1. The Thag La operation (Leghorn) was conducted on the ground by 9 Punjab and NOT 2 Rajput, as stated in the article. 2 Rajput was deployed on the south bank of Namka Chu and for some strange reason, had been ordered to move up to the crossing points, in broad daylight, under the Chinese guns, after 9 Punjab had already commenced its attack towards the Thag la ridge, on the north of the river. The 9 Punjab force was led by Major M.S.Chaudhary, MVC. It consisted of 2 platoons. One was from Maj Chaudhary's own D Company and the other, under Subedar Chhail Singh, was borrowed from A Company which was deployed on the extreme left flank, around the Tsangle hut, north of the river.
2. For some unfathomable reason, Nehru has been blamed for the failure of the Thagla Operation, in this article and held responsible for Indian troops carrying 35 kgs battle load! This comes from ignorance in military matters. Government of India had ordered the occupation of the Thagla pass since it was the "watershed mark" in that sub sector of the border. As per the usual practice in border demarcations and as practiced elsewhere along the Mc Mahon Line, the highest crest line becomes the border, in any area. Captain Mahavir Prasad of 1 Sikh, had led the first Indian Army patrol in the Namka Chu area in May-June 1962. He had set up the Dhola Post south of the Namka Chu river, on the Tse Dong pasture. he had patrolled the entire border area and decided that no single specific location, including the Thag la pass area, was tactially tenable, by itself, in case of war. He chose the Dhola Post's location since it was below the snow line in June and had better accessability for supply and administration. Thag la was a further 9 miles north from Dhola Post, over a very difficult climb. And this would involve crossing rickety bridges over the Namka Chu. No infantry man prefers a river obstacle behind him, sitting on his line of communication. Its always preferable to have a river obstacle ahead of one's position which the potential enemy needs to cross under fire! However he had marked out Thagla pass as a possible CDL (Company Defended Locality). The Indian Army hierarchy didnt take a decision to occupy Thag la for two months after Captain Prasad returned from his patrol. It was only after the Chinese climbed over the Thag la feature, crossed Namka Chu and surrounded the Dhola Post (manned by an Assam Rifles platoon)on 8th September 1962, that the decision was taken to occupy Thag la. By that time the PLA was present there in strength.Tactical operations are planned and directed by the Army hierarchy and not by the PM of a country! Battle loads are determnined by tactical, operational considerations and NOT by the PM of a country! While puerile comments on "35 kgs" battleload slowing down operations, have been made here, the reality is that 9 Punjab troops were carrying less resources than would be required in battle!
3. In the actual battle for Thag la ridge, the battle plan was made by Brigadier John Dalvi (local commander of 7 infantry brigade) himself. He had chosen the Tseng Jong pasture, some way below the Thag la pass, as the goal. Major Chaudhary's force occupied it easily and defended it bravely against superior Chinese forces on the morning of 10th october 1962. Major Chaudhary had posted a section under Havildar Malkiat Singh on the flanks, on the Karpola II pass, which commanded the path to Tseng Jong from the west. Havildar Singh descended from the pass when he saw the Chinese approach Tseng Jong, in large numbers from the west. His section opened up with a LMG (Bren Gun) on the approaching PLA troops and mowed them down! The Chinese suffered heavy casualties through this unexpected ambush. After this, a full PLA battalion of 600-800 men attacked the 9 Punjab force of 50 odd men from both west and east. At this point Major Chaudhary requested heavy weapons support from Brigadier Dalvi over wireless. It is to be noted that Major Chaudhary, during his briefing for the operation, had been promised MMG (Medium Machine Gun) and Mortar support, by his two superiors - Brigadier Dalvi (7 Brigade) and Major General Niranjan Pershad (GOC 4 Mountain Division). However, when the time came to provide the promised support, Brigadier Dalvi REFUSED! He later misrepresented the situaion in his self exculpatory book on the battle (The Himalayan Blunder). He gave three reasons- a) There was low ammunition for the MMGs. b) 2 Rajput battalion's men were just moving up in the open for crossing the river and were thus exposed to Chinese counter fire from the opposite heights. c) If the chinese reacted to India's MMG and Mortar fire then there will be high casualties!
