Immigration judge (United States)

Immigration Judge

An immigration judge is an administrative judge who presides over immigration court proceedings in the United States, primarily determining whether noncitizens may remain in the country or must be removed under immigration law. defined in INA 101(b)(4). Immigration judges are responsible for applying U.S. immigration statutes and regulations in cases involving asylum, deportation, removal, detention, and other related matters.

Overview

Immigration judges (IJs) are part of the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), an agency within the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ). Although they perform adjudicative functions, immigration judges are executive branch employees, not Article III judges. Their role is quasi-judicial, like other administrative judges, and they conduct formal hearings under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).

Immigration courts operate under the authority of the Attorney General of the United States, who has ultimate oversight of EOIR and may review or certify immigration judge decisions.

Duties and responsibilities

Immigration judges adjudicate a broad range of immigration cases, including:

• Removal proceedings, in which the U.S. government seeks to deport a noncitizen.
• Asylum and withholding of removal claims filed by individuals fearing persecution in their home countries.
• Adjustment of status requests for certain noncitizens seeking to become lawful permanent residents.
• Bond and custody determinations, where judges decide whether noncitizens may be released from immigration detention pending proceedings.
• Motions to reopen or reconsider prior immigration court decisions.
• Administrative hearings on issues such as cancellation of removal, protection under the Convention against Torture (CAT), and voluntary departure.

Immigration judges conduct hearings that resemble bench trials but are typically less formal. They take testimony, admit evidence, and issue oral or written decisions that may be appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).

Appointment and authority

Immigration judges are a position created in the Immigration and Nationality Act and they have jurisdiction and authority as allowed under that Act. Immigration judges are appointed by the Attorney General and serve under the authority of the DOJ. As of 2025, there are between 550 and 600 immigration judges working in 73 immigration courts across the United States.

To qualify, candidates must be U.S. citizens, licensed attorneys in good standing, and have at least seven years of legal experience, often in immigration or administrative law. Many have prior experience as prosecutors, defense attorneys, or military, state, or administrative law judges.

Unlike federal judges, immigration judges do not have life tenure; they are career civil servants within the federal executive branch. Their decisions are subject to review by the BIA and, in some cases, by the federal courts of appeals.

Court structure

The immigration court system is organized under EOIR and consists of:

• Immigration Courts: Located throughout the U.S., where judges conduct hearings in person or via video teleconference.
• Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA): The highest administrative body for interpreting and applying immigration laws.
• Office of the Chief Immigration Judge (OCIJ): Provides policy guidance, management, and oversight for all immigration judges and courts.

The Attorney General retains the authority to refer cases to themselves (a process known as certification), allowing the Attorney General to set nationwide precedents on immigration law interpretation.

Caseload and backlog

Immigration courts face a significant case backlog, with over 3 million pending cases as of 2025. The high volume of cases, limited resources, and growing complexity of immigration law contribute to long delays in adjudication. Immigration judges often manage thousands of active cases, raising concerns about workload, burnout, and due process.

Immigration judges face significant challenges, including:

• High caseloads with often traumatic facts and limited support staff, require high levels of personal resilience and reduced time for individual cases.
• Complex and shifting legal standards influenced by frequent policy changes.
• Public and political scrutiny, particularly surrounding high-profile immigration enforcement actions and asylum decisions.
• Limited judicial discretion due to statutory, structural, and regulatory constraints.

Several studies and reports have highlighted the need for structural reforms, improved resources, and stronger procedural safeguards in immigration courts.

Judicial independence and reform debates

Supporters of the current system argue that DOJ oversight ensures consistency, accountability, and coordination with federal immigration enforcement priorities, and streamlines immigration court processes for law enforcement and foreign affairs purposes.

However, because immigration judges operate within the DOJ—an executive branch agency—concerns have been raised about judicial independence and political influence.

Reformists argue that housing judges within a law enforcement agency creates conflicts. More specifically, they say the structure of immigration court is flawed because both the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which is responsible for immigration enforcement, and DOJ, responsible for immigration adjudication, answer to the President of the United States.

