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I Corps (South Vietnam)
Corps of the South Vietnamese Army From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
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I Corps (Vietnamese: Quân đoàn I) was a corps of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), the army of the nation state of South Vietnam that existed from 1955 to 1975. It was one of four corps of the ARVN. This was the northernmost region of South Vietnam, bordering North Vietnam at the Vietnamese Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). These five provinces are Quảng Trị Province, (Khe Sanh, Đông Hà, Quảng Trị City), Thừa Thiên-Huế Province, (Phu Bai, Huế City), Quảng Nam Province, (Đà Nẵng, Hội An), Quảng Tín Province, (Tam Kỳ, Chu Lai) and Quảng Ngãi Province, (Quảng Ngãi).
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1957-1963
I Corps headquarters became operational at Danang on 1 June 1957 and was responsible for the area from Danang north to the DMZ.[1]: 289 US advisors at I Corps headquarters consisted of about a dozen officers and enlisted men with a colonel of infantry as senior corps adviser, and two lieutenant colonels to advise the corps engineer, armor, ordnance, and Signal units.[1]: 300 Its assigned units were the 1st Field Division at Danang and the 2nd Field Division at Huế.[1]: 289 US advisors at I Corps headquarters consisted of about a dozen officers and enlisted men with a colonel of infantry as senior corps adviser, and two lieutenant colonels to advise the corps engineer, armor, ordnance, and Signal units.[1]: 291
I Corps' operational strategy focussed its efforts on the heavily populated coastal plain, moving gradually westward to secure the piedmont. The bulk of the mountainous, but sparsely populated interior remained in VC hands, punctuated only by occasional raids to keep them off balance. The staff planned to establish a chain of strategic hamlets running north to south to block VC penetrations to the coast. The only new feature was a series of major clear-and-hold operations moving progressively from the southern end of the corps north to the DMZ.[2]: 98
1964
Following the 1963 South Vietnamese coup d'état, coup leader General Dương Văn Minh reassigned II Corps commander General Nguyễn Khánh to command I Corps, allegedly to get him as far from Saigon as possible. On 30 January 1964 Khánh overthrew Minh in a bloodless coup. By 6 March Khánh had replaced three of the four Corps commanders.[2]: 65 Khanh appointed BG Tôn Thất Xứng, to lead I Corps.[2]: 99
On 24 February 1964 Khánh issued the 1964 National Campaign Plan under the name Chien Thang (Struggle for Victory). Khanh decided the provinces surrounding Saigon would receive top priority in the distribution of troops, civil servants, and money. The rest of III Corps and IV Corps were next in the resource queue, whereas the provinces of II and I Corps had the lowest priority. One reason why the north received the least resources was that, at least before late 1963, it had appeared to be in the best shape. Thus, Chien Thang forecast that I and II Corps would be the first to enter into the final phase, the destruction of the enemy's last major formations and bases in January 1965, whereas III and IV Corps would not reach that point until January 1966.[2]: 66–7
The Diem regime's relative success in pacifying significant parts of I and II Corps had led to decisions in 1963 and 1964 to transfer troops to more troubled areas further south. This meant that troops were leaving just as the VC were increasing their efforts. The number of VC-initiated actions per month in I Corps quadrupled between November 1963 and February 1964. By infiltrating small guerrilla, propaganda, and terror teams from the mountains into the coastal plain, the VC began seriously to erode government control in certain areas.[2]: 98
I Corps' southernmost provinces of Quang Tin and Quang Nam posed the most difficulties. The French had never truly controlled this area during the Indochina War, handing South Vietnam a difficult legacy. The majority of enemy forces in I Corps resided in these two provinces, with each hosting a VC regimental headquarters and several battalions. The 2nd Division had responsibility for these provinces. In December 1963, the division had begun a new round of patrolling and some intensive training for an even greater effort to come. The plan for Quang Tin and Quang Nam envisioned a multiphase, 12-month process. During the first phase, from February to May, the ARVN would secure a narrow strip along Highway 1. In subsequent phases, the Civil Guard, protected by the 2nd Division's dense patrol screen, would solidify control over first the eastern coast and then the piedmont. The final phase, the destruction of the VC's mountain bases, would begin in 1965. During the first two phases, regimental commanders would assign battalions and companies to discrete geographical areas for the conduct of extensive day and night platoon- and company-size patrols. After a battalion cleared its zone, a task the Vietnamese estimated would take about three weeks, it would transfer the burden of holding the region to the Civil Guard and move to clear a new area, so that eventually government control would spread to all populated areas.[2]: 101–2 The strategy saw initial success with Operation Dan Chien I reconquering the Phuoc Chau valley and returning 11,000 civilians to government control by late April.[2]: 102
By mid-1964 the US Corps senior advisor reported that "The pacification of I Corps Tactical Zone... is progressing inexorably towards the final victory over the Viet Cong."[2]: 108
