Separatist movements of Pakistan

There are or have been a number of separatist movements in Pakistan based on ethnic and regional nationalism, that have agitated for independence, and sometimes fighting the Pakistani state at various times during its history.^[1] As in many other countries, tension arises from the perception of minority/less powerful ethnic groups that other ethnicities dominate the politics and economics of the country to the detriment of those with less power and money.^[2] The government of Pakistan has attempted to subdue these separatist movements.^[3]

Influence and success of separatist groups has varied from total, in the case of Bangladesh, which separated from Pakistan in 1971.^[4] The separatist movement in Balochistan is engaged in a low-intensity insurgency against the Government of Pakistan. As of 2023, it is the most active secessionist movement in the region.^[5][6][7]

Causes of separatist sentiments

Punjabistan

Punjabistan, sometimes termed Punjabi Sunni Supremacism or Punjabisation, is a term often used critically by the scholars and political analysts in Pakistani political and academic discourse, which asserts the concept of ethnic, political, and economic supremacy exercised by the province of Punjab in Pakistan and its predominantly Sunni Punjabi Muslims population over the other provinces and ethnic groups of Pakistan.^{[8][9][10][11]}

This concept contends that the structure of the Pakistani state, including the military, civil bureaucracy, and fiscal decision-making bodies, is disproportionately dominated by Punjabi elites, leading to the systematic concentration of national resources, development funding, and socio-political power in Punjabis contributing to marginalization among non-Punjabi communities such as the Baloch, Pashtuns, Sindhis, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK), and residents of Gilgit-Baltistan and Azad Kashmir.^[12][13][9] The concept also overlaps with sectarian and linguistic divides, as the Punjabi Sunni majority is viewed as enjoying structural advantages over Shia-majority regions such as Gilgit-Baltistan, as well as Seraiki, Pashtun, Baloch, and Sindhi populations.^[14] Perceptions of Punjabi centralism have been linked by scholars to the rise of ethno-national and separatist movements across Pakistan. The 1971 secession of East Pakistan as Bangladesh is often cited as an early manifestation of regional alienation. In subsequent decades, Baloch nationalist insurgencies, the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement, calls for an "Azad Sindh" or "Mohajiristan", and autonomy campaigns in Gilgit-Baltistan and Azad Kashmir have all drawn upon grievances of resource deprivation, underrepresentation, and perceived Punjabi hegemony.^[15]

Analysts argue that such imbalances have transformed Punjabiyat, the cultural identity of Punjabis, into "Punjabistan," a system where national unity under pakistaniyat conceals ethnic favoritism, suppressing authentic Punjabi ethnic expression while alienating minorities.^[9] Human rights organizations and independent analysts have frequently described this Punjab-centric centralization as a driver of unrest, separatism, and political instability.^[16]

Dominance of Punjabis

Institutional dominance of Punjabis

The historical roots of "Punjabistan" are frequently traced to the colonial era, specifically the British policy of recruiting "martial races" predominantly from the northern districts of Punjab, which created a sustained Punjabi majority in the armed forces following Pakistan's independence in 1947.^[17] This trend resulted in the Pakistan Army presently being overwhelmingly Punjabi-dominated in its officer corps, a structure critics claim has allowed the military, as the most powerful institution in the country, to align state policy and resource distribution in favor of its primary recruiting base of Punjabis. The officer ranks of Pakistan Military are overwhelmingly dominated by Punjabis who hold 70% top military posts^[18] (even though Punjabis comprise only 45% of Pakistan population), followed by 20% Pahstuns and 10% other ethnic groups.^[18][19]

Political dominance of Punjabis

Analysts highlight that despite representing approximately 44% of the national population, Punjab often controls a much higher percentage of seats in the National Assembly, translating to significant legislative and political control over the federation.^[13]

Economic dominance of Punjabis

Critics argue that the economic prosperity and larger share of Punjab province of Pakistan in the national Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is often achieved through fiscal policies and disproportionate central investment favoring Punjab, contributing to stark developmental gaps between Punjab and other provinces, i.e. Punjabis comprise nearly 45% of Pakistan population but corner nearly 59% GDP of Pakistan.^[19] Punjab receives the largest share of federal resources, for example, 51.74% under the National Finance Commission Award in 2009, while smaller provinces like Balochistan received only 9.09% despite their significant natural resources.^[20][21]

Ethnic and linguistic dominance of Punjabis

The proportion of people with Urdu as their mother tongue in each Pakistani district as of the 2017 Pakistan census.

