Late Francoism - Wikiwand

Late Francoism represents the final phase of the Francoist dictatorship, concluding with the death of Francisco Franco on November 20, 1975. This period is commonly dated from October 1969, when the "monocolor" government was established under the effective leadership of Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco, Franco's chief advisor (a designation that followed by three months the Caudillo’s appointment of Prince Juan Carlos I as his successor with the title of king).^[1] This era is also recognized as the final crisis of Francoism, with some historians pinpointing its onset to the "Burgos trial" of December 1970.^[2] Shortly after Franco's demise, Jorge de Esteban [es] and Luis López Guerra observed that "from the early 1970s, it became apparent to the majority of Spaniards that, following a period of apparent stability, the nation was re-entering a pronounced crisis, evidenced primarily by escalating contemporary conflicts and profound uncertainty regarding the future".^[3]

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The political landscape of this final dictatorship phase was characterized, according to Javier Tusell, by the physical and personal decline of General Franco,^{[note 1]} the fragmentation of the regime's political elite, the stagnation induced by uncertainty over the succession, and the rising influence of the anti-Francoist opposition.^[4] Luis Suárez Fernández noted with respect to the Francoist regime that "between 1969 and 1975, clear policy directions were notably scarce".^[5]

According to Borja de Riquer [es], "the final six years of the Francoist regime elucidate why the dictatorship could not persist beyond General Francisco Franco's death. The erosion and political crisis afflicting this authoritarian regime were so severe that efforts to sustain it were progressively undermined and delegitimized".^[6]

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Background

Summarize

Perspective

In the 1960s, Francoist leaders contemplated the regime's future following the anticipated death of the Generalísimo Francisco Franco (who reached the age of seventy in 1962).^[7] Two distinct factions emerged:

The "immobilists," who aimed to preserve the Francoist regime's continuity, maintaining its institutional framework and principles as outlined in the Fundamental Laws of the Realm. They supported the establishment (rather than restoration) of a monarchy—"Catholic, social, and representative," distinct from the liberal monarchy overthrown in 1931—embodied by Juan Carlos, son of Juan de Borbón, who had been under Franco's tutelage since 1948. This group included the majority of "technocrats [es]" associated with Opus Dei, with Admiral Carrero Blanco—Franco's principal advisor and de facto government head—as their key figure, alongside the "old guard" Falangists of the National Movement.^[8]
The "aperturists," who advocated for reforms aligned with the transformations in Spanish society, driven by significant economic growth since the 1959 Stabilization Plan, which had phased out the outdated autarkic model. They argued that economic development [es] necessitated corresponding political development.^[9] The "aperturists," drawn from the Movement, were led by three ministers: Manuel Fraga Iribarne, Minister of Information and Tourism; Fernando María Castiella, Minister of Foreign Affairs; and José Solís Ruiz, Minister-Secretary General of the Movement [es] and National Delegate of Unions [es]. Solís, leveraging his dual roles, sought to reinvigorate the Movement—then largely a bureaucratic entity—through popular participation via "political associations" and enhance the Trade Union Organization by increasing worker involvement, aiming to broaden the regime's social support.^[10]^[11] Some "aperturists," including Solís and possibly Fraga, opposed Carrero Blanco's monarchic approach, favoring a presidential system akin to Gaullism (envisioning a military regent, potentially General Muñoz Grandes, though his health was failing; he died in 1970).^[12]^[13]

The historian Borja de Riquer [es] has emphasized that the divide between "immobilists" and "aperturists" stemmed from "differing assessments of societal changes and the nature of political and social contestation." The former believed that countering "subversion" required reinforcing the regime's foundational principles, rejecting reforms that might lead to its dissolution, while the latter argued that the disconnect between existing political structures and Spain's social and cultural reality necessitated adaptation to prevent a crisis stemming from Francoism's growing anachronism.^[14]

A key achievement of the "aperturists" was the enactment of the 1966 Press Law [es], spearheaded by Fraga. However, José Solís failed to advance the Statute of Associations within the Movement, and elections for links and jurors in the Trade Union Organization were exploited by the clandestine, anti-Francoist workers' commissions to gain influence.^[10]^[15] Conversely, the "immobilists" secured two critical milestones: the passage of the Organic Law of the State in 1967 and Franco's designation of Juan Carlos as his successor in July 1969. Juan Carlos subsequently swore allegiance to the Law of Principles of the National Movement [es] and assumed the title of Prince of Spain (rather than the traditional Prince of Asturias).^[16]^[17] In his address to the Cortes proposing Juan Carlos, Franco delivered a statement that would resonate in subsequent years, particularly after his death: that with this appointment, "everything was to be tied and well tied".^[18]

When by natural law my Captaincy comes to fail you, which inexorably has to come, it is advisable the decision we are going to take today, which will contribute, in a great way, to everything being tied and well tied for the future.