In early July, as part of their summer offensive the VC and People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) units attacked Nam Dong, losing the battle but forcing the relocation of the base.[2]: 316–8 The 1st Division had its hands full trying to prevent pacified areas from regressing during the summer. Most operations inflicted few casualties, as the VC broke into small groups and avoided contact. The government worsened the situation by diverting all recruits meant for I and II Corps to III and IV Corps.[2]: 320 In mid-August, the 2nd Division's new commander, Colonel Nguyen Thanh Sang, abandoned his predecessor’s method of saturation patrolling. He terminated Operations Dan Chien 1 and 2 in favor of a more passive posture.[2]: 321 As a result, pacification regressed in the Corps over the summer. Significant declines in population control in the 2nd Division’s area, particularly in Quang Nam and Quang Tin Provinces, more than offset small gains in the 1st Division zone. By September, I Corps adviser Colonel Wohner admitted that the situation was "not encouraging."[2]: 322
In September the Joint General Staff (JGS) reassigned Quang Ngai province from II Corps to I Corps.[2]: 355
On a visit to I Corps in October COMUSMACV General William Westmoreland described the situation as "depressing" and "dismal." Another officer noted that Highway 1 "is interdicted daily and must be traveled with armed escort. Almost all piedmont areas and many parts of the coastal plains are under communist control, and government administration below the district level is practically non-existent."[2]: 355–7
In November in the aftermath of the September 1964 South Vietnamese coup attempt, Khánh appointed Brigadier general Nguyễn Chánh Thi as the new Corps commander.[2]: 455
By the end of the year US advisers acknowledge that pacification had "made little progress, if any." All of I Corps' provincial advisory teams considered the state of pacification as unsatisfactory. US officers attributed this state of affairs to the enemy’s growing strength, the result of increased recruiting and, particularly worrisome in their minds, increased North Vietnamese infiltration. One Marine officer stated "If this input is continued, we will shortly be in the third phase of counterinsurgency," that is, mobile conventional warfare.[2]: 363–4 Population control was assessed to have declined from 81% in January to 51% in December.[2]: 421
At the end of 1964 a US Army helicopter aviation company or US Marine Corps helicopter squadron was assigned in direct support of each Vietnamese infantry division. Further fixed-wing transport, reconnaissance, and observation aircraft were available as well. As a result, each senior Corps adviser had between 70 and 100 aircraft at his disposal, with MACV retaining control over the rest.[2]: 242
1965
Military Region 5 prioritized I Corps second to II Corps for its winter-spring offensive. It expected its forces in I Corps to continue to erode the government's presence and, if possible, to defeat a few government units. Most importantly, it directed its troops in southern I Corps to assist those in northern II Corps in cutting South Vietnam in two. As for the government, its plans for I Corps focused on furthering pacification, continuing its long-standing effort to secure the populated flatlands that lay between the South China Sea to the east and the north-south rail line to the west. The two visions were incompatible.[2]: 455
Thi embraced the government's pacification plan except in Quang Nam and Quang Tin, where he felt it was more important to pacify the piedmont immediately west of the railroad before moving east to the coast. He allocated 70% of his regular army forces to pacification and security work. In all provinces, he assigned primary importance to keeping Highway 1 open.[2]: 455–6
The VC didn't undertake any major attacks in January, but continuous low-level subversive activity and distractions caused by political turmoil in Saigon and Buddhist riots in several northern cities meant the Corps made little progress in pacification. Nor would it make any progress the following month, for as in II Corps, the VC launched a fresh wave of assaults in the early hours of 7 February attacking an outpost protecting Tam Ky losing 230 killed and seven captured while killing 37 ARVN. The attacks continued across the Corps until late March.[2]: 456–63
On 8 February, as US aircraft conducted Operation Flaming Dart, bombing attacks on North Vietnam in retaliation for the attack on Camp Holloway in II Corps, President Lyndon Johnson ordered the Marine Corps to deploy an antiaircraft unit to protect Da Nang Air Base. When Johnson opted in to replace Flaming Dart’s tit-for-tat retaliatory strikes with Operation Rolling Thunder in late February, a violent reaction from North Vietnam now deemed more likely. As a result, on 8 March the 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade went ashore to defend Da Nang Air Base.[2]: 500–2
During the first three months of 1965, the percentage of the Corps' more than 1.8 million people living under government control had risen from 24% to 26%. Similarly, the percentage of the population over which the government either controlled or exercised some manner of influence had risen from 51% to 56%. As in II Corps, the increases were due as much to people fleeing the VC as to successful pacification operations. By the end of March 1965, 112,000 refugees crowded into I Corps' towns and cities.[2]: 464–5
On 11 April the mission of the US Marines at Danang was changed from defensive operations around the air base to offensive operations within I Corps.[2]: 511–2
In April, Westmoreland convinced the JGS to order the commanders of I, II, and IV Corps to develop Hop Tac-style pacification programs for their areas. After receiving joint MACV-JGS briefings about the program, the commanders presented their plans on 3 May. I Corps was to create a Hop Tac program centered on Da Nang.[2]: 540