Reformists believe this solely executive-branch structure inherently allows for political influence on both the interpretation and application of immigration law, limits judicial independence of judges, and creates conflicts of interest and inconsistency in immigration law.

Others believe that the maligned structure creates a gap in legal power and authority between DHS and DOJ. Many immigration experts believe providing immigration judges with contempt or sanction power would alleviate this gap. However, the constitutionality of creating that power while immigration courts are housed in DOJ has proven to be a barrier to true reform and efficiency in immigration courts.

Legislative proposals on contempt authority

Several members of the United States Senate have introduced legislation aimed at granting or clarifying contempt authority for immigration judges. These proposals generally seek to allow judges to sanction individuals who disrupt proceedings, refuse to comply with orders, or otherwise impede the functioning of the court. In recent years, Senator John Kennedy has introduced multiple bills that would expressly authorize immigration judges to issue fines for contempt and enforce compliance with court orders, while Senators Ted Cruz and Marsha Blackburn have cosponsored related measures. Earlier proposals from Senators Mazie Hirono and the late Edward M. Kennedy included provisions directing the Department of Justice to establish regulations governing the exercise of contempt authority within immigration courts. Although none of these bills have been enacted, they reflect ongoing bipartisan concern about courtroom management, docket efficiency, and the limited tools available to immigration judges to maintain orderly proceedings.

Legislative proposals for an Article I or Article III immigration court

Over several decades, members of Congress have introduced legislation to restructure the immigration courts as an independent judicial body under Article I or, less commonly, Article III of the U.S. Constitution. Most formal proposals have originated in the House of Representatives. Representative Bill McCollum sponsored a series of early bills in the 1980s and 1990s to establish an Article I immigration court, marking the first major congressional efforts to remove the courts from the Department of Justice. More recently, Representative Zoe Lofgren has introduced the Real Courts, Rule of Law Act, reintroduced across multiple Congresses, which would create a new U.S. Immigration Court as an Article I tribunal with its own trial and appellate divisions. Other Representatives, including Greg Stanton and numerous bipartisan cosponsors, have supported similar restructuring proposals.

Although several Senators have expressed support for an independent immigration court in hearings and policy statements, no recent Senate bill has been introduced that would itself create an Article I or Article III immigration court. These legislative efforts reflect ongoing concern about the structural independence, efficiency, and perceived impartiality of the immigration adjudication system.

Professional associations

The National Association of Immigration Judges (NAIJ) is the professional organization representing immigration judges. It advocates for improved court conditions, judicial independence, and fair treatment of both judges and litigants. Established in 1971, NAIJ functions as a professional labor association and is affiliated with the International Federation of Professional Engineers (IFPTE), a labor union. On April 15, 2022, the NAIJ was decertified as a union and stripped of any collective bargaining agreement. However, NAIJ still functions as a labor association and maintains broader union leadership through IFPTE.

Professional organizations such as NAIJ and various legal advocacy groups have called for the creation of an independent Article I immigration court, similar to the U.S. Tax Court, to ensure neutrality and protect judicial decision-making from political pressure and ensure judges have necessary constitutional authority.

Criticism and challenges

Mass terminations and non-renewals

A significant wave of terminations and non-renewals has affected judges in the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) in recent years. For example, on 14 February 2025, EOIR terminated around 20 immigration judges via email—including 13 who had not yet been sworn in and seven who served as assistant chief immigration judges (ACIJs).

In one reported case, judges at courts in the San Francisco and Concord areas were fired in July and September 2025.

Since January 2025, EOIR lost more than 141 judges (through firings or voluntary resignations) from a corps originally at about 700, raising concerns about the ability of the courts to keep up with case backlogs. At least 70 of those judges were fired or not converted from probationary periods.

Key concerns and patterns

• Lack of transparency: Many judges report receiving termination or non-conversion notices without explanation or any cited misconduct. For instance, one judge received a three-sentence email notifying them of removal effective immediately.
• Probationary period terminations: Several terminations involve judges still within their two-year probationary period, but there are also examples of judges past their probation being let go.
• Background/experience filter effect: Some analyses suggest that judges with prior experience defending immigrants or working in non-law-enforcement roles are disproportionately likely to be terminated or non-converted, while those with DHS or immigration-enforcement backgrounds appear more likely to be retained.
• Operational impact: The firings coincide with a record backlog of immigration cases (near or above 3.5 million) and raise concerns that court capacity will be eroded just as demand rises.