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Failure of Immobilist Continuism (1969-1973)

Summarize

Perspective

"Monocolor" Government

The unequivocal ascendancy of Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco following the appointment of Juan Carlos as Franco's successor intensified the rift within the government between the "technocrats" and "aperturists." This tension culminated in the "Matesa scandal [es]," which erupted in August 1969. Two "technocrat" ministers from Opus Dei—Juan José Espinosa San Martín, Minister of Economy, and Faustino García-Moncó Fernández, Minister of Commerce, both of whom resigned—were indirectly implicated. The "aperturist" ministers, José Solís Ruiz and Manuel Fraga Iribarne, sought to leverage the scandal to oust the "technocrats" (publicizing the issue through Movement-controlled press, with the newspaper Arriba labeling it a "national disaster"). However, the outcome reversed their intentions: the "technocrats" emerged strengthened when Franco endorsed Carrero's call for a "united government without wear and tear".^[19]^[20]^[21]^[22]^[23] Carrero Blanco presented Franco with a highly critical dossier on Solís, Fraga, and Foreign Affairs Minister Fernando María Castiella. Regarding Fraga, the dossier criticized the 1966 Press Law [es], which permitted attacks "on the Spanish way of being and on public morality." It noted, "The Press exploits pornography to a large extent as a commercial instrument. [...] The bookstores are full of communist and atheist propaganda; the theaters represent works that prevent the attendance of decent families, the cinemas are full of pornography...".^[24]

Consequently, the "monocolor" government was formed in October 1969, a term coined by its detractors due to its near-exclusive composition of Opus Dei "technocrats" or individuals loyal to Carrero Blanco and his confidant Laureano López Rodó—though some historians argue that "the term 'monocolor government' is imprecise" given "substantial ministerial disagreements on certain issues".^[25]^[26] Carrero retained the vice presidency but assumed de facto presidential duties, meeting weekly with ministers and leading "little councils" that pre-determined Council of Ministers decisions.^[27]^[28] The three "aperturist" ministers targeted by Carrero—Fraga, Solís, and Castiella—were removed, and Falangist representation was reduced to three ministers, with Francoist Catholic representation limited to one.^[26] López Rodó’s influence in ministerial selections was evident, as four of the eleven new appointees hailed from the Commissariat of the Development Plan [es].^[29] A notable event was the new Minister-Secretary General of the Movement [es], Torcuato Fernández Miranda, taking office in a white shirt rather than the traditional blue Falangist shirt.^[30]

The "monocolor" government of October 1969 departed from the traditional balance among families that Franco had maintained in his administrations. Javier Tusell regarded this resolution of the crisis as evidence of "the decline of Franco's personal faculties, who, having reached seventy-five in 1967, would not have so evidently failed in arbitrating between the victorious factions of the Spanish Civil War had his political acumen remained intact".^[26] "That Franco sanctioned a government excluding other regime factions signals a loss of grasp on Spain's political and social reality," asserts Paul Preston.^[31] The "monocolor" government was seen as a decisive victory for Carrero Blanco, "regarded as Franco's apparent successor and the clearest guarantor of the regime's continuity post-dictator," according to Borja de Riquer [es].^[32] In his traditional year-end address, Franco claimed "everything had been tied and well tied".^[33] However, Javier Tusell noted that Carrero "lacked the qualifications to exercise what was effectively a Presidency, particularly given a Spanish society so markedly divergent from his worldview".^[34] The formation of the "monocolor" government further exacerbated divisions within the regime between "immobilists" and "aperturists".^[35] To offset the Carrero-López Rodó dominance, Franco appointed a Falangist, Alejandro Rodríguez de Valcárcel, to preside over the Cortes and the Council of the Realm, breaking the tradition of a traditionalist in that role.^[36]

[...] Our war was not, then, a civil war; it was a war of liberation and a crusade. It was a war of liberation, because what was at stake was our independence as a nation; is there anyone who can doubt that if we had not launched into the war or if we had lost it, Spain would not be a communist country since then?; and do communist countries have political independence? As for the qualification of crusade, crusades are fights in defense of the Faith. Is communism not a declared enemy of God? In red Spain the temples were razed, in a second edition, corrected and enlarged, of the systematic burning of churches with which the second Spanish Republic was inaugurated [...].

Because God knew well your righteousness of intention when launching into the war in defense of the Faith and the independence of Spain, not only did He grant you the victory of 1939, but He inspired you the political prudence necessary to free us from the vicissitudes of the Second World War, maintaining our neutrality in it. […]

The victors of 1945 were the USSR and what were called the "democracies", that is, communism, which comes out of the war notably strengthened, and liberalism, which is the political system most favorable to weaken the peoples and favor with this weakness that they can fall into the clutches of the first, but liberalism and communism had been our defeated in 1939 and over Spain a danger looms again, which in not a few produces justified anguish. [...] In the complicated world in which we live, we will have to face permanently the offensive from the outside, because Marxism and Freemasonry are tenacious enemies, but we have the firm conviction that all difficulties will be overcome, because we have faith in your person and in the solidity of your work.

— Luis Carrero Blanco, Address delivered to Franco on the occasion of his 80th anniversary, at the Council of Ministers on December 7, 1972.

During the four years of the "monocolor" government's tenure (1969-1973), the rift between the "immobilists," now unequivocally led by Admiral Carrero with Franco's support, and the "aperturists" widened. Carrero was convinced of a communist and Masonic "subversive" campaign against the Francoist regime. In 1972, he declared before the National Council of the Movement: "Today we are targets, like the entire free world, of the subversive offensive launched by communism, yet we are also assailed by liberal propaganda sponsored by Freemasonry".^[37] Conversely, the "aperturist" Manuel Fraga Iribarne, shortly after his dismissal, remarked at a National Council of the Movement meeting: "the country will not tolerate stagnation"; "but how, without associations, can we integrate the new generations and emerging middle classes, those youth of ideas and development currently outside the system?".^[38]^[39]^[40] The Generalísimo Franco, in a speech to the National Council of the Movement on October 29, 1970, commemorating the 1933 Teatro de la Comedia rally (the founding event of Falange Española), described the Movement as "Spain's great reserve in any near or distant contingency" and emphasized "transmitting our national spirit to new generations" (he also lauded the Army as the "jealous guardian of national conscience," citing the July 18, 1936 as a defense of Christian civilization and traditions).^[41]