On 18 April the 2nd Division attacked the headquarters of the VC 1st Regiment in the Viet An area of Quang Tin province. The attack turned into a rout with the allies losing 26 dead, 28 missing, and eight crew-served and 25 individual weapons lost for 53 VC killed.[2]: 598–9
On 6 May units from the ARVN 2nd Division and 3rd Battalion, 9th Marines secured the Chu Lai area southeast of Danang. On 7 May, the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Brigade (3rd MEB), landed at Chu Lai to establish a jet-capable airfield and base area.[3]: 29–35
In mid-1965 the VC planned make the northern half of South Vietnam—and particularly the area of southern I Corps and northern II Corps—the focal point for their new offensive.[2]: 619 Military Region 5 planned a series of operations in I Corps designed to destroy ARVN battalions and to liberate additional populated areas. All provinces would see action, but the VC's focal point was northern Quang Ngai.[2]: 631 On 28 May the VC attacked Ba Gia inflicting a defeat on the ARVN in a three day battle.[2]: 631–3
During June, MR 5 followed up its battlefield victories of late May with myriad small actions that challenged the government’s control throughout I Corps.[2]: 634 The US Mission reported that I Corps had lost control of 215,000 people and 240 of the region's 1,599 hamlets.[2]: 644 By the end of June 1965, the USOM adviser in Quang Tin reported that only 13 of 426 hamlets now met the six-point criteria for pacification. I Corps' revised pacification plan, which was to have gone into effect on 1 May, remained moribund. Not surprisingly, Quang Ngai seemed to be suffering the most. The USOM representative wrote that the situation in Quang Ngai was "critical and deteriorating," and that the South Vietnamese were preparing “for the last ditch stand they feel is in the offing.” Unless reinforcements and supplies arrived, "the bitter end may not be far off."[2]: 635
In late June and early July, MR 5 tried to weaken allied airpower by bombarding six airfields in I Corps. At Da Nang, sappers used a bombardment to sneak by U.S. Marine guards and destroy four aircraft. Other insurgents continued to interdict lines of communications, ambush patrols, and further erode the government’s position in the countryside.[2]: 635 By mid-July, Highway 1 was impassible through most of I Corps, but efforts to reclaim the road were underway. In Quang Ngai the summer offensive had worsened an already critical situation, the South Vietnamese had lost control of 62 hamlets in Quang Ngai and 50% of the people and terrain it had governed two months earlier.[2]: 636
By late 1965 Major general Lewis W. Walt, the commander of the US III Marine Amphibious Force and the I Corps senior adviser, assessed the 1st Infantry Division under General Nguyễn Văn Chuân as "waging a skillful campaign... consistently destroying the VC in all significant encounters." South of Huế, his evaluation was less optimistic. The 2nd Infantry Division had done little, and the independent 51st Infantry Regiment had not budged from its static defensive positions. Westmoreland blamed the 2nd Division's temerity on its "less aggressive" commander, General Hoàng Xuân Lãm who had been either unwilling or unable to get the unit moving during the year.[4]: 113–4
In the Combined Campaign Plan for 1966, which the JGS and MACV issued in December, the allies declared their "basic objective" for the year to be clearing, securing, and developing the heavily populated regions around Saigon, in the Mekong Delta, and in selected portions of the I and II Corps coastal plain. "Coincident" with this effort, they would defend significant outlying government and population centers and conduct search and destroy operations against "major VC/PAVN forces." In pursuit of these objectives, South Vietnamese forces would concentrate on defending, clearing, and securing the designated strategic areas. American and third-country forces, besides securing their own bases and helping to protect rice-producing areas, were to "conduct operations outside of the secure areas against VC forces and bases." Implicit in these words was the defacto division of labor between the South Vietnamese and Americans that had been in effect since the summer.[5]: 152
1966
In early 1966 after the military junta announced plans to draft a new constitution, domestic critics of the military regime united under two prominent Buddhist leaders, the militant Thích Trí Quang, heading the High Council of the Buddhist Hierarchy in Central Vietnam, and the more moderate Thích Tâm Châu, presiding over the Buddhist Institute for Secular Affairs in Saigon. Both religious leaders railed against government corruption and inefficiency, declining economic conditions, and the regime's subservience to American influence. They demanded the immediate resignation of the Nguyễn Văn Thiệu-Nguyễn Cao Kỳ government, its replacement by an elected national assembly to draw up a constitution, and a rapid settlement of the war. The bonzes drew immediate support from Buddhists and students in the major South Vietnamese cities. Huế, a focal point for regional interests in the northern I Corps, quickly became the center of the protest for dissidents, who, by March, had formed a loose confederation known as the Struggle Movement.[4]: 128