Structural and procedural changes

• The regulations governing the size of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) were amended in 2025 via an interim final rule to reduce the board from 28 members to 15.

Implications for the immigration court system

• Backlog and delay escalation: With judge departures and vacancies, hearings are often reassigned and delayed. Some cases now have hearing dates as late as 2030 in certain jurisdictions. Certain immigration courts have up to 46,000 cases pending per judge.
• Judicial independence concerns: The pattern of terminations without clear justification, combined with shifts in hiring criteria and oversight memos, raises questions about neutrality, fairness, and the independence of immigration judges as adjudicators.
• Case continuity and fairness: When judges are removed mid-case (or before ever hearing a case), litigants may face additional delays, reassignment to less-familiar judges, and uncertainty regarding previously scheduled proceedings.
• As reported, more than 17 judges were fired across 10 states in mid-2025, including several outside of probationary periods.
• Analyses show that EOIR is hiring large classes of temporary judges with backgrounds in military law or enforcement, and reducing or non-converting judges whose experience lies more in defense of immigrants.

Changes to the immigration courts (2021–present)

Since January 2021, the operations, procedures, and structure of the U.S. immigration court system (administered by the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) within the United States Department of Justice) have undergone a number of significant policy changes. Some of the major developments are described below.

• In April 2021, EOIR announced a “Dedicated Docket” for expedited adjudication of certain families placed in removal proceedings; under this docket immigration judges must aim to issue decisions within 300 days of the master calendar hearing, prioritizing these cases over other pre-scheduled hearings and backlogging the immigration system.
• EOIR restored and expanded the use of “off-docketing” (administratively de-calendaring) of cases in certain circumstances—for example, when respondents have pending or approved applications with the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)—enabling court resources to focus on higher-priority cases. However, EOIR subsequently ended this practice abruptly in 2025, causing rescheduling of hundreds of cases and further backlogging the immigration system and limiting access to administrative processing of immigration benefits by USCIS.
• Court data show that by the end of FY 2025, the backlog of pending cases is still approximately 3.4 million. Shifts in enforcement policy favoring detention and subsequent decisions from the BIA limiting access to bond and other forms of relief under INA Section 235(b)(2) have reduced the backlog. Many legal issues arising from the BIA decisions are pending adjudication in federal district courts.

Procedural and adjudication-policy shifts

• EOIR reinstated policy memos (in February 2025) directing immigration judges to adjudicate asylum applications within 180 days “to the maximum extent practicable,” and to limit continuances unless exceptional circumstances exist.
• EOIR proposed in November 2023 to expand immigration judges’ authority to administratively close, terminate, or dismiss cases in removal proceedings.
• The Policy Manual and the court-practice manuals have seen centralization of oversight by EOIR.
• Reallocation of cases from centralized management programs has contributed to disorganizing dockets.
• ICE officials have also transferred immigrants between detention facilities, delaying hearings and making access to counsel more difficult.

Technological and structural reforms

• EOIR has increased use of video teleconference (VTC) and internet-based technologies to allow immigration judges to adjudicate cases remotely and to better utilize courtroom capacity, especially since the COVID-19 pandemic.
• Efforts to modernize case-management systems: the electronic filing system (ECAS) has been launched nationwide; paper-to-electronic scanning and conversion remains in process.
• EOIR policy “No Dark Courtrooms” (Policy 19-11) formalized the goal of reducing under-utilized courtrooms by assigning cases more efficiently.

Asylum-eligibility and restriction changes

• Restrictive asylum-processing policies have been reinstated or expanded, including rejecting incomplete applications even if referred by DHS, directing immigration judges to adjudicate within 180 days, and stopping the asylum “clock” in certain situations.
• Filings and docketing for asylum cases now face stricter evidentiary and procedural requirements (for example, full responses, articulated social groups, and signed forms) under newly issued memos.