Both "immobilists" and "aperturists" sought to ensure the regime's continuity, though their approaches diverged: the former aimed to preserve the authoritarian framework in a new monarchy "of July 18"—established by Franco rather than restored through dynastic claims—while the latter proposed expanding the regime's social base and participation through political associations within the Movement.^[42]^[43] The "immobilists," particularly their most rigid involutionist [es] faction—termed "ultras" or the bunker for their resistance to change akin to Hitler's stance in the bunker of the Third Reich's Chancellery—dominated the National Council of the Movement. Their strength derived from military leadership support, operating through organizations such as the National Confederation of Ex-Combatants [es] (led by former minister José Antonio Girón de Velasco), the Guardia de Franco [es], the José Antonio Doctrinal Circles [es], the Hermandad del Maestrazgo (presided over by Carlist Ramón Forcadell), the Spanish Priestly Brotherhood [es] (directed by Miguel Oltra [es]), Fuerza Nueva (headed by Blas Piñar), and the Guerrilleros de Cristo Rey (led by Mariano Sánchez-Covisa).^[44]

In these years, a third Francoist faction emerged, comprising former "aperturists" whose growing rift with "immobilists" led them to adopt an increasingly "reformist" stance, believing the only viable exit from Francoism was a "democracy" with "undefined contours" and guided from within power.^[45]^[46] The foremost "reformist" was former minister Manuel Fraga Iribarne, with key members including senior administrators and public company directors (Pío Cabanillas, Antonio Barrera de Irimo, Francisco Fernández Ordóñez), alongside young Movement cadres (José Miguel Ortí Bordás [es], Rodolfo Martín Villa, Gabriel Elorriaga Fernández [es], Adolfo Suárez).^[47] Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo, Marcelino Oreja, and Alfonso Osorio, among others, formed the "Tácito [es]" collective, oriented toward Christian democracy.^[48] These individuals would later play significant roles during the Spanish transition.^[47]

The primary objective of the government during this period was to facilitate the succession of Don Juan Carlos, though this process was complicated by the December 1971 announcement of the engagement between Don Alfonso de Borbón Dampierre and Franco's eldest granddaughter, María del Carmen Martínez-Bordiú Franco. This development sparked speculation regarding a potential alteration of the designated successor, as the law permitted such a change. As the eldest son of Infante Jaime, Duke of Segovia, the second son of King Alfonso XIII—who, due to his deaf-mute condition, had been compelled to renounce his dynastic rights—Don Alfonso asserted himself as the head of the House of Bourbon in preference to Don Juan de Borbón, the third son of Alfonso XIII and father of Prince Juan Carlos. Don Alfonso pursued the title of prince, necessitating intervention by Juan Carlos with Franco to prevent its conferral. Ultimately, Franco bestowed upon him the title of Duke of Cádiz, positioning him in the protocol above even the wife of the Generalísimo, reflecting his status as second in the line of succession (a circumstance described by Javier Tusell as a "pilgrim situation"). Don Alfonso consistently presented himself "as an individual wholly and unequivocally loyal to the regime".^[49] Following the marriage, Don Alfonso sought appointment as Minister of Sports but was instead named president of the Institute of Hispanic Culture [es], "a largely ceremonial role that nonetheless enabled him to integrate more directly into his wife’s familial circle".^[50]

The "monocolor" government introduced no substantial political reforms despite escalating social conflicts, with one notable exception being the cessation of the designation FET y de las JONS for the National Movement, the single party of the Francoist dictatorship.^[51]^[52] The earlier initiative to establish associations "within" the Movement was definitively abandoned (the National Council of the Movement rejected this proposal on December 15, 1969, at the behest of Minister-Secretary General of the Movement Torcuato Fernández Miranda).^[53] The Generalísimo Franco cautioned the Cortes in November 1971 that "it would be erroneous to conflate the legitimacy of diverse opinions with the potential for preconceived dogmatic frameworks within ideological groups, which, in any form, would merely constitute political parties".^[54] Indeed, Fernández Miranda, acting on Franco's directive, shelved the project of political associations ("He will not permit them during his lifetime and will endeavor to prevent their emergence posthumously," Fernández Miranda confided privately).^[17]^[55] Similarly, the "aperturist" initiative of José Solís Ruiz to devise a legal framework for the independence of the Trade Union Organization^[56] was discarded. In its stead, a Union Law was enacted in 1971, which failed to address existing issues and "solidified the bureaucratization of the Trade Union Organization".^[25]^[57] Meanwhile, Carrero Blanco increasingly aligned with the neo-Francoist [es] stance of the "bunker," distancing himself from the "technocrats [es]," who thus lost their primary advocate.^[58] Carrero Blanco asserted that intransigence "is an unyielding duty when fundamental issues are at stake".^[59] He further intensified his "paranoid vision" ("apocalyptic," per Javier Tusell)^[27] of Spanish political life, attributing all conflicts to a concealed "subversive" minority, which he equated with "communism" and "Freemasonry".^[60] On occasion, he also associated this threat with "Christian democracy".^[27] This perspective was detailed in a 98-page report submitted to Franco on March 17, 1970, titled Planning of a Government Action, wherein Carrero identified communism, Freemasonry, and Christian democracy as the regime's primary threats.^[61]

