Democracy movements of China

Democracy movements in the People's Republic of China are a series of organized political movements, inside and outside of the country, addressing a variety of grievances, including objections to socialist bureaucratism and objections to the continuation of the one-party rule of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) itself. The Democracy Wall movement of November 1978 to spring 1981 is typically regarded as the beginning of contemporary Chinese democracy movement. In addition to the Democracy Wall movement, the events of the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre are among the notable examples of Chinese democracy movements.

Democracy movements of China
Part of politics in China and protest and dissent in China
Date	November 1978 (1978-11) – present (46 years, 9 months and 3 days)
Location	China
Caused by	Various, including: Discontent with the one-party rule of the Chinese Communist Party in China Discontent with bureaucratism (Democracy Wall movement) Discontent with poor management of student welfare (university movements from 1986–1989) Discontent with foreign policy (university movements from 1986–1989)
Status	Ongoing

History

Further information: New Enlightenment (China), Beijing Spring, and Democracy Wall

Origin

The beginning of China's democracy movements is usually regarded as the Democracy Wall movement of November 1978 to spring 1981.^[1] The Democracy Wall movement framed the key issue as the elimination of bureaucratism and the bureaucratic class.^[1] Former Red Guards from both rebel and conservative factions were the core of the movement.^[1] Democracy Wall participants agreed that "democracy" was the means to resolve the conflict between the bureaucratic class and the people, the nature of the proposed democratic institutions was a major source of disagreement.^[1] A majority of participants in the movement favored viewed the movement as part of a struggle between correct and incorrect notions of Marxism.^[1] Many participants advocated classical Marxist views that drew on the Paris Commune for inspiration.^[1] The Democracy Wall movement also included non-Marxists and anti-Marxists, although these participants were a minority.^[1] Demands for "democracy" were frequent but without an agreed-upon meaning.^[2] Participants in the movement variously associated the concept of democracy with socialism, communism, liberal democracy, capitalism, and Christianity.^[2] They drew on a diverse range of intellectual resources "ranging from classical Marxist and socialist traditions to Enlightenment philosophers, [socialist] experiments in Yugoslavia, and Western liberal democracy."^[2]

Significant documents of the Democracy Wall Movement include The Fifth Modernization manifesto by Wei Jingsheng, who was sentenced to fifteen years in prison for authoring the document. In it, Wei argued that political liberalization and the empowerment of the laboring masses was essential for modernization, that the CCP was controlled by reactionaries and that the people must struggle to overthrow the reactionaries via a long and possibly bloody fight.^{[citation needed]}

Development

Throughout the 1980s, these ideas increased in popularity among college-educated Chinese, through the "New Enlightenment movement" led by intellectuals.^[3][4] Overseas pro-democracy organizations including the Chinese Alliance for Democracy were founded by Chinese activists. Student protests inspired by intellectuals broke out in 1986.^[5]

In the wake of growing corruption and economic dislocation, the Tiananmen Square protests erupted in 1989, which culminated in a military crackdown in June.

Government's response

Ideologically, the government's first reaction to the democracy movement was an effort to focus on the personal behavior of individual dissidents and argue that they were tools of foreign powers. In the mid-1990s, the government began using more effective arguments which were influenced by Chinese Neo-Conservatism and Western authors such as Edmund Burke. The main argument was that China's main priority was economic growth, and economic growth required political stability. The democracy movement was flawed because it promoted radicalism and revolution which put the gains that China had made into jeopardy. In contrast to Wei's argument that democracy was essential to economic growth, the government argued that economic growth must come before political liberalization, comparable to what happened in the Four Asian Tigers.^{[citation needed]}