Corps' commander Thi, a Buddhist and political rival of Kỳ, failed to take action against the protestors. Kỳ accused Thi of seeking to topple the regime and strengthen his own political base by supporting the Struggle Movement. On 11 March Kỳ replaced Thi with Chuân as Corps' commander.[4]: 129 The replacement of the popular Thi sparked the Buddhist Uprising and by the beginning of April Struggle Movement forces appeared to control most of Huế, Da Nang, and Hoi An and had the support of Corps' headquarters and the 1st Division. At the same time, ARVN combat operations began to peter out, and the danger that the crisis presented to the war effort became evident.[4]: 130 As Chuẩn supported the Struggle Movement, on 9 April Kỳ replaced him with Lieutenant general Tôn Thất Đính, a native of Huế and a favorite of the Buddhist leaders, in an attempt to shut down the opposition.[4]: 133 [6] Dinh proved either unwilling or unable to restore the normal tempo of combat operations. During a visit to the zone on 1 May Westmoreland found crowds of local combat troops in the streets of Huế and Da Nang and rejected Dinh's assertion that the political situation there was settling down.[4]: 134
On 15 May government forces, commanded by JGS chairman General Cao Văn Viên, seized Da Nang in the early morning hours. Two Marine Corps battalions, supported by tanks and covered by Republic of Vietnam Air Force planes, moved quickly into the city and secured the mayor's office, the radio station, the I Corps headquarters and other military installations, and the police stations. Two Airborne battalions provided reinforcements. Little fighting transpired, as most of the dissidents fell back inside several Buddhist pagodas, which the troops refrained from attacking. Kỳ and General Nguyễn Hữu Có later joined Viên, and during the next four days an uneasy truce prevailed inside the city. When Đính objected to the action, the junta replaced him with the political warfare director, General Huỳnh Văn Cao. Đính fled first to General Walt's headquarters and then north to Huế, where he joined Thi, 1st Division commander Phan Xuân Nhuận, several dissident province chiefs, and leading Buddhists in publicly denouncing the return of government troops. Nhuận placed units of the 1st Division on the approaches to Huế and at the nearby Phu Bai airfield, but made no move to reinforce Da Nang. 2nd Division commander, Lãm, remained loyal to the government, but some elements of his unit made their way to Da Nang to take part in the revolt. Lãm warned that any attack on the pagodas would cause more troop defections and even recommended reinstating Thi as Corps' commander.[4]: 136–7
On 16 May Walt met with Cao and was unimpressed. In talks with both Walt and Special Assistant to the COMUSMACV Colonel John F. Freund, Cao revealed that he had no interest in commanding the corps and that other Directory members had coerced him into taking the assignment. On 17 May Cao flew in a U.S. Marine Corps helicopter to Huế to confer with dissident Generals Thi and Nhuận. Accompanying him were Walt's chief of staff, Brigadier general Jonas M. Platt and the I Corps deputy senior adviser, Colonel Archelaus L. Hamblen, Jr. After Thi and Nhuận declined to see him, Cao returned to the helicopter and prepared to depart when about a hundred students and soldiers rushed the helicopter pad. Cao scrambled aboard, but as the aircraft began to rise, a South Vietnamese lieutenant began firing at it with a .45-caliber pistol. Returning the fire, the American helicopters door gunner killed the lieutenant and wounded several other South Vietnamese soldiers. Cao returned to Da Nang when he encountered more trouble in the person of Colonel Nguyễn Ngọc Loan, chief of the National Police. Loan insisted that Cao order an immediate attack on the pagodas in Da Nang and apparently threatened Cao with bodily harm if he refused. Sometime during an ensuing argument, Hamblen arrived unannounced to find Cao surrounded by Loan and several of his armed police. Terrified, Cao departed with Hamblen and subsequently begged Walt for asylum. He later explained that had he ordered attacks on the pagodas, the Buddhists might have taken reprisals against his Roman Catholic parents, who resided in Huế, and other Catholics. Although first Viên, then Có, flew to Da Nang to try to calm Cao, neither was able to coax him out of the US Marine Corps compound.[4]: 136–8
On the afternoon of 19 May Kỳ and Thiệu at last decided to act decisively. Because Cao continued to refuse to order an attack on the pagodas, they finally told Viên to do the job. Under the deputy airborne commander, Colonel Ngô Quang Trưởng, five battalions, numbering some 3,300 troops, forcibly occupied most of the pagodas and the remaining military installations within the city. In an effort to hold down casualties Trưởng surrounded the two main centers of resistance, located in the Tan Linh and Thinh Hoi pagodas, and offered amnesty to any who would surrender.[4]: 138 On 21 May the dissidents in the Tan Linh pagoda surrendered and two days later the remaining hold-outs capitulated. While Loan's police arrested the mayor of Da Nang, RVNAF planes dispersed a dissident battalion marching on the city from Hue. By the 24th Da Nang was under complete government control. According to rough US estimates, casualties for both sides included 150 South Vietnamese dead and 700 wounded.[4]: 141
General Trần Thanh Phong replaced Cao as temporary commander of I Corps and then the junta appointed loyalist Lãm at the end of May, becoming the sixth Corps' commander in three months.[4]: 138–9
