Rationalizability
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Rationalizability is a solution concept in game theory. The general idea is to provide the weakest constraints on players while still requiring that players are rational and this rationality is common knowledge among the players. It is more permissive than Nash equilibrium. Both require that players respond optimally to some belief about their opponents' actions, but Nash equilibrium requires that these beliefs be correct while rationalizability does not. Rationalizability was first defined, independently, by Bernheim (1984) and Pearce (1984).
Quick Facts Relationship, Superset of ...
Rationalizability | |
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A solution concept in game theory | |
Relationship | |
Superset of | Nash equilibrium |
Significance | |
Proposed by | D. Bernheim and D. Pearce |
Example | Matching pennies |
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