The government's "immobilism" prompted initial resignations, beginning with Minister of Public Works Federico Silva Muñoz in April 1970, who also sought increased funding for his ministry. He was succeeded by Gonzalo Fernández de la Mora, a proponent of the most reactionary "technocrats" and an opponent of any pluralism. Two years later, Interior Minister Tomás Garicano Goñi resigned for similar reasons.^[62]^[63]^[64] With Silva Muñoz's departure, only one representative of the "family" Catholic, Alberto Monreal Luque, remained in the government.^[63]

Among the few achievements of the "monocolor" government, alongside the 1970 enactment of the new General Law of Education [es] (known as the "Villar-Palasí Law" after its architect, the education minister), which introduced significant reforms to the "obsolete" Francoist educational system [es],^[65] foreign policy under Gregorio López Bravo proved relatively successful. This included the signing of a Preferential Agreement with the European Economic Community on June 30, 1970 (though full membership remained precluded by the regime's anti-democratic nature),^[66] and a Friendship and Cooperation Agreement with the United States in August (followed by President Richard Nixon's visit to Spain the next month, en route from visiting another aging autocrat, Marshal Tito; Secretary of State Henry Kissinger described Franco's Spain as "seemingly suspended, awaiting the end of a life to rejoin Europe's history").^[67] Greater controversy arose from commercial treaties with Eastern European socialist states and the Soviet Union (September 1972), opposed by "ultra" factions, and the recognition of the People's Republic of China (severing ties with Nationalist China). López Bravo failed, however, to improve relations with the Holy See, stalled over updates to the Concordat of 1953 in line with the Second Vatican Council's directives.^[68]^[69]

In efforts to enhance the regime's international image, Prince Juan Carlos, accompanied by his wife Doña Sofía, undertook visits to various Western nations, occasionally encountering challenges. During his late 1971 visit to Washington, several newspapers reported his remarks, including one quoting him as saying: "I believe the Spanish people desire greater freedom. It is merely a matter of determining the pace." Upon returning to Spain, Juan Carlos promptly visited Franco, who admonished him: "There are matters you may and must address outside Spain, and others you must not voice within it."^[70] Months earlier, The New York Times had published an interview with Franco's successor under the headline "Juan Carlos Promises a Democratic Regime." Minister Laureano López Rodó, Carrero's close associate, advised Juan Carlos to exercise caution.^[71]

Growing social and political conflict

Entrenched in rigid immobilism, the "monocolor" government responded to the resurgence of labor and student unrest primarily through the deployment of public order forces. Between 1970 and 1973, seven workers lost their lives due to police actions (three in Granada in 1970;^[72] one in Barcelona in 1971; two in Ferrol in 1972;^[73] and one in Sant Adrià de Besòs in 1973).^[74] In 1971 and 1972, the Trade Union Organization dismissed 17,643 union links accused of "subversive activities," and in June of the latter year, the leading figures of the illegal "workers' commissions" were apprehended during a meeting at a convent in Pozuelo de Alarcón. The ten defendants, including Marcelino Camacho, Nicolás Sartorius [es], Eduardo Saborido [es], and Francisco García Salve [es], were subsequently sentenced to lengthy prison terms in the "process 1001".^[75]^[76]^[73]

A confidential 1972 report from the Civil Government of Barcelona noted that, although worker activists were few, they had succeeded "if not in politicizing the working masses, at least in sensitizing them to a spirit of solidarity," facilitated by assemblies and gatherings "that amplify the voice of the small organizing minority, politicizing and sensitizing participants while fostering solidarity."^[77] Some regime politicians were convinced that these conflicts were instigated by the "workers' commissions," "which had already developed highly skilled agents in mass agitation" and "exploited any opportunity presented."^[78] Franco himself, in a November 11, 1971, address to the Cortes, referenced the "strikes, riots, and violence" that endangered businesses,^[79] attributing them to "external forces, often merely economic and financial." He questioned, "Don't we have to think that it is about using violence and subversion to hinder our industrial process?"^[80]

The unrest was even more pronounced in universities, where conditions became increasingly unmanageable (Luis Suárez Fernández, Director General of Universities from 1972 to 1974, later acknowledged that "the authorities failed in their efforts to significantly improve the institution's functionality").^[81] Francoist authorities attributed this to "subversive agitators" who "utilized students as a manipulable mass," creating "an atmosphere of disobedience and attrition against the principle of authority,"^[82] necessitating a constant police presence on campuses.^[83] "The political and ideological radicalization of students transformed many faculties and university schools into venues for regular assemblies, mural postings, distribution of clandestine publications, and solidarity events," complemented by the movement of non-tenured professors (PNNs). Carrero Blanco, in a report to Franco, wrote: "It is necessary to erase from the cadres of the teaching staff of Basic Education and of the university all the enemies of the regime and it is necessary to separate from the University all the students who are instrument of subversion."^[83] Consequently, police interventions, administrative sanctions, governmental arrests, and attacks by far-right groups tolerated by authorities (Guerrilleros de Cristo Rey, National University Action [es],...) ensued.^[84]^[85] Regarding the Guerrilleros de Cristo Rey, Paul Preston described them as a "parapolice terrorist gang," organized by Carrero's SECED [es], tasked with "conducting repressive actions the government preferred to avoid public association with."^[86] In his 1969 year-end message, the Generalísimo Franco characterized university agitation as "those minor student disturbances, driven by communist directives, fomented by their agents worldwide," contrasting it with "the entirety of our industrious and studious youth."^[87] The following year, he revisited the topic: "It is with sadness that we observe a small segment of some universities reduced to playthings of ideological mechanisms wholly detached from genuine student concerns."^[88]