On 27 May and 1 June Walt sponsored formal meetings at Chu Lai between members of the opposing military factions. The American mediators emphasized their support for the existing Saigon government and guaranteed the safety of the dissident generals should they accept offers of amnesty. Continued government control of Da Nang and the announcement of an agreement between the Directory and the Buddhist Institute reinforced the government's position. Cao finally agreed to return to Saigon, and although Thi and Đính elected to remain in the northern zone, they indicated their willingness to cooperate. When the chief of Thua Thien province (who was also mayor of Huế) also threw his lot in with the government, only Nhuận and his 1st Division remained to be persuaded. The Directory already had a plan to bring Nhuận and his division into line. Viên estimated that two of the division's three regiments would remain neutral, but he expected trouble from a few division headquarters elements and the third regiment commanded by a nephew of Thi. Viên intended to send the potentially difficult regiment north to Quang Tri province for combined operations with USMC units. Should Nhuận refuse to cooperate, the Directory would dismiss him. Government troops would blockade the remaining rebel forces at Huế and offer them amnesty. Force was to be used only as a last resort.[4]: 141
On 26 May Struggle Movement demonstrators (including soldiers) had burned the US Information Agency's library in Huế and then on 1 June, sacked the US consulate there. American observers blamed the acts on Thích Trí Quang. A few days later the Saigon government's understanding with the more moderate Buddhist Institute broke down, and Buddhist clergy once again were aligned against the regime. On 7 June, as turmoil in Huế continued, Buddhist priests placed altars as roadblocks on the main thoroughfares of Huế, Da Nang, Quang Tri, and Qui Nhon, and military and civilian traffic ground to a halt. When local troops refused to remove the altars, the Directory decided to use government forces.[4]: 142–3
Starting on 10 June, Kỳ began a steady buildup of special riot police under Loan on the outskirts of Huế and, on the 15th, sent a task force of two Airborne and two Marine battalions under Trưởng into the city for a final showdown. Intermittent fighting lasted in Huế for four days. Opposition was disorganized and consisted of about 1,000 1st Division troops, mostly soldiers from support units. Protected by Trưởng's forces, Loan's police removed the Buddhist altars and arrested most of the remaining leaders of the Struggle Movement, including Thích Trí Quang. The Directory gave Trưởng command of the 1st Division, and by the end of June both the division and Huế were under firm government control. On 23 June government troops and police swept through the Buddhist Institute in Saigon, eliminating the last stronghold of the Buddhist leaders. On 9 July 1966 a special military tribunal dismissed Cao, Đính, Thi and Nhuận from the ARVN.[4]: 143
The revolt in the I Corps was finally over. Aside from a comparatively slight reduction in military operations, the crisis had little effect on the battlefield. Although surprised by the turmoil, the VC failed to take advantage of it. The Thiệu-Kỳ regime successfully tested its power against the Buddhists and a popular Corps commander and, as a consequence, seemed to increase its political standing. While the government agreed to hold elections for a constituent assembly, it successfully resisted demands to have the projected assembly replace the Kỳ government. On the other hand, several good commanders, notably Thi and Chuân, were gone, and the chief virtue of Lãm, the new I Corps commander, was his loyalty to the current Saigon regime. The crisis also marked the last stand of the Buddhists as an intermediate political force, leaving the Vietnamese people little choice between the Saigon generals on one end of the political spectrum and the VC on the other.[4]: 143
In August Walt began the Combined Action Program (CAP), integrating small USMC rifle units with local Popular Forces platoons. By 1966 Walt viewed the practice a success, stiffening the morale of the poorly trained and equipped territorials, pushing them out of their fixed fortifications, and putting them to work in the field. Over the next several years he gradually extended the program to each of the five provinces in I Corps, guarding about 350 hamlets with 114 CAP units comprising 2,000 US marine and US Navy corpsman and 3,000 Popular Forces soldiers. Through a formal written agreement with the Corps' commanders, Walt had his Marine noncommissioned officers leading, not advising, the mixed contingents under supervisory CAP elements at the district and province headquarters.[4]: 181
In August, the South Korean 2nd Marine Brigade redeployed from Tuy Hoa in II Corps north to Chu Lai.[5]: 250
In November MACV and the JGS released their new combined campaign plan. It reflected the division of labor already in effect. The plan divided South Vietnam into three mission-oriented areas. Critical were those designated as "National Priority Areas" and "Areas of Priority for Military Offensive Operations." The remainder constituted a mix of sparsely inhabited regions of less military consequence or areas where weather, terrain, or troop strength limited allied effectiveness, such as those opposite the DMZ or along the Laotian border. The two priority categories comprised about half of South Vietnam and included about 77% of its population, 85% of its food production, and 75% of its roads. According to MACV, these areas also contained 77% of the enemy's conventional units and 43% of his bases Ostensibly, South Vietnamese forces would have primary responsibility for providing security in the National Priority Areas-heavily populated zones with reasonably good road and water networks. For this mission, all ARVN regular infantry battalions were to receive special revolutionary development, or pacification, training during 1966 and 1967, and at least half were to be assigned direct pacification support or security missions as soon as possible. Meanwhile, the more mobile American forces would take the fight to the enemy in the less accessible Areas of Priority for Military Offensive Operations. Only in IV Corps were both securing and offensive missions given to South Vietnamese commanders. While the South Vietnamese would pursue a strategy of pacification, US forces would follow one of attrition.[7]: 6–7