With regard to political dissent engendered by the movement, the government has taken a three-pronged approach. First, dissidents who are widely known in the West such as Wei Jingsheng, Fang Lizhi, and Wang Dan are deported. Although Chinese criminal law does not contain any provisions for exiling citizens, these deportations are conducted by giving the dissident a severe jail sentence and then granting medical parole. Second, the less well-known leaders of a dissident movement are identified and given severe jail sentences. Generally, the government targets a relatively small number of organizers who are crucial in coordinating a movement and who are then charged with endangering state security or revealing official secrets. Thirdly, the government attempts to address the grievances of possible supporters of the movement. This is intended to isolate the leadership of the movement, and prevent disconnected protests from combining into a general organized protest that can threaten the CCP's hold on power.^{[citation needed]}

Chinese socialist democracy

CCP leaders assert there are already elements of democracy; they dubbed the term "Chinese socialist democracy" for what they describe as a participatory representative government.^[6]

Academic interpretations

Academic Lin Chun criticizes the phrase "democracy movement" as typically used in the scholarly and media discourse on China, noting that the term is often used exclusively to refer to the "demands and activism of an urban, educated group of people seeking liberal more than democratic values."^[7] She notes, for example, that the political turbulence in universities over the period 1986 to 1989 had specific flash points ranging from anger at the government's "too soft" position on China–Japan relations to poor management of student welfare.^[7]

The Impossibility Debate of China’s Democratization

As China continues to rise without democratizing, discourse has emerged suggesting that democratization of China may be impossible forever. Makoto Mogi [ja] explains the reasons why democratization of China is difficult by touching on geopolitics, An Ecological View of History, and Oriental despotism of Karl Wittfogel in his YouTube videos and books.^[8][9] Similarly, based on the interpretation of An Ecological View of History, Yang Haiying [ja] states, “Democratization does not arise from Chinese civilization.”^[10]

Sekihei [ja] explains in his book Why China Cannot Democratize Even if It Wants To: Understanding the Essence of “Imperial Politics” Reveals the Core of Modern China that Chinese people have a sentiment desiring a moderate emperor, which is why democratization cannot occur.

Tanaka Sakai [ja] cites the decline of the democratization movement was due to the chaos caused by democratization and market economy reforms in Russia, the spread of nationalism^[11] the promotion of consumer society culture, and tolerance of criticism limited to corruption without rejecting the system itself.^[12] He also quoted an Australian think tank’s analysis that “Democratic China is unpredictable,” warning that domestically internal conflicts and abroad patriotic politicians who stir nationalism would rise, posing danger.^[13][14]

Among commentators outside Japan, Hong Kong commentator Chip Tsao said, “China’s territory is large, like the United States, Canada, Russia, and Australia, and governing a large country is difficult. Moreover, Chinese people want to immigrate to the United States or Canada. China has an imperial culture, and for China’s democratization [ja], federalism is difficult, so the only option is to break China into small countries.”^[15]

Lee Teng-hui stated in a speech at the Diet members’ office building, “Both the current Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China are merely continuations of China’s 5,000 years of history, and China is still a regime that constantly repeats progress and regression. China’s 5,000-year history is a history connected from one dynasty to the next within a certain space and time; even a new dynasty is only an extension of the previous one.”^[16][17]

In his Hong Kong city-state theory [ja], Chin Wan cites some misconduct by certain mainland Chinese. ^{[18]: 43–46} Furthermore, he speculates that if China were to rapidly democratize, nine factors — "international humiliation, victim mentality, pressure on living space, anger over territorial loss, distrust of international morality, an industrially disciplined society, the spiritual narrowness of the middle class, patriotic impulses of large entrepreneurs, and the rapid increase in corporate productivity coupled with employment difficulties for the youth" — could easily become a breeding ground for totalitarianism similar to Nazism.^{[18]: 51–52}

Stephen Bannon said that China’s democratization is fake, stating, “Even after 4,000 years of history, nothing has changed. From the Opium War, the Taiping Rebellion, the Sino-Japanese War, the Boxer Rebellion, and the Chinese Civil War, to the Cultural Revolution, China has not changed. The idea that democracy will take root in China in a short time is just a joke. It’s nonsense.”^[19]

See also

• Protest and dissent in China
• 2011 Chinese pro-democracy protests
• Liberalism in China