Proponents of the term Punjabistan argue that this dominance extends to cultural hegemony, where Punjabi norms and the adoption of Urdu by the Punjabi elite marginalize the languages and traditions of other ethnic groups, including Pashto, Sindhi, and Balochi.^{[13][14][15][19]} Urdu is the sole national, and one of the two official languages of Pakistan (along with English),^[22] even though only 9.25% of the population reported it as their mother tongue, according to the 2023 Pakistani census.^[23] Regime of general Zia-ul-Haq (1977–1988), who came from a middle-class Punjabi family, fervently supported a rapid and complete Urduisation of Pakistani society earning him the honorary title of the Patron of Urdu.^[24] Government of Pakistan attempts the Urduisation of Pakistan,^[24] including purging Urdu of native Prakrit and Sanskrit words, new Urdu vocabulary draws primarily from Persian and Arabic.^[25][26][27]

Various ethno-linguistic groups of Pakistan have resented imposition of Urdu by Punjabi Establishment. Bengali Muslims of former East Pakistan launched the Bengali language movement, liberated the former East Pakistan and formed Bangladesh as a new nation with Bengali language as it's official language.^[28]

Similarly, the 1972 language violence in Sindh occurred due to imposition of Urdu at the expense of Sindhi language.^[29][30]

Consequences of Punjabi domination: ethnic grievances and separatism

The perception of a Punjabistan political reality has been a fundamental source of ethnic tensions and conflict since Pakistan’s inception. The most dramatic and violent outcome attributed to ethnic and economic marginalization was the secession of East Pakistan in 1971 and the creation of Bangladesh, a movement driven by Bengali Muslims' grievances over economic exploitation and political disenfranchisement by the West Pakistan's often Punjabi-led—central government.^[17]

In the western parts of the country, ethnic nationalist and separatist movements continue to cite Punjabi dominance as a core reason for their political struggle. This is evident in the ongoing Baloch insurgency, where militant groups frequently accuse the central government (viewed as Punjabi-controlled) of denying locals a fair share of the province's mineral resources.^[8]

Historically, the dominance of Punjab in Pakistani state structures has also been cited as a contributory factor in significant national crises, such as the secession of East Pakistan as Bangladesh in 1971, which Bengali nationalists argued resulted from prolonged political and resource marginalization by the Punjabi-led establishment.^[31] The historical origins of Punjabistan sentiments are illustrated by the exploitation of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh), where Punjabi-dominated West Pakistan controlled central governance, leading to economic disparities that precipitated the 1971 Liberation War. East Pakistan, with a population of 75 million Bengalis, faced lower per capita income, higher import costs, and significantly reduced defense and development spending compared to the West, with aid disproportionately directed toward Punjab, worsening poverty and vulnerability to natural disasters. Bengalis perceived this as colonial subjugation, with Punjabis acting as bureaucratic overlords imposing Urdu and military priorities over Bengali culture and autonomy demands, culminating in widespread resentment and the secession of Bangladesh.^[32] This event established a precedent for ethnic fractures, as the Punjabi-led military's actions, including Operation Searchlight, underscored the risks of centralized dominance, a pattern repeated in later insurgencies.^[33]

Contemporary manifestations of Punjabistan drive separatist movements across Pakistan's periphery, particularly in Balochistan, where insurgents protest the extraction of natural gas from Sui—contributing 38% of national output—while only 6% benefits local infrastructure, amid military presence and human rights abuses such as enforced disappearances attributed to Punjabi-led security forces.^[20][34] This centralization of power and resources in Punjab has been cited as a root cause for long-standing resentment and separatist movements in other regions. In Balochistan, for example, accusations against the Punjabi-dominated federal government regarding economic marginalization and the exploitation of natural resources have been driving forces behind Baloch nationalist insurgencies, some seeking outright independence from Pakistan.^[35][36] Armed movements like the Balochistan Liberation Army frequently frame their struggle as a reaction to decades of Punjabi predominance and coercive military interventions.^[37]