1967
In mid-February the ROK marines and ARVN forces fought the PAVN 21st Regiment, 2nd Division that had entered Quang Ngai from the north. In two separate battles northwest of Quang Ngai City, they reported killing over 1,000 PAVN.[7]: 207
On 6 April MACV implemented Task Force Oregon which involved the movement of an Army task force, consisting of the 3rd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division and the 196th Light Infantry Brigade, to Đức Phổ District and Chu Lai area to allow the 1st Marine Division to move north to Danang.[7]: 209
From 7 to 27 April the 2nd Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division conducted Operation Lejeune in Đức Phổ District to relieve the 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines at Landing Zone Montezuma until they could be replaced by Task Force Oregon forces.[7]: 210–3
On 20 April the headquarters of Task Force Oregon at Chu Lai assumed control of all US Army forces in southern I Corps.[7]: 214
From 11 May to 2 August the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division conducted Operations Malheur I and Malheur II against PAVN/VC bases in the foothills of Quảng Ngãi province.[7]: 236–9
By the end of July PAVN/VC activity had declined in the Corps as they regrouped for attacks around the September elections. Their plans called for assaults in each of the five northern provinces, together with a demonstration along the DMZ intended to attract large numbers of US forces to its defense. During the summer lull, the VC 1st and 2nd Regiments, both weakened, departed from Quang Ngai province. The former rejoined the 2nd Division up in Quang Tin, while the latter traveled south to rejoin the 3rd Division in Binh Dinh.[7]: 245
From 2 to 13 August the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, ROK 2nd Marine Brigade and ARVN Ranger and Airborne forces conducted Operation Hood River against Base Area 121, 20 km west of Quảng Ngãi.[7]: 246–8
From 13 to 29 August the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division conducted Operation Benton against Base Area 117 west of Chu Lai.[7]: 248–51
In an attempt to reduce civilian casualties and to deny peasant support of the PAVN/VC, allied troops relocated more than 30,000 people from rural Quang Ngai between June and September, swelling the refugee lists to over 168,000, or some 20% of the provincial population.[7]: 254
From 5 September to 31 October the ROK 2nd Marine Brigade conducted Operation Dragon Fire against the VC 48th Battalion on the Batangan Peninsula.[7]: 282–3
On 6 September a VC attack on Tam Ky was repulsed by gunships and ARVN forces resulting in over 200 VC killed for the loss of 21 ARVN.[7]: 259
From 11 September the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division launched Operation Wheeler against Base Area 116 west of Tam Ky.[7]: 270
On 25 September Task Force Oregon was redesignated the 23rd Infantry Division (Americal) and given responsibility for all of Quang Ngai and Quang Tin provinces and part of Quang Nam.[7]: 264
On 30 September the 3rd Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division replaced the 5th Marine Regiment operating in the Quế Sơn valley.[7]: 268 On 4 October the brigade launched Operation Wallowa in the Hiệp Đức District-Quế Sơn Valley.[7]: 275
In October US engineers opened Sa Huỳnh Base to provide logistical support for Americal operations in southern I Corps.[7]: 269
In October MACV and South Vietnamese commands finalized plans for the upcoming year. Although pacification activities occurred in every province in South Vietnam, the Combined Campaign Plan for 1968 (AB 143) continued the previous year's program of concentrating resources on 26 of South Vietnam's 44 provinces. Omitted were areas where the enemy's military forces were strongest—such as the northernmost and southernmost reaches of the country. The 1968 plan called for the greatest effort to be made in areas close to Saigon, with the rest of the country receiving progressively fewer resources the farther north or south one traveled from that location. The MACV and Vietnamese staffs further decided that for 1968 they would focus the pacification effort on two types of areas. First, they wished to solidify control over areas in which the South Vietnamese government already held some sway. Second, they wanted to target areas where a significant number of people could be added to the rolls of those living under government authority without expanding allied resources over a large physical area. Military plans reflected the pacification design. The 1968 Campaign Plan designated most of the pacification priority provinces as priority areas for offensive military operations. Other areas targeted for offensive action were the four northernmost provinces, where the enemy posed a significant threat due to the proximity of North Vietnam. Disrupting the enemy in these areas would both shield pacification efforts in the more populated areas and pave the way for geographical expansion in the future. Since the areas the allies planned to target in 1968 were similar to those of 1967, little movement of forces was needed to execute the AB 143 plan. In I Corps two US Marine divisions and one US Army division would continue to battle heavy PAVN forces that drew support from North Vietnam.[8]: 12–14
On 11 November, Operations Wheeler and Wallowa were combined to simplify command and control arrangements.[8]: 230 Operation Wheeler/Wallowa would continue until 11 November 1968.
