Immigration judge (United States)

Formerly known as “special inquiry officers.” An immigration judge is an administrative judge, as defined in INA 101(2)(b)(4), who presides over immigration court proceedings in the United States. Immigration judges (IJs) are part of the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), an agency within the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ). Although they perform adjudicative functions, immigration judges are executive branch employees, not Article III judges. Their role is quasi-judicial, like other administrative judges, and they conduct formal hearings under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).

They primarily determine whether noncitizens may remain in the country or must be removed under immigration law. Immigration judges are responsible for applying U.S. immigration statutes and regulations in cases involving asylum, deportation, removal, detention, and other related matters.

Immigration courts operate under the authority of the Attorney General of the United States, who has ultimate oversight of EOIR and may review or certify immigration judge decisions.

Duties and responsibilities

Immigration judges adjudicate a broad range of immigration cases, including:

• Removal proceedings, in which the U.S. government seeks to deport a noncitizen.
• Asylum and withholding of removal claims filed by individuals fearing persecution in their home countries.
• Adjustment of status requests for certain noncitizens seeking to become lawful permanent residents.
• Bond and custody determinations, where judges decide whether noncitizens may be released from immigration detention pending proceedings.
• Motions to reopen or reconsider prior immigration court decisions.
• Administrative hearings on issues such as cancellation of removal, protection under the Convention against Torture (CAT), and voluntary departure.

Immigration judges conduct hearings that resemble bench trials but are typically less formal. They take testimony, admit evidence, and issue oral or written decisions that may be appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).

Appointment and authority

The Immigration and Nationality Act gives immigration judges jurisdiction and authority. As of 2025, there are between 550 and 600 immigration judges working in 73 immigration courts across the United States.

Unlike federal judges, immigration judges do not have life tenure; they are career civil servants within the federal executive branch. Their decisions are subject to review by the BIA and, in some cases, by the federal courts of appeals.

Court structure

The immigration court system is organized under EOIR and consists of:

• Immigration Courts: Located throughout the U.S., where judges conduct hearings in person or via video teleconference.
• Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA): The highest administrative body for interpreting and applying immigration laws.
• Office of the Chief Immigration Judge (OCIJ): Provides policy guidance, management, and oversight for all immigration judges and courts.

The Attorney General retains the authority to refer cases to themselves (a process known as certification), allowing the Attorney General to set nationwide precedents on immigration law interpretation.

Caseload and backlog

Immigration courts face a significant case backlog, with over 3 million pending cases as of 2025. The high volume of cases contributes to long delays in adjudication. Immigration judges often manage thousands of active cases.

Immigration judges face significant challenges, including:

• High caseloads and limited support staff, and reduced time for individual cases.
• Complex and shifting legal standards influenced by frequent policy changes.
• Public and political scrutiny, particularly surrounding high-profile immigration enforcement actions and asylum decisions.
• Limited judicial discretion due to statutory, structural, and regulatory constraints.

Several studies and reports have highlighted the need for structural reforms, improved resources, and stronger procedural safeguards in immigration courts.

Judicial independence and reform debates

Supporters of the current system argue that DOJ oversight ensures consistency, accountability, and coordination with federal immigration enforcement priorities, and streamlines immigration court processes.

Reformists argue that housing judges within a law enforcement agency creates conflicts. More specifically, they say the structure of immigration court is flawed. Reformists believe the solely executive-branch structure of both the immigration courts and DHS inherently allows for political influence on both the interpretation and application of immigration law, limits judicial independence of judges, and creates conflicts of interest and inconsistency in immigration law.

Other reformists believe that the maligned structure creates a gap in legal power and authority between DHS and DOJ. Many immigration experts believe providing immigration judges with contempt or sanction power would alleviate this gap.

Legislative proposals on contempt authority

Several members of the United States Senate have introduced legislation aimed at granting or clarifying contempt authority for immigration judges. These proposals generally seek to allow judges to sanction individuals who disrupt proceedings, refuse to comply with orders, or otherwise impede the functioning of the court. In recent years, Senator John Kennedy has introduced multiple bills that would expressly authorize immigration judges to issue fines for contempt and enforce compliance with court orders, while Senators Ted Cruz and Marsha Blackburn have cosponsored related measures. Earlier proposals from Senators Mazie Hirono and the late Edward M. Kennedy included provisions directing the Department of Justice to establish regulations governing the exercise of contempt authority within immigration courts. Although none of these bills have been enacted, they reflect ongoing bipartisan concern about courtroom management, docket efficiency, and the limited tools available to immigration judges to maintain orderly proceedings.