Repression was most severe in the Basque Country and Navarre due to the escalating terrorist activities of ETA, which "shattered the myth of the regime's invulnerability."^[89] In 1969, for instance, 1,953 individuals were arrested, with 890 reporting mistreatment, 510 alleging torture, 93 tried by the Court of Public Order, and 53 facing courts-martial.^[90]^[91] On September 18, 1970, during Franco's attendance at the world pelota championship in a San Sebastián fronton, Basque nationalist Joseba Elósegui set himself ablaze and leapt from the stands, shouting Gora Euskadi askatuta ('Long live free Euskadi'). Severely burned, he was removed while Franco continued observing the match. Elósegui achieved his aim, as the incident garnered international attention. His diary, written three weeks prior, stated: "I do not intend to eliminate Franco. I only wish him to feel, if possible in his own flesh, the fire that devastated Guernica" (Elósegui had commanded a military unit present during the bombing of Guernica in April 1937).^[92] Two and a half months later, the "Burgos trial" commenced against sixteen ETA members, held in Burgos due to adjudication by a military tribunal, as it housed the Captaincy General overseeing the Basque Country.^[93]

The Crisis of the "Burgos Trial"

The so-called "Burgos trial" marked the most critical juncture for the newly formed government and the broader Francoist regime ("it precipitated a rapid escalation of tensions, severely impacting the regime's stability and deepening divisions among the Francoist political elite").^[94] "The proceedings revealed themselves as a formidable challenge for the Regime."^[95] The trial was ostensibly pressured by the so-called "blue" generals (the most involutionist [es] faction), who urged Franco to respond to ETA's terrorist activities with an exemplary judicial process.^[96] The government acquiesced and opted for extensive publicity. However, the outcome contradicted their intentions, as the mere announcement of the summary trial triggered a wave of solidarity in the Basque Country and Navarre, revitalizing Basque nationalism's social foothold. On the trial's opening day, student and worker strikes occurred in several Guipúzcoa companies, accompanied by various street incidents in San Sebastián. The government responded by declaring a three-month state of exception in Guipúzcoa, later extending it nationwide on December 14 due to similar disturbances in Bilbao and elsewhere.^[90]^[97]^[98]^[99]^[100] The defendants' counsel included prominent lawyers affiliated with the anti-Francoist opposition: Gregorio Peces Barba, Juan María Bandrés [es], Francisco Letamendía [es], and Josep Solé Barberà [es].^[95]

Three hundred intellectuals, artists, and Catalan professionals, including painter Joan Miró, sequestered themselves in the Montserrat Monastery in solidarity with the accused "for defending the national rights of the Basque people" (also calling for the reinstatement of the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia of 1932).^[99]^[101] In Madrid, 131 intellectuals, including Ramón Tamames, Enrique Tierno Galván, Joaquín Ruiz Giménez [es], and Manuel Jiménez de Parga, issued a December 23 manifesto demanding amnesty and political and union freedoms (the press reported it but aimed to discredit it, aligning with government views).^[102] Protests also erupted across numerous universities.^[103] Two days before the trial, ETA kidnapped the honorary German consul in San Sebastián, Eugen Beihl, releasing him on December 25 (the Episcopal Conference condemned the abduction, appealing "to the conscience of those responsible to free this innocent person and avoid introducing such deplorable violent methods into our country"). The following day, the tribunal delivered its verdict, sentencing six accused to death (three to double death penalties) and the remainder to lengthy imprisonments (with one woman acquitted). ^[104]^[105]^[106] Another ETA action during the trial involved an attempt to seize a television repeater on Burgos province's outskirts to disrupt its broadcasts (at the time, Spain had only one channel, TVE, the state broadcaster); police thwarted the effort.

The "Burgos trial" sparked an international solidarity campaign for the Basque people and the restoration of democratic freedoms in Spain.^[107]^[95] It also marked a further rift between the Catholic Church and Francoism, prompting a joint pastoral from the Bishop of San Sebastián, Jacinto Argaya, and the Apostolic Administrator of Bilbao, José María Cirarda (who had suspended the traditional Te Deum for the "liberation" of Bilbao in 1937 on June 5),^[108] criticizing the death penalty and military jurisdiction over the accused (while also condemning "all forms of violence... structural, subversive, and repressive," eliciting an indignant response from Justice Minister Antonio Oriol Urquijo, who argued that offenders could not be equated with law enforcers). This was followed by a Spanish Episcopal Conference statement supporting the San Sebastián and Bilbao bishops (though not endorsing their pastoral text) and advocating "maximum clemency," while clarifying "in no case or for any reason does it seek to obstruct justice" (twenty-three bishops, led by José Guerra Campos [es], dissented, as did the integrist Spanish Priestly Brotherhood [es]).^[107]^[99]^[109] The nuncio Monsignor Luigi Dadaglio, supporting the Spanish bishops, also worked to prevent death sentences.^[110] Some foreign Catholic bishops, such as the Archbishop of Paris, Monsignor François Marty, went further, asserting that human rights violations necessitated not clemency but justice.^[111] Upon the verdict's release, a Holy See spokesperson expressed that the news was received with "deep emotion," impacting the government.^[112] Concurrently, the government intensified press control ("reverting to a policy of threatening editors, imposing fines, seizing editions, and temporarily closing publications"), culminating eleven months later in the permanent closure of the newspaper Madrid [es] (its building was demolished in 1972).^[113]^[114]^[115]