From 18 December to 10 June 1968 the Americal Division conducted Operation Muscatine in Quảng Ngãi province.[8]: 240
By 1967 US advisers to the Corps reported that Trưởng had whipped the rebellious 1st Division into one of the ARVN's best units and that Lãm, and General Nguyễn Văn Toàn, commanding the 2nd Division, had proven to be competent leaders. The allied troop commitment in the northern zone was also considerable and included two USMC divisions, one South Korean Marine brigade, and three US Army brigades that would later form the 23rd Infantry Division.[4]: 247 By year's end, the HES reported that 56.6 percent of I Corps' population was relatively secure—well below the national average of 66.9 percent, but an 8.1 percent increase over the course of the year. The 317,000 people added to the rolls of those living in government-controlled areas represented the largest gain of any corps area in 1967.[8]: 248
1968
On 19 January the 1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division flew from Camp Radcliff in Binh Dinh province to Phu Bai Combat Base with orders to continue on to Quang Tri City as soon as possible to relieve the 3rd Marine for duty farther north. As Phu Bai could not accommodate the Brigade's over 100 helicopters, they established a base further west that became known as Landing Zone El Paso.[8]: 267–8
On 21 January the PAVN began the Battle of Khe Sanh in an attempt to draw US mobile forces and South Vietnamese reserves away from more populated areas.[8]: 269 The 37th Ranger Battalion was flown in to join the base garrison. Following a request from Westmoreland, Thieu agreed to cancel the Tết truce in northern I Corps and to reduce it to 36 hours elsewhere in the country.[8]: 271
Also on 21 January Westmoreland ordered the 1st Cavalry Division commander General John J. Tolson to move the 1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division from LZ El Paso to Quảng Trị City to relieve the 3rd Marine Regiment and move the 3rd Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division from the Quế Sơn Valley to Camp Evans, to relieve the 1st Marine Regiment. Tolson was also given operational control of the 2nd Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, which flew into Phu Bai Combat Base from III Corps.[8]: 272 Once repositioned the 1st Cavalry Division was to launch Operation Jeb Stuart against PAVN base areas 101 and 114 to the west of Quảng Trị City and Huế.[8]: 272
On 26 January Westmoreland ordered the formation of a new provisional corps headquarters, MACV Forward, under the command of his deputy, General Creighton Abrams at Phu Bai.[8]: 273
From 29 January the PAVN/VC began their Tet Offensive attacks in I Corps with a series of attacks around Da Nang.[8]: 313–21
On the early morning of 30 January the V25 Local Force Battalion and the Q12 Local Force Company assaulting the headquarters of the 51st Regiment at Hoi An. The attack was stopped and at dawn the VC were forced to retreat having lost approximately 300 killed.[8]: 308–9
On the morning of 31 January the 406th Sapper Battalion, the 506A Sapper Company and the C19 Local Force Company attacked the 2nd Division headquarters in the citadel of Quang Ngai City. The attack was repulsed by the afternoon with 128 VC and 31 ARVN killed. In the city itself the 409th Sapper Battalion, the 81st Local Force Battalion, and the C95 Sapper Company overran the hospital and the jail, releasing about 900 prisoners. The ARVN recaptured the city center on the morning of 1 February with the VC losing 161 killed. The 407th Sapper Battalion, the 20th Montagnard Battalion, the 107th Anti-Aircraft Battalion, and eight local force companies attacked the airfield and the headquarters of the 4th Infantry Regiment on the west of the city. The attack was repulsed at dawn with 209 VC and six ARVN killed. An attempt to destroy the Highway bridge over the Tra Khuc River was repulsed with 144 VC and nine ARVN killed.[8]: 310–11
At Tam Ky on the morning of 31 January the 72nd and 105th Local Force Battalions and three local force companies attacked from the east. While the 70th and the 74th Main Force Battalions and three local force companies entered the city from the north. At dawn ARVN troops recaptured the city with help from US helicopter gunships. A search of the battlefield on the morning of 1 February found 486 VC bodies.[8]: 312
On the morning of 31 January the PAVN 812th Regiment, 324th Division, 808th Main Force Battalion and 814th Main Force Battalion attacked Quang Tri. The attack was repulsed and the city was cleared by 1 February of PAVN/VC by the 1st Regiment, 1st Division, 2nd Troop, 7th Cavalry, 9th Airborne Battalion and the US 1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division.[8]: 381–7
On the morning of 31 January a division-sized PAVN/VC force attacked Huế seizing most of the city. Eleven South Vietnamese battalions from the 1st Division, Airborne and Marines, four US Marine battalions and four US Army battalions would take over a month to evict the PAVN/VC and secure the city. During their occupation the PAVN/VC conducted the Massacre at Huế.[8]: 387–431
The Tet attacks had brought widespread destruction to Revolutionary Development areas in Quang Tri and Thua Thien provinces, while Quang Tin province had escaped virtually untouched.[8]: 440
On 6/7 February the PAVN overran the Lang Vei Special Forces camp in an assault supported by PT-76 light tanks.[8]: 447–8
On 14 February the 3rd Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division began arriving by air at Chu Lai Air Base and were then moved north to Phu Bai Combat Base and attached to the 101st Airborne Division.