Organizational and personnel-related changes

• The backlog, expedited dockets, and productivity expectations have translated into numerical benchmarks for judges (for example, annual case completions and remand-rate thresholds) and increased performance pressure.
• The size and composition of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) has been subject to policy change and internal restructuring; for instance, widespread removal of members and shifts in appellate review practices signal organizational change.

Implications and commentary

These changes reflect a broader emphasis on:

• speeding adjudications and reducing backlog;
• greater use of administrative tools (off-docketing, termination, dismissal) to manage case inventories;
• increased technology and remote-hearing capacity;
• more restrictive asylum processing; and
• tighter oversight of court practices and adjudicator productivity.

Some experts argue that some reforms raise questions about due-process protections, given the tighter timelines, heightened production expectations for immigration judges, increased external public pressure and internal political pressure, and potentially reduced flexibility for continuances, bond, or access to representation.

National Association of Immigration Judges v. Executive Office for Immigration Review

National Association of Immigration Judges (NAIJ) v. Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR)—often referred to as the “Knight litigation”—is a lawsuit challenging a speech policy of EOIR that restricted immigration judges’ ability to speak or write publicly in their personal capacities about immigration law, immigration policy, or agency matters.

Background

In July 2020, NAIJ filed a lawsuit challenging EOIR’s speech policy. The suit was brought with support from the Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University and is commonly referenced as the “Knight litigation.”

The policy at issue had evolved from an earlier 2017 rule requiring prior approval for public statements by immigration judges, to a 2020 revision that categorically prohibited immigration judges from speaking in their personal capacity about immigration law or EOIR programs, and required prior approval for other topics.

Key legal claims

NAIJ argued that:

• The 2020 policy constituted an unconstitutional prior restraint on free speech in violation of the First Amendment.
• The policy was impermissibly vague and lacked appropriate procedural safeguards, violating the Fifth Amendment’s due-process protections.
• Because immigration judges have unique insight into the immigration court system, the policy’s sweeping restrictions inhibited the public’s interest in hearing from them.

Procedural history

• The original complaint was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia on 1 July 2020 under the case name National Association of Immigration Judges v. Neal.
• In August 2020, the district court denied a preliminary-injunction motion.
• The case proceeded through appeals. In June 2025 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit issued a published opinion in National Association of Immigration Judges v. Owen (No. 23-2235), vacating and remanding the decision of the district court.

Fourth Circuit decision (June 3, 2025)

The Fourth Circuit held that while the mechanics of the federal Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA) normally direct federal employees to administrative boards (for example, the Merit Systems Protection Board) for employment-related claims, the court could not simply assume that framework was functioning properly. The court found that because the MSPB and U.S. Office of Special Counsel (OSC) had recent issues raising questions about independence and functionality, the jurisdiction-stripping effect of the CSRA could not automatically apply. Thus the court vacated and remanded for factual inquiry into whether meaningful judicial review remains available under the CSRA scheme.

Key points of the opinion:

• The court affirmed that NAIJ had standing based on alleged self-censorship and chilling of speech.
• The case raises whether district courts are barred from hearing such constitutional challenges when federal employees must rely on administrative remedies.
• The court did not decide on the merits of the speech-restriction policy; instead it remanded.

Significance and implications

• The decision signals that federal courts may entertain First Amendment challenges brought by federal employees even when a labor/CSRA remedy appears available, if the administrative scheme may no longer guarantee meaningful review.
• For the immigration-court system, the case underscores tensions between independence of adjudicators (immigration judges) and executive-branch oversight.
• The litigation may influence how speech restrictions on administrative judges or similar quasi-judicial officials are evaluated for constitutionality.
• Outcomes could affect the ability of immigration judges to publicly comment, teach, write, or engage in public discourse in their personal capacities.

Current status

As of June 2025:

• The Fourth Circuit remanded the case; the district-court proceedings will determine whether the CSRA scheme is functioning and, if so, whether the case may proceed in federal court.
• The exact merits of the speech-policy challenge (First and Fifth Amendment) remain to be resolved.
• The policy continues to affect immigration judges’ public-speaking opportunities while the litigation proceeds.