Involutionist Francoist factions, including the hermandades de excombatientes [es]—which offered support to public order forces—accused the government of weakness and passivity amid international condemnation and "subversion," while also targeting the ecclesiastical hierarchy for joining the criticisms. The Hermandad de Alféreces Provisionales [es], regarding the San Sebastián and Bilbao bishops' pastoral, decried the "confusionism provoked by the demagogic and partisan stance of certain clerical sectors."^[116] The Captain General of Catalonia, Alfonso Pérez Viñeta [es], declared that "the Army is willing never to allow the return of the horde that already put in danger the existence of the Fatherland," adding that "if necessary, it would be summoned again to Crusade to purge our Fatherland once more of godless, lawless men."^[117] On December 8, several hundred individuals gathered outside the church of San Francisco el Grande, where a mass honoring the Infantry Corps' patron saint was attended by Prince Juan Carlos and several ministers. Many wore blue shirts, carrying banners reading "Long live the unity of Spain!", "Spaniards, united against separatism and Marxism," and "Burgos, national justice!" (they also distributed a protest leaflet against the Spanish bishops). On December 14, the first "patriotic" demonstration supporting Franco and rejecting international protests occurred in Valladolid, followed by others in various cities.^[118] In Barcelona, a banner proclaimed: "Red bishops to Moscow."^[62] The most significant took place in Madrid on December 17, convened by the obscure Coordinating Board of National Affirmation, which distributed thousands of pamphlets across the capital (apparently a phantom entity created by the SECED [es]). Thousands assembled in the Plaza de Oriente, as in 1946,^[119]^[120] to acclaim Franco and the Army (having first gathered at the Church of the Incarnation for a memorial for ETA's three fatal victims: civil guard José Pardines [es], commissioner Melitón Manzanas, and taxi driver Fermín Monasterio).^[121]^[107]^[62] Some demonstrators brandished banners against the government, such as "From weak governments Deliver us Lord!!" or "Franco yes, Opus No!" (and against the Church: "Bishops reds to Moscow"). Though his attendance was unplanned, Franco ultimately appeared and greeted the crowd from the Royal Palace balcony.^[122]^[123] Numerous telegrams and letters of support for Franco reached the El Pardo Palace.^[100]

Concurrently, contacts were established among the most involutionist [es] military, coordinated by the Captain General of the I Military Region [es] Joaquín Fernández de Córdoba [es], who secured an audience with Franco. They expressed condemnation of "aperturist" initiatives and demanded a firmer stance against the anti-Francoist opposition (alongside Fernández de Córdoba, Tomás García Rebull [es], Alfonso Pérez Viñeta [es], and Manuel Chamorro [es], captains general of Burgos, Barcelona, and Seville, respectively, visited the El Pardo Palace).^[123]^[100] The response was swift. The state of exception was extended nationwide (specifically suspending article 18 of the Fuero de los Españoles [es], which limited preventive detention to 72 hours), and General Carlos Iniesta Cano, a "hardliner," assumed leadership of the Civil Guard. Lieutenant General García Rebull was appointed Captain General of the I Military Region [es], the most significant, based in Madrid.^[124] On December 21, Carrero Blanco, denouncing the "international campaign orchestrated by communism in support of ETA and the Workers' Commissions, that is, the forces of subversion,"^[62]^[123]^[125] addressed the Francoist Cortes with a warning to "aperturists": "the communists, like the barbarians, require traitors to open city gates, but they despise them and are resolved to exterminate them once they are no longer needed."^[126] Carrero's address received robust applause from the procurators.^[112] Other military figures insisted that the "deep crisis" afflicting the "Regime" warranted a more active Army role and the separation of the Head of State from the government presidency.^[127] Admiral Pedro Nieto Antúnez, a Franco ally, and Lieutenant General Manuel Coco Rodríguez [es] also urged the Caudillo to apply the law's full rigor.^[111]

Ultimately, in light of the "Burgos trial"’s widespread resonance and numerous clemency appeals, General Franco commuted the nine death sentences imposed by the military tribunal on six ETA members (three of whom had received double death penalties) on December 30. This decision followed deliberation within the Council of Ministers (where a majority, including Carrero, López Rodó, López Bravo, and the three military ministers, favored it)^[112] and consultation with the Council of the Realm (which recommended clemency).^[107]^[128]^[129]^[130] One advisor against confirming the death sentences was Franco's brother Nicolás Franco: "Dear Paco, do not sign those sentences. It does not suit you. No, it does not suit you. I tell you because I love you. You are a good Christian; you will regret it later. We are old. Heed my advice, you know how much I care for you."^[123]^[100] Lieutenant General Rafael García Valiño, Captain General of Madrid during Julián Grimau’s 1963 trial, had reminded Franco in a December 1 letter to García Rebull, two days before the trial began, that "the execution of the death penalty imposed on him created a tense national atmosphere, subsequently adverse to the Army" (the letter also urged ensuring "military jurisdiction"’s competence, prompting a Supreme Court report confirming it).^[131]

British documentary from 1971 about Franco's Spain. It features the 1970 or 1971 Victory parade, the dispersal of a University of Madrid student demonstration by the Armed Police on horseback during the Burgos trial, and the appointment of Prince Juan Carlos as Franco's successor in the July 1969 Francoist Cortes session (Duration: 10 minutes).

