaepistemology" title="Metaepistemology" class="wl">Metaepistemology</a></li>
<li><a href="/en/Social_epistemology" title="Social epistemology" class="wl">Social epistemology</a></li></ul></td>
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<hr>
<p><b>Notable epistemologists</b></p>
<ul><li><a href="/en/Aristotle" title="Aristotle" class="wl">Aristotle</a></li>
<li><a href="/en/Sextus_Empiricus" title="Sextus Empiricus" class="wl">Sextus Empiricus</a></li>
<li><a href="/en/Edmund_Gettier" title="Edmund Gettier" class="wl">Edmund Gettier</a></li>
<li><a href="/en/René_Descartes" title="René Descartes" class="wl">René Descartes</a></li>
<li><a href="/en/David_Hume" title="David Hume" class="wl">David Hume</a></li>
<li><a href="/en/Immanuel_Kant" title="Immanuel Kant" class="wl">Immanuel Kant</a></li>
<li><a href="/en/Willard_Van_Orman_Quine" title="Willard Van Orman Quine" class="wl">W. V. O. Quine</a></li>
<li><i><a href="/en/List_of_epistemologists" title="List of epistemologists" class="wl">more...</a></i></li></ul></td>
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<hr>
<p><b>Related fields</b></p>
<ul><li><a href="/en/Epistemic_logic" title="Epistemic logic" class="mw-redirect wl">Epistemic logic</a></li>
<li><a href="/en/Philosophy_of_mind" title="Philosophy of mind" class="wl">Philosophy of mind</a></li>
<li><a href="/en/Philosophy_of_perception" title="Philosophy of perception" class="wl">Philosophy of perception</a></li>
<li><a href="/en/Philosophy_of_science" title="Philosophy of science" class="wl">Philosophy of science</a></li>
<li><a href="/en/Bayesian_probability" title="Bayesian probability" class="wl">Probability</a></li></ul></td>
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<p>There are various ways that contemporary <a href="/en/Philosopher" title="Philosopher" class="mw-redirect wl">philosophers</a> have tried to describe beliefs, including as representations of ways that the world could be (<a href="/en/Jerry_Fodor" title="Jerry Fodor" class="wl">Jerry Fodor</a>), as dispositions to act as if certain things are true (<a href="/en/Roderick_Chisholm" title="Roderick Chisholm" class="wl">Roderick Chisholm</a>), as interpretive schemes for making sense of someone's actions (<a href="/en/Daniel_Dennett" title="Daniel Dennett" class="wl">Daniel Dennett</a> and <a href="/en/Donald_Davidson_(philosopher)" title="Donald Davidson (philosopher)" class="wl">Donald Davidson</a>), or as mental states that fill a particular function (<a href="/en/Hilary_Putnam" title="Hilary Putnam" class="wl">Hilary Putnam</a>).<span class="mw-ref reference" id="cite_ref-SEP_Belief_2-2"><a href="#cite_note-SEP_Belief-2" style="counter-reset: mw-Ref 2;"><span class="mw-reflink-text">[2]</span></a></span> Some have also attempted to offer significant revisions to our notion of belief, including <a href="/en/Eliminativism" title="Eliminativism" class="mw-redirect wl">eliminativists</a> about belief who argue that there is no phenomenon in the natural world which corresponds to our <a href="/en/Folk_psychology" title="Folk psychology" class="wl">folk psychological</a> concept of belief (<a href="/en/Paul_Churchland" title="Paul Churchland" class="wl">Paul Churchland</a>) and <a href="/en/Formal_epistemology" title="Formal epistemology" class="wl">formal epistemologists</a> who aim to replace our bivalent notion of belief ("either we have a belief or we don't have a belief") with the more permissive, probabilistic notion of credence ("there is an entire spectrum of degrees of belief, not a simple dichotomy between belief and non-belief").<span class="mw-ref reference" id="cite_ref-SEP_Belief_2-3"><a href="#cite_note-SEP_Belief-2" style="counter-reset: mw-Ref 2;"><span class="mw-reflink-text">[2]</span></a></span><span class="mw-ref reference" id="cite_ref-SEP_Formal_Belief_3-0"><a href="#cite_note-SEP_Formal_Belief-3" style="counter-reset: mw-Ref 3;"><span class="mw-reflink-text">[3]</span></a></span></p>

<p>Beliefs are the subject of various important philosophical debates. Notable examples include: "What is the rational way to revise one's beliefs when presented with various sorts of evidence?", "Is the content of our beliefs entirely determined by our mental states, or do the relevant facts have any bearing on our beliefs (e.g. if I believe that I'm holding a glass of water, is the non-mental fact that water is H<sub>2</sub>O part of the content of that belief)?", "How fine-grained or coarse-grained are our beliefs?", and "Must it be possible for a belief to be expressible in language, or are there non-linguistic beliefs?".<span class="mw-ref reference" id="cite_ref-SEP_Belief_2-4"><a href="#cite_note-SEP_Belief-2" style="counter-reset: mw-Ref 2;"><span class="mw-reflink-text">[2]</span></a></span></p>



A belief is a subjective attitude that something or proposition is true. There are various ways that contemporary philosophers have tried to describe beliefs, including as representations of ways that the world could be , as dispositions to act as if certain things are true , as interpretive schemes for making sense of someone's actions , or as mental states that fill a particular function . Beliefs are the subject of various important philosophical debates. Notable examples include: "What is the rational way to revise one's beliefs when presented with various sorts of evidence?", "Is the content of our beliefs entirely determined by our mental states, or do the relevant facts have any bearing on our beliefs ?", "How fine-grained or coarse-grained are our beliefs?", and "Must it be possible for a belief to be expressible in language, or are there non-linguistic beliefs?". 