From 18 March to 17 May the 1st and 2nd Brigades, 101st Airborne Division and the 3rd Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division conducted Operation Carentan in Thừa Thiên province.[8]: 502–6
From 1-14 April the 1st Cavalry Division, 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines, 2nd Battalion, 3rd Marines, 1st Battalion, 9th Marines and the 37th Ranger Battalion conducted Operation Pegasus to relieve the siege of Khe Sanh.[8]: 502–19
1969
At the end of 1969 Major general Melvin Zais, commanding US XXIV Corps in I Corps, proposed breaking up the 1st Division (with four regiments and about nineteen combat battalions) into two divisions controlled by a "light corps" headquarters responsible for the defense of the DMZ area, but his immediate superior, Lieutenant general Herman Nickerson Jr. (USMC), commanding III MAF (and the I Corps senior adviser) and Lãm, both vetoed the idea, citing the lack of enough experienced Vietnamese officers to staff a new command.[4]: 382
1970
In August XXIV Corps commander Lieutenant general James W. Sutherland reported that the ARVN leaders from Corps and battalion were good to excellent but "still not ready to stand on their own," and were hampered by the " lack of competent small unit leaders." Other continuing problem areas were the inability of existing engineer units to maintain roads and bases, a shortage of aerial resupply support, poor equipment maintenance, and a sluggish resupply system that still made units reluctant to turn in inoperative equipment.[4]: 422
1971
In early February Operation Lam Sơn 719, an attack into Laos along Route 9 to sever the Ho Chi Minh Trail and destroy PAVN supply caches was launched. While the advance was initially successful, stiffening PAVN resistance, poor planning and execution and dysfunctional command and control resulted in a near-disaster. Abrams reported gloomily that the operation confirmed that Saigon "cannot sustain large scale major cross border operations... without external support."[4]: 473–5
In July rather than move one of the Mekong Delta based ARVN divisions north, as recommended by General Robert E. Cushman Jr., the IV Corps senior adviser, COMUSMACV General Creighton Abrams went along with JGS chief General Viên's decision to create the new 3rd Infantry Division from existing regular and territorial elements in I Corps.[4]: 476
The 20th Tank Regiment, the first tank regiment in the ARVN, was formed at Quảng Trị equipped with the M48 Patton.[9]
1972
On 30 March the PAVN launched the Easter Offensive sending two divisions across the DMZ and one heading east from Laos, quickly overrunning several 3rd Division bases in northwest Quang Tri province and forcing the ARVN to withdraw to the Cửa Việt/Thạch Hãn River. The PAVN then attacked out of the A Sầu Valley heading east towards Huế. The 3rd Division held onto Quang Tri city until 27 April when a new PAVN thrust, confusion and conflicting orders forced 3rd Division commander Giai on 29 April to order a withdrawal to a new line on the Mỹ Chánh River, 13km to the south.[4]: 481
Giai had been forced to conduct the defense with minimal support from Lãm or the Corps' headquarters. Lãm was recalled to Saigon on 2 May by Thiệu, who relieved him and his deputy Nguyễn Văn Hiếu of command. Lãm was succeeded as commander by Trưởng former commander of the 1st Division and IV Corps. Meanwhile Giai was made a scapegoat for the debacle, court-martialled and imprisoned.[4]: 483–4
Trưởng stabilised the situation in the Battle of the Mỹ Chánh Line and then in June launched Operation Lam Son 72 to recapture Quảng Trị province. By mid-September the ARVN had recaptured Quang Tri city, but the PAVN still held most of the province.[4]: 482
On 30 June XXIV Corps and I Corps Advisory Group became the First Regional Assistance Command.
1975 Spring Offensive
Military Region 1's forces disintegrated during the 1975 Spring Offensive (the Hue–Da Nang Campaign). The situation for the South Vietnamese in Military Region 1 had regained some stability after the defeat of a three-division PAVN push during late 1974. By early the following year, Military Region 1 fielded three infantry divisions (the 1st, 2nd and 3rd), the elite Airborne and Marine Divisions, four Ranger Groups and the 1st Armored Brigade (established in 1969 to parent all the armored cavalry regiments in the MR). Until mid-March, the PAVN had limited their offensive operations to attempts to cut Highway 1, the main north/south line of communication, between Huế and Da Nang and between Da Nang and Chu Lai. To confront the South Vietnamese, PAVN Brigadier General Lê Trọng Tấn had amassed a force of the crack 2nd, 304th, 324B, 325C and 711th Divisions and nine independent infantry regiments, three sapper regiments, three armored regiments, twelve anti-aircraft and eight artillery regiments.
At a meeting in Saigon on 13 March Thiệu was briefed on the military situation by Trưởng and another corps commander. Thiệu then laid out his plan for national consolidation. As Trưởng understood it, he was free to redeploy his forces to hold the Da Nang area. South Vietnam's second largest city was to be held due to possible future exploitation of offshore oil deposits.[10]: 68 Trưởng was shocked to discover, however, that the Airborne Division was to be removed to III Corps (unknown to Trưởng at the time, the Marine Division was also already earmarked for redeployment with both units then forming a new national reserve).
Trưởng was recalled to Saigon on 19 March to brief Thiệu on his withdrawal plan. The general had developed two contingency plans: The first was predicated on government control of Highway 1, which would be utilized for two simultaneous withdrawals from Huế and Chu Lai to Da Nang; The second course presupposed PAVN interdiction of the highway and called for a withdrawal into three enclaves: Huế, Da Nang, and Chu Lai. This was to be only an interim measure, however, since the forces that withdrew to Huế and Chu Lai would then be sea-lifted to Da Nang by the navy. The president then stunned the general by announcing that he had misinterpreted his previous orders:[10]: 68–9 The old imperial capital of Huế was not to be abandoned. Making matters worse, Trưởng discovered that his force was to be reduced by the removal of the Airborne Division.
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