In Sindh, discontent has similarly grown, where the effects of what critics call Punjab-centric policies have been cited as factors behind Sindhi nationalist sentiments, including calls for an independent Sindhudesh.^[38] Anti-Punjabi sentiment in Sindh intensified following the 2007 assassination of Benazir Bhutto, viewed as targeting ethnic identity amid economic neglect and water disputes, strengthening calls for an independent Sindhudesh.^[39]

Pashtuns in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the former FATA resent underrepresentation in the Punjabi-dominated army, reviving aspirations for a Greater Afghanistan,—a movement which sees Pakistani Pashtuns asserting bonds with their Afghan kin, partly in response to the concentration of state power in Punjab,^[40] and interpreting post-9/11 operations as extensions of Punjabi control.^[41]

These grievances extend to religious minorities, including Shia Muslims in Gilgit-Baltistan—who seek full provincial status against the limited 2009 autonomy package seen as superficial Punjabi oversight—and Ahmadis, as well as non-Muslims, facing systemic exclusion in resource and power distribution.^[42] Movements like Muhajirstan in urban Sindh and demands for a Free Gilgit-Baltistan reflect this ethnic backlash, with violence including sectarian attacks and insurgent activities indicating a deepening crisis of national cohesion.^[43]

In Gilgit-Baltistan and Azad Kashmir, allegations of neglect and the lack of political autonomy have fueled anti-Punjab sentiments and movements that question the legitimacy of federal control.^[38] Resentment in Azad Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan appears in autonomy movements protesting constitutional ambiguity and resource exploitation, such as hydroelectric dams benefiting Punjab at local cost, with protests highlighting anti-Punjabistan feelings amid allegations of electoral manipulation and demographic changes favoring Punjabi settlers.^[42]

Think tanks caution that without equitable reforms, such as revising center-province power-sharing, Punjabistan risks destabilizing Pakistan through persistent separatism, echoing Baloch perceptions of the state as a "Punjabi instrument."^[34]

Opinion polls on separatist sentiment

The separatist movement in Balochistan is engaged in a low-intensity insurgency against the Government of Pakistan.^[5][6]

In 2009, the Pew Research Center conducted a Global Attitudes survey across Pakistan, in which it questioned respondents whether they viewed their primary identity as Pakistani or that of their ethnicity. The sample covered an area representing 90% of the adult population, and included all major ethnic groups.^[44] According to the findings, 96% of Punjabis identified themselves first as Pakistanis, as did 92% each of Pashtuns and Muhajirs; 55% of Sindhis chose a Pakistani identification, while 28% chose Sindhi and 16% selected "both equally"; whereas 58% of Baloch respondents chose Pakistani and 32% selected their ethnicity and 10% chose both equally.^[44] Collectively, 89% of the sample opted their primary identity as Pakistani.^[44] Similarly in 2010, Chatham House conducted an opinion poll in the Pakistani and Indian-administered regions of Kashmir asking respondents if they favoured independence or an accession to either countries; in Azad Kashmir controlled by Pakistan, 50% of respondents voted to join Pakistan, 44% voted for independence, and only 1% voted for accession to India.^[45] In the northern region of Gilgit-Baltistan, longstanding local sentiments oppose any merger of the area with Kashmir, and instead demand a constitutional integration with Pakistan.^{[46][47][48][49]}

Bangladesh

Further information: Bangladesh Liberation War

Pakistan was established in 1947, from the partition, as a state for Muslims.^[50] Its formation was based on the basis of Islamic nationalism.