Challenges to impartiality and administrative pressure

Structural constraints and independence concerns

Immigration judges serve within EOIR, a component of the U.S. Department of Justice—the same department responsible for criminal immigration enforcement. EOIR is also under the authority of the President in the executive branch. The Department of Homeland Security, responsible for representing the United States in immigration courts, is also part of the executive branch. Because the courts are housed within the executive branch, rather than the judicial branch, immigration judges lack the tenure, independence, and structural safeguards of Article I or III federal judges and are more susceptible to political interference and policy changes related to political enforcement.

Legal scholars, professional associations, and congressional testimony have raised concerns that this framework may compromise the appearance or reality of judicial independence. Immigration judges can be reassigned or terminated by DOJ officials, and the Attorney General retains authority to issue binding precedents through the case-certification process. Critics argue that there is a blur in the separation between prosecutorial and judicial functions.

Supporters of the current system, however, contend that DOJ oversight promotes policy consistency, accountability, and alignment with national immigration priorities.

Performance metrics and case-completion quotas

Since 2018, EOIR has experimented with case-completion benchmarks and other performance metrics intended to improve efficiency and reduce the backlog. These include numerical goals for completed cases per year and limits on the number of continuances granted.

Opponents, including NAIJ and the American Bar Association (ABA), have asserted that such measures risk turning judicial work into production targets, undermining careful case consideration and due process protections. The metrics do not always accurately reflect the work done by judges due to faulty algorithms, the inability to account for changes in policy affecting the courts, the type of cases a judge hears, the complexity of cases, or other judicial or legal considerations. Reliance solely on metrics for personnel evaluation is considered ineffective by critics. The DOJ maintains that performance tracking is necessary to manage resources and ensure timely adjudication within a system now exceeding 3 million pending cases.

Resource and caseload pressures

Immigration judges operate under intense workloads. The average docket may include hundreds or thousands of cases per judge, many requiring interpreters, translation, or multiple hearings. Reports from the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and EOIR Inspector General have cited persistent shortages of support staff, uneven access to technology, and inconsistent courtroom infrastructure across jurisdictions.

While EOIR has implemented the Electronic Case Access System (ECAS) and expanded video-teleconference (VTC) hearings to modernize operations, these tools have introduced new challenges in ensuring accurate records, privacy protections, and reliable translation services.

Observers note that high caseloads and administrative burdens can contribute to burnout, increased turnover, and disparities in decision outcomes.

Variation in decisions and consistency of adjudication

Studies have documented significant variation among judges’ grant rates for asylum and other forms of relief, even within the same court or region. Research from universities and advocacy groups suggests that these disparities often exceed what would be expected based solely on case facts or applicant nationality.

For example, some reviews have found that the same type of asylum claim might succeed in one jurisdiction but fail in another, highlighting questions about uniform application of immigration law.

Proponents of reform argue that these inconsistencies stem partly from resource strain and policy shifts; others emphasize that judicial discretion naturally produces differing results.

Reformists argue that an Article I immigration court would create a system of direct appeal to the courts of appeals more similar to the Tax Court, which would allow for more legal consistency to develop. Currently, multiple layers of appeal and limits to appeal inhibit the interpretation of consistent, clear, national immigration law.

Summary

The combination of structural dependency, administrative oversight, high caseloads, policy turnover, and speech limitations has prompted sustained debate about whether U.S. immigration courts can operate with the independence expected of a judicial body.

While the DOJ emphasizes efficiency, consistency, and national control, critics warn that the system’s current design risks creating an adjudicative framework vulnerable to political influence and systemic strain.

See also

• Executive Office for Immigration Review
• Board of Immigration Appeals
• Immigration and Nationality Act
• National Association of Immigration Judges
• Asylum in the United States
• United States Department of Justice

References

1. U.S. Department of Justice, Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR).
2. Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq.).
3. National Association of Immigration Judges (NAIJ).
4. U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), Immigration Courts: Actions Needed to Reduce Backlogs and Ensure Due Process, 2023.
5. American Bar Association, Reforming the Immigration Court System, 2020.

See also

• Executive Office for Immigration Review