Now let us check the facts on the ground vis a vis this bizarre set of excuses given by Brigadier Dalvi: a) Jemadar Mohan Lal, commnanding the MMG platoon ex- 6 Mahar, by the river side, testified in the enquiry commission held later, that he had 12000 rounds of ammunition that day, which was enough to mow down the advancing PLA battalion! So the excuse about ammunition was a lie. b) 2 Rajput was supposed to advance behind Major Chaudahry's small 9 Punjab force and attack towards Thag la pass, once Tseng Jong had been secured. To be noted, this entire battle raged through the late morning hours. So why was 2 Rajput not in a position by that time, on the northern side of the river, ready to exploit 9 Punjab's initial success? Why were troops moving up willy nilly, late in the morning, in broad daylight, in the open and vulnerable to PLA fire from opposite heights? To be further noted, the 2 platoons from 9 Punjab had started deploying north of the river, on the heights, starting 8th October. By 9th october evening they were all in place. So why hadn't 2 Rajput been deployed across the river overnight, under darkness on the night of 9th - 10th October? How is this "Nehru's fault"? c) Jemadar Mohanlal testified after the war that he was ready and keen to open up with his MMGs when the PLA unit was deploying, to attack Major Chaudhary's men, across his line of sight, in the open. He said that when Brig Dalvi expressed concern about Chinese reaction and counter fire, he advised Dalvi and the seniors to move away fromn the river side and to remain under cover, when he opened up with MMGs. But Dalvi simply refused to give the order to provide the promised fire support to 9 Punjab. At that moment there were three senior officers present by the river side- Brigadier Dalvi, Maj General Pershad and Lt. Genral B.M. Kaul, the GOC IV Corps. Not one of them could bring themsleves to do the needful as per the standard operation drill, in an infantry attack!
Subsequently on the day of the actual battle of Namka Chu (20th October 1962), when the chinese having stealthily crossed the river overnight and having surrounded the 2 Rajput area, actually attacked, the expected happened. Except for 2 Rajput which was directly attacked and some sub units of 1/9 Gurkhas behind the Rajputs, on the heights, no other infantry stood and fought! 9 Punjab (less company) and 4 Grenadiers (less 2 companies) on the right flank of 7 Brigade's positions, simply withdrew when ordered (by 4 Div's Tac HQ) and didnt deploy tactically to hold the fall-back positions on the Hathung la heights. The Chinese came and swamped the entire right flank, at leisure, the next morning, having wrapped up the left flank on 20th. The same 9 Punjab which displayed such valour on the 10th simply melted away! Military logic would put the responsibility squarely on Brigadier Dalvi and to a lesser extent on Maj Gen Pershad. By letting down Major Chaudhary's force on the 10th and denying them heavy weapons support as promised, they had destroyed the command credibility of 7 Brigade and sapped the fighting morale of its men. They knew that their commanders would not support them when it came to the actual fight. To make matters worse Brig Dalvi had not tested the wire-less communication devices for effectiveness under prevailing conditions. So on the morning of the 20th, no signals devise worked! Dalvi had NO Command and Control of his brigade and abandoned them to their fate by mid morning. It was a pure military failure later on politicsed and rationalised.
My sources are impeccable and incontrovertible-
1. HBR (Henderson Brooks Report) available in the open net.
2. Indian Army's Official history of the war by Colonel Athvale and Dr. Sinha
3. 1 Sikh's Brigadier Injo Gakhal (R) who provided information on Capt Prasad's patrol.
4. Maj General Krish Khorana (R) who was then with 1 Sikh, was Captain Prasad's friend and junior and who fought in the victorious battle on the Bumla axis, on 23rd October.
5. Brigadier A.J.S(Tiger)Behl, who fought in the Namka Chu battle as the Gun Position Officer, of the 17 Para Field (artillery)Regiment, E Troop and held on to his position with 34 men, till 3.30 in the afternoon, long after Brigadier Dalvi had fled! Libertarian196 (talk) 10:27, 1 November 2023 (UTC)
- I appreciate the time you have taken in writing this; However, it would be more productive if you could propose specific changes in the format change X to Y as an edit request. Alternatively, once you are a WP:AUTOCONFIRMED editor, you will be able to directly contribute to the ongoing improvement of this article. Cinderella157 (talk) 02:43, 2 November 2023 (UTC)
- Thanks. I have given these inputs vis a vis the section on "Confrontation at Thagla Ridge (Sino India War). There a
- re other corrections/additions I wish to make, once I get used to how this thing works. The section of Forward Policy, for instance needs improvement. As do sections on political and higer command role in the build up to the debacle. Libertarian196 (talk) 10:37, 8 November 2023 (UTC)