As part of the Partition of India in 1947, Bengal was partitioned between the Dominion of India and the Dominion of Pakistan. The Pakistani part of Bengal was known as East Bengal until 1955 and thereafter as East-Pakistan following the implementation of the One Unit program. However, rampant corruption within the ranks of the Pakistani government and bureaucracy, economic inequality between the country's two wings caused mainly by a lack of representative government and the government's indifference to the efforts of fierce ethno-nationalistic politicians, like Sheik Mujibur Rahman from East Pakistan, who fought for Bangladeshi independence, resulted in civil war in Pakistan and subsequent separation of East Pakistan as the People's Republic of Bangladesh. Bilateral relations between the two wings grew strained over the lack of official recognition for the Bengali language, democracy, regional autonomy, disparity between the two wings, ethnic discrimination, and the central government's weak and inefficient relief efforts after the 1970 Bhola cyclone, which had affected millions in East Pakistan. These grievances led to several political agitations in East Bengal and ultimately a fight for full independence, which was made possible in 1971 with the assistance of the Indian military.

Pashtunistan

Further information: Pashtun question

The Pashtunistan movement traces its roots back to the Khudai Khidmatgar (Servants of God) movement in the North-West Frontier Province (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) which was led by Abdul Ghaffar Khan. Seven weeks before the partition of British India, a Loya Jirga was held which included Bacha Khan, Abdul Samad Khan Achakzai, the Khudai Khidmatgars, members of the Provincial Assembly, Mirzali Khan (popularly known as the Faqir of Ipi), and various other Pashtun tribal leaders. The Pashtunistan Resolution, was adopted on the 21 June 1947. The resolution demanded that Pashtuns be given the option to have an independent Pashtunistan consisting of all Pashtun territory in British India, rather than choosing to join the dominions of India or Pakistan.^[51] The British refused the demands which resulted in Pashtuns who were eligible to vote (Pashtuns in the Princly states were not eligible to vote) to boycott the referendum.^[52] As a result, the referendum was boycotted on the basis that it was undemocratic and did not offer the Pashtuns the option of independence or joining Afghanistan. After the partition, Bacha Khan and his associates faced frequent imprisonment, and the Khudai Khidmatgar movement was violently suppressed. Despite years of state repression, Bacha Khan remained committed to nonviolence, Pashtun identity, and the pursuit of rights within a democratic and federal political framework. In contrast, Faqir Ipi continued his armed resistance campaign against the Pakistani government until dying of natural causes in 1960.^[53][54][55]

During the 1950s and 1960s, calls for an independent — a homeland for Pashtuns — intensified, especially after the One Unit policy of West Pakistan merged smaller provinces, undermining Pashtun autonomy. This fueled nationalist sentiment, which was further supported by Afghanistan. Successive Afghan governments under King Zahir Shah and later President Mohammad Daoud Khan extended diplomatic and moral support to the Pashtunistan cause, including allowing exiled leaders and activists to operate from Afghan territory.^[56][57][58]

In recent years, the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (PTM) has emerged as a prominent grassroots civil rights movement advocating for the rights of Pashtuns in Pakistan. While PTM explicitly positions itself as a nonviolent and constitutional movement focused on justice, enforced disappearances, and military accountability, some analysts and critics have suggested that its rhetoric and activities may align with broader Pashtun nationalist sentiments. This perception is fueled by PTM's emphasis on Pashtun identity, historical grievances, and calls for greater autonomy. In October 2024, the PTM hosted the Pashtun National Jirga, which addressed issues of Pashtun political, cultural, and economic rights—an event interpreted by some as echoing elements of the historical Pashtunistan movement. In the same month, the Government of Pakistan officially banned the PTM, citing concerns over national unity and allegations of foreign backing. However, PTM leaders have repeatedly denied any separatist agenda, maintaining that their demands remain within the framework of Pakistan's constitution and democracy.^[59][60]