General Franco announced his decision to commute the death sentences in his traditional year-end message, addressing international protests: "The peace and order we have enjoyed for over thirty years have incited the hatred of powers historically opposed to our people's prosperity." He added that "Spain constitutes a state of law whose political actions are directed toward the common good, and in its defense, we will spare no efforts or sacrifices to combat the passion and violence of any who seek to disrupt Spaniards' peaceful coexistence." He also addressed the Catholic Church, asserting that the "finalities" of Church and State "cannot contradict each other, for that would precipitate a lamentable social crisis... Ultimately, we all desire the consolidation of our Christian peace within our borders and contribution to the global pacification endeavor." As in his previous year's message, Franco reiterated his intent not to retire: "The firmness and strength of my spirit will not fail you while God grants me life to continue guiding our Fatherland's destinies."^[132]^[133] The specific paragraph conveying his decision stated:^[88]

The clamorous and multitudinous manifestations of adhesion that you have rendered in the last days not only to my person but to the Spanish Army and to our institutions, have reinforced our authority in such a way that it facilitates us, in agreement with the Council of Realm, the making use of the prerogative of the grace of pardon of the last penalty, despite the gravity of the crimes that the court-martial of Burgos, with high patriotism, judged.

Following the commutation of death sentences to thirty years' imprisonment, "ultra" criticisms of the government persisted (according to then Minister Laureano López Rodó, an attempt was made to initiate a form of censure motion against the government in the Cortes via its president Alejandro Rodríguez de Valcárcel, despite the Francoist Cortes lacking such authority and the government being dismissible only by Franco, its appointer).^[134] At an event organized by the hermandades de excombatientes, the Captain General of Granada, Lieutenant General Fernando Rodrigo Cifuentes,^[135] called for combating the "white Freemasonry of the Opus Dei" that "seeks to sow discord among the nation's noblest elements" (he was subsequently removed from his post).^[136]

Between February 17 and 23, 1971, the National Council of the Movement convened in closed session (the call, signed by forty councilors on December 14 amid the "Burgos trial" crisis, reflected their view that "the Regime was dangerously weakening," per Admiral Pedro Nieto Antúnez, who led the group).^[137] Criticism of the government (and Opus Dei) abounded, exposing divisions between "immobilists" and "aperturists." One of the most vocal critics, involutionist [es] figure Blas Piñar, leader of Fuerza Nueva (already functioning as a covert political association via its magazine [es]), accused "aperturists" and the government of betraying the ideals of the "July 18 [es]." Piñar repeatedly emphasized "subversion" (equating it with "communism," "intrinsically perverse, unrelenting in its policy of capture"), and his call for the government's resignation "for patriotism and love of Spain" elicited prolonged applause.^[138] Years later, Piñar claimed that Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco, government vice president, approached and embraced him, signaling agreement with his stance and the resignation proposal.^[139] However, Javier Tusell noted that Carrero viewed Piñar as "a dangerous extremist, though well-intentioned."^[140]

The most anticipated address within the plenary session of the National Council emanated from Admiral Nieto Antúnez, the instigator of the convocation and a confidant of General Franco, to whom he dispatched a missive enclosing a copy of the oration he intended to deliver (“for loyalty to H.E. it is my duty to express my opinion as I have seen it in the month of December and as I see it now”). He leveled accusations against the Government for its failure to implement measures to counter the “international campaign organized by communism in favor of ETA and of the Workers' Commissions, that is, of the forces of subversion” and subsequently advocated for its replacement with an alternative administration composed of “a team that, utilizing the charismatic authority of the individual designating them, is further endowed with the moral authority derived from the knowledge of being supported by the majority of Spaniards,” capable of initiating a program encompassing “defense of national honor, fortification of institutions, authentic social justice, [and] popular participation.”^[141]

In conclusion, “the government itself, by pretending to make a great political trial, had turned the terrorist activism of ETA, until then a relatively secondary issue, into the center of a serious identity conflict between a good part of the Basque population and the Francoist regime.” Subsequent to the “Burgos trial,” the tenets of ETA not only “found a growing echo in the Basque population” (and the organization reconstituted itself when it teetered on the brink of dissolution),^[142] but the anti-Francoist opposition was compelled to “tolerate, almost as a lesser evil, the violence practiced by ETA.”^[143] “It was a serious political error since it became a political process of international repercussion by deriving the process into a questioning of the legitimacy of the Francoist regime to process some Basque patriots who defended their culture and identity,” has averred Borja de Riquer.^[93]

For his part, the “Burgos trial” has been regarded as the genesis of the terminal crisis of Francoism, for when, on December 29, 1971, in his customary year-end address, General Franco announced with apparent nonchalance that he had commuted the death sentences, “he came to recognize publicly, even if in implicit form, the existence of strong internal tensions that forced the Regime to urgently review its decisions.”^[144] According to Paul Preston, “the Burgos trials constituted a disaster for the regime, because they radically altered the balance of forces in Spain. The clumsiness of the regime had united the opposition forces as never before, the Church showed itself deeply critical and the more aperturist Francoists began to abandon what they saw as a sinking ship.”^[145] However, Javier Tusell contends that “the final decision of the pardon managed to calm the situation after a few days of climax in the fright,” though he acknowledges that “the regime deteriorated a lot by the peculiarity of this military trial against the members of ETA and erred very seriously in matter of public opinion, Spanish and foreign.”^[140]

