English resistance to a standing army

English resistance to a standing army refers to the long-standing political and constitutional opposition in England to maintaining a permanent military force in peacetime. Before the mid-seventeenth century, national defence relied on local militia, noble levies, and mercenaries. The creation of the New Model Army by Oliver Cromwell during the English Civil War demonstrated the effectiveness—but also the dangers—of a professional army under centralized control.

After the Restoration in 1660, fear of military despotism shaped English political thought. The 1689 Bill of Rights confirmed that no standing army could be maintained without Parliament’s consent, establishing the principle of civilian oversight. Despite continuing unease through the eighteenth century, especially among advocates of the militia system, a permanent army became an accepted feature of the modern British state.

Civil War

Charles I's attempts to rule without Parliament often centered around attempts to maintain armed forces without Parliamentary approval particularly in the war against Spain and the Bishops' Wars in Scotland.

In the lead up to the English Civil War one of the grievances was Charles I's attempt to raise Coat and conduct money money without parliamentary approval.^[1]

Prior to the influence of Oliver Cromwell, England lacked a standing army, instead relying on militia organized by local officials, private forces mobilized by the nobility and hired mercenaries from Europe. This changed during the English Civil War, when Cromwell formed his New Model Army of 50,000 men. This professional body of soldiers^[2] proved more effective than untrained militia, and enabled him to exert control over the country.

Restoration

The army was disbanded by Parliament following the Restoration of the Monarchy in 1660 with the concept of a standing army having become widely unpopular^[3] and replaced by a militia.^[4]

There were three Militia Acts of 1661, 1662 and 1663.^[5] The Militia Act 1661 was a temporary act that said that the militias belonged to the King and neither house of Parliament^[5] and prohibited local authorities from assembling militia without the approval of the king, to prevent such a force being used to oppress local opponents. This weakened the incentive for local officials to draw up their own fighting forces, and King Charles II subsequently assembled four regiments of infantry and cavalry, calling them his guards, at a cost of £122,000 paid out of his regular budget. This became the foundation of the permanent British Army. By 1685 it had grown to 7,500 soldiers in marching regiments, and 1,400 men permanently stationed in garrisons.

Glorious Revolution

The Monmouth Rebellion in 1685 provided James II with a pretext to increase the size of the force^[6] to 20,000 men, and there were over 34,000 in 1688,^[7] when England played a role in the closing stage of the Franco-Dutch War. In 1689, William III expanded the army to 74,000, and then to 94,000 in 1694.

After the Glorious Revolution the authority of the standing army rested in Parliament, not the king.^[8]

Country Party

During the Standing Army Controversy, nervous at the power such a large force afforded the king whilst under his personal command, Parliament reduced the cadre to 7,000 in 1697. Scotland and Ireland had theoretically separate military establishments, but they were de facto merged with the English force.

Mid-eighteenth-century opposition writers such as James Ralph argued that a peacetime standing army was unconstitutional and pressed for reliance on a militia; in his History of England (1744–46) Ralph censured William III for regularising the army and disputed Robert Walpole’s 1733–34 troop justifications.^[9]

In his influential work The Wealth of Nations (1776), economist Adam Smith comments that standing armies are a sign of modernizing society, as modern warfare requires the increased skill and discipline of regularly trained standing armies.^[10]