Balochistan

Further information: Insurgency in Balochistan

See also: Baloch nationalism

The Baloch Liberation Front (BLF) separatist group was founded by Jumma Khan Marri in 1964 in Damascus, and played an important role in the 1968-1980 insurgency in Pakistani Balochistan and Iranian Balochistan. Mir Hazar Ramkhani, the father of Jumma Khan Marri, took over the group in the 1980s. The Balochistan Liberation Army (also Baloch Liberation Army or Baluchistan Liberation army) (BLA) is a Baloch nationalist militant secessionist organization. However, Jumma Khan Marri ended his opposition and pledged allegiance to Pakistan on 17 February 2018.^[61] The stated goals of the organization include the establishment of an independent state of Balochistan separate from Pakistan and Iran. The name Baloch Liberation Army first became public in summer 2000, after the organization claimed credit for a series of bomb attacks in markets and railways lines. Following Dead of Akbar Bugti,^[62] The Insurgency Escalated ^[63] and Government response grew much harsh resulting in large numbers of Balochs being detained for being Nationalistic or suspicious of being a Rebel With Many Mutilated Bodies found with marks of Torture,^[64][65] BLA retaliated by target killing of Primarily Punjabis as well Pashtuns and Sindhis in Balochistan as well as blowing up of gas pipelines.^{[66][67][68][69][70]} Local Balochs have also been targeted by the separatist groups in the province.^[71] Brahamdagh Khan Bugti, alleged leader of Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), also asked separatists to conduct ethnic cleansing of Non-Baloch citizens from the province^[72] and Brahamdagh Khan Bugti's sister was murdered in 2012.^[73] In 2006, the BLA was declared to be a terrorist organization by the Pakistani and British governments.^[74]

However, the insurgency led by the Baloch separatists in the province has been struggling. Baloch separatists have been losing their leaders and they have been unable to fill their ranks. There is also currently ongoing infighting between the different insurgents groups.^[6][75] The last insurgent leader, Balach Marri, was able to keep the different insurgent groups united. However, after his death in Afghanistan,^[76][77] infighting broke out between various insurgent groups. The insurgents were unable to replace him.^[6][78] Moreover, attacks on pro-government leaders and politicians who are willing to take part in election has also contributed to the decline in separatist appeal.^[6]

The News International reported in 2012 that a Gallup survey conducted for DFID revealed that the majority of Baloch do not support independence from Pakistan. Only 37 percent of Baloch were in favour of independence. Amongst Balochistan's Pashtun population support for independence was even lower at 12 percent. However, a majority (67 percent) of Balochistan's population did favour greater provincial autonomy.^[79] Majority of Baloch also don't support separatist groups. They support political parties who use legislature to address their grievances. Experts also claim that most of the nationalists in the province had come to believe that they could fight for their political right within Pakistan.^[80]

As of 2018, the Pakistani state was using Islamist militants to crush Balochi separatists.^[81] Academics and journalists in the United States have allegedly been approached by Inter-Services Intelligence spies, who threatened them not to speak about the insurgency in Balochistan, as well as human rights abuses by the Pakistani Army, or else their families would be harmed.^[82]

By 2020, Baluch separatists had been "greatly weakened" by Pakistan counterinsurgency operations, including incentives for the militants to lay down their weapons, and by fatigue and rifts among the separatists. In addition, the safe haven for the separatists in Afghanistan was eliminated by the victory of the Taliban in 2021. However, in 2021, the number of terrorist attacks by separatists in Baluchistan "nearly doubled" compared to the previous year.^[83]

On 16 January 2025, in a speech before the Pakistan National Assembly, Maulana Fazlur Rehman of Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (F), expressed concern over the state's loss of authority in Balochistan. He stated that the government had "completely lost its writ" in these provinces.^[84] He additionally remarked that in some areas, "even Pakistan’s national anthem cannot be sung" and "the country’s flag cannot be hoisted in some schools today."^[85]

Sindhudesh

Main article: Sindhudesh

Sindhudesh (Sindhi: سنڌو ديش, literally "Sindhi Country") is an idea of a separate Homeland for Sindhis^[86][87] proposed by Sindhi nationalist parties for the creation of a Sindhi state, which would be independent from Pakistan.^[1][88] The movement is based in the Sindh region of Pakistan and was conceived by the Sindhi political leader G. M. Syed. A Sindhi literary movement emerged in 1967 under the leadership of Syed and Pir Ali Mohammed Rashdi, in opposition to the One Unit policy, the imposition of Urdu by the central government and to the presence of a large number of Muhajir (Indian Muslim refugees) settled in the province.^[89]