Legislative proposals for an Article I or Article III immigration court

Over several decades, members of Congress have introduced legislation to restructure the immigration courts as an independent judicial body under Article I or, less commonly, Article III of the U.S. Constitution. Most formal proposals have originated in the House of Representatives. Representative Bill McCollum sponsored a series of early bills in the 1980s and 1990s to establish an Article I immigration court, marking the first major congressional efforts to remove the courts from the Department of Justice. More recently, Representative Zoe Lofgren has introduced the Real Courts, Rule of Law Act, reintroduced across multiple Congresses, which would create a new U.S. Immigration Court as an Article I tribunal with its own trial and appellate divisions. Other Representatives, including Greg Stanton and numerous bipartisan cosponsors, have supported similar restructuring proposals.

Although several Senators have expressed support for an independent immigration court in hearings and policy statements, no recent Senate bill has been introduced that would itself create an Article I or Article III immigration court. These legislative efforts reflect ongoing concern about the structural independence, efficiency, and perceived impartiality of the immigration adjudication system.

Mass terminations and non-renewals

A significant wave of terminations and non-renewals has affected judges in the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) in recent years. Since January 2025, EOIR lost more than 162 judges (through firings or voluntary resignations) raising public concerns about the ability of the courts to keep up with case backlogs.

Implications for the immigration court system

• Backlog and delay escalation: With judge departures and vacancies, hearings are often reassigned and delayed.

• Case continuity and fairness: When judges are removed mid-case (or before ever hearing a case), litigants may face additional delays, reassignment to less-familiar judges, and uncertainty regarding previously scheduled proceedings.

National Association of Immigration Judges v. Neal

The National Association of Immigration Judges v. Neal is a lawsuit challenging a speech policy of EOIR that restricted immigration judges’ ability to speak or write publicly in their personal capacities about immigration law, immigration policy, or agency matters.

Background

In July 2020, NAIJ filed a lawsuit challenging EOIR’s speech policy. The policy at issue had evolved from an earlier 2017 rule requiring prior approval for public statements by immigration judges, to a 2020 revision that categorically prohibited immigration judges from speaking in their personal capacity about immigration law or EOIR programs, and required prior approval for other topics.

Procedural history

• The original complaint was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia on 1 July 2020 under the case name National Association of Immigration Judges v. Neal.
• In August 2020, the district court denied a preliminary-injunction motion.
• The case proceeded through appeals. In June 2025 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit issued a published opinion in National Association of Immigration Judges v. Owen (No. 23-2235), vacating and remanding the decision of the district court.

Fourth Circuit decision (June 3, 2025)

The Fourth Circuit held that while the mechanics of the federal Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA) normally direct federal employees to administrative boards (for example, the Merit Systems Protection Board) for employment-related claims, the court could not simply assume that framework was functioning properly. The court found that because the MSPB and U.S. Office of Special Counsel (OSC) had recent issues raising questions about independence and functionality, the jurisdiction-stripping effect of the CSRA could not automatically apply. Thus the court vacated and remanded for factual inquiry into whether meaningful judicial review remains available under the CSRA scheme.

In December 2025, the 4th Circuit decision was stayed by the Supreme Court of the United States pending further consideration by the Supreme Court. The case was retitled NAIJ v. Margolin due to a change in the Director of EOIR, not the case.

See also

• Executive Office for Immigration Review
• Board of Immigration Appeals
• Immigration and Nationality Act
• National Association of Immigration Judges
• Asylum in the United States
• United States Department of Justice

References

1. U.S. Department of Justice, Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR).
2. Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq.).
3. National Association of Immigration Judges (NAIJ).
4. U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), Immigration Courts: Actions Needed to Reduce Backlogs and Ensure Due Process, 2023.
5. American Bar Association, Reforming the Immigration Court System, 2020.

See also

• Executive Office for Immigration Review