However, neither the separatist party nor the nationalist party have ever been able to take centre stage in Sindh. Local Sindhis strongly support Pakistan People Party (PPP). The unparalleled and unhindered success of the PPP in Sindh shows the preference of Sindhis for a constitutional political process over a separatist agenda to resolve their grievances. Similarly public opinion is also not heavily in favour of these parties either. In other words, neither the Sindhi separatists nor the nationalists have significant popular support — certainly not the kind that will make them capable of fuelling a full-scale insurgency. Almost all of the Sindhis have a strong Pakistani identity and prefer to remain part of Pakistan.^[90]

In 2012, a Sindhudesh rally was organised by a nationalist party in Karachi, which had a notably low turnout. The nationalist party had claimed that they would gather around million people for their million march. Although, only 3,000 to 4,000 people attended the rally.^[91]

In 2020, the Pakistani government banned multiple separatist outfits including the Jeay Sindh Qaumi Mahaz - Aresar group, Sindhudesh Liberation Army, and Sindhudesh Revolutionary Army^[92]

Azad Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan

As of 2015, an independence movement exists in Gilgit-Baltistan (called "Balawaristan" by its supporters).^[93] Balawaristan National Front (Hameed Group) (BNF-H) led by Abdul Hamid Khan were trying to seek independence of Gilgit-Baltistan from Pakistan. However, Abdul Hamid Khan unconditionally surrendered to Pakistan security officials on 8 February 2019 after being banned for having connections to Indian intelligence agencies. Following his surrender, 14 more members of BNF-H were arrested for their anti-Pakistani activities.^[94][95] Since then the fate of BNF-H is unknown. Another organisation by the name of Balawaristan National Front led by Nawaz Khan Naji seeks to declare Gilgit-Balistan an autonomous Region under Administration of Pakistan till Promised pelbicite.^[96]

In Pakistan administered Kashmir, no political parties with that do not agree with accession with Pakistan can contest elections.^[97]

Sardar Arif Shahid, was a Kashmiri nationalist leader who advocated the independence of Kashmir from both India and Pakistan's rule. He was killed on May 14, 2013, outside his house in Rawalpindi. It was the first time any pro-independence Kashmiri leader was targeted in this way in Pakistan. His supporters allege that he was killed by Pakistan security forces.^[98] Within the area, "Custodial torture and intimidation of independence supporters and other activists" has occurred.^[3]

In 2010, Chatham House, a London-based think tank, did a survey,^[99] sponsored by Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, in both Pakistani and Indian administered Kashmir. Based on a sample size of 3,774,^[99] it found that Kashmiris on both sides wanted independence. The survey states, 44% of Kashmiris in Pakistan administered Azad Kashmir wanted independence.^[100]

In October 2019, the People National Alliance organised a rally to free Kashmir from Pakistani rule. As a result of the police trying to stop the rally, 100 people were injured.^[101]

Jinnahpur and Muhajir Sooba

Main article: Jinnahpur

Jinnahpur referred to an alleged plot in Pakistan to form a breakaway autonomous state to serve as a homeland for the Karachi based Urdu-speaking Muhajir community.^{[citation needed]} Mohajirs are immigrants who came to Pakistan from India in the wake of the violence that followed the independence of India in 1947. The alleged name to be given to the proposed breakaway state was "Jinnahpur", named after Mohammed Ali Jinnah. In 1992, the Pakistani military claimed it had found maps of the proposed Jinnahpur state in the offices of the Mohajir Qaumi Movement (now renamed Muttahida Qaumi Movement), despite the party's strong denial of the authenticity of the maps. Despite the party's strong commitment to the Pakistani state, at that time government of Nawaz Sharif chose to use it as the basis for the military operation against the MQM, known as Operation Clean-up.^[4]

The Muhajir Sooba (literally meaning 'Immigrant Province') is a political movement which seeks to represent the Muhajir people of Sindh.^[102][103] This concept floated as a political bargaining tool by the leader of Muttahida Qaumi Movement, Altaf Hussain for the creation of a Muhajir province for the Muhajir-majority areas of Sindh, which would be independent from Sindh government.