Two months subsequent to the commutation of the death sentences, Franco received the visitation of General Vernon A. Walters, deputy director of the CIA. The latter observed Franco to be “old and weak. His hand trembled sometimes so violently that he covered it with the other. At times he seemed very distant and at others he went directly to the point.” When Walters inquired about the prospects following his demise, Franco assured him that the succession of Don Juan Carlos was secured and that the Army would never permit matters to spiral out of control. As Paul Preston has emphasized, “at the beginning of the 1970s, the symptoms of Parkinson's disease (trembling hands, rigid movements, empty expression) were becoming unmistakable.”^[70]

In April 1970, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Walter Scheel, undertook a visit to Madrid, where, to the considerable vexation of Franco, he conducted an interview on the 23rd with four representatives of the “moderate” opposition, albeit tacitly tolerated (Joaquín Ruiz-Giménez, Enrique Tierno Galván, José María de Areilza, and Joaquín Satrústegui), who reiterated the demands articulated in the manifesto of the 131 intellectuals dated December 23, 1969. They entreated Scheel to preclude Spain’s admission into the European Economic Community until such time as it satisfied five conditions: assurances for individual and collective rights; universal suffrage; recognition of political parties; establishment of a Parliament freely elected; and trade union freedom [es].^[146]

Tensions with the Catholic Church

Subsequent to the "Burgos Trial," the relationship between the Francoist regime and the Catholic Church entered a phase of escalating discord. In January 1971, an incident transpired involving the Bishop of Oviedo, Gabino Díaz Merchán, who contested the apprehension of a priest accused of employing "sacred preaching for political or even Marxist purposes," maintaining that solely ecclesiastical authority possessed the jurisdiction to evaluate the doctrinal substance of sermons, with civil powers restricted to adjudicating legal transgressions.^[147] Tensions intensified markedly when, toward the close of May 1971, Vicente Enrique y Tarancón was designated Archbishop of Madrid (succeeding his predecessor Casimiro Morcillo [es], who had also served as president of the Spanish Episcopal Conference until his decease), though the official appointment remained unratified until December.^[148] In consonance with Díaz Merchán,^[149] Tarancón espoused the termination of "National Catholicism" and collaboration with the regime, aligning with the reformed doctrines promulgated by the Second Vatican Council. It is noteworthy that the Church had historically constituted a fundamental pillar of the regime.^[150] A year thereafter, Tarancón formally assumed the presidency of the Spanish Episcopal Conference.^[151] On June 25, 1971, the Minister of Justice Antonio Oriol Urquijo disseminated a contentious article in ABC, addressing the "skillful Marxist infiltration" pervading the Spanish clergy and alleging distortions of Catholic doctrine.^[152]

A definitive transformation in the Catholic Church’s posture materialized in September 1971 during the Joint Assembly of Bishops and Priests, presided over by Cardinal Tarancón, which endorsed by a majority (215 votes to 26) a declaration favoring "independence and healthy collaboration between the Church and the State," thereby diverging from the Concordant of 1953. A second document, of greater historical significance, failed to attain the requisite two-thirds majority (137 votes in favor, 78 against). This document humbly sought forgiveness "because we did not know how to be true ministers of reconciliation within our people, divided by a war between brothers." The "Spanish Crusade," the official appellation of the Spanish Civil War that the Church had endorsed and adopted in the Collective Letter of the Spanish Bishops on the Occasion of the War in Spain of 1937, was recharacterized as a "war between brothers" (a formal adoption was deferred until the issuance of the document La Reconciliación en la Iglesia y en la Sociedad. Carta Colectiva del Episcopado Español in April 1975).^[153]^[154]^[155] For Francoist politicians, what was frequently "concealed" beneath the "spirit of reconciliation" represented an assertion by those defeated in the Civil War, resuscitating animosities that many Spaniards deemed extinguished.^[156] Years later, Cardinal Tarancón reflected that the Assembly "had been the first public act of the Spanish Church in which the intimate connection between the Church and the Regime, a logical consequence of the Civil War, which had been labeled a crusade, was called into question."^[157] The integrist Spanish Priestly Brotherhood, convened in Zaragoza, expressed vehement opposition to the Assembly’s conclusions.^[158] The Vatican Congregation for the Clergy also issued a critical assessment of the Assembly’s ratified documents on February 9, 1972.^[159]

Conversely, churches and other Catholic edifices were increasingly utilized to host clandestine opposition convocations, convene strike assemblies, or serve as loci for protest occupations (frequently encountering police interventions).^[160] Additionally, parish and diocesan bulletins, alongside other Catholic publications, periodically documented instances of conflict, protest, and mobilization.^[153]^[154]^[155]^[161] The Ministry of Justice promulgated a report asserting that apostolic movements were exceeding the confines of the Concordant of 1953 through engagement in "political" activities.^[149] In September 1971, a controversy arose concerning Cardinal Tarancón’s decision to reinstate Mariano Gamo as parish priest of Moratalaz, who had recently been liberated from the Zamora Concordat Prison after serving a sentence for "subversive acts" (including permitting his church to be utilized for "unauthorized" gatherings).^[162]

Franco received the Church’s defection and the shifting stance of its hierarchy with profound bewilderment and acute bitterness, privately characterizing it as a veritable "stab in the back." Carrero Blanco amplified this grievance, publicly decrying in December 1972 the ecclesiastical ingratitude toward a regime that, since 1939, "has expended some 300,000 million pesetas on the construction of churches, seminaries, charity centers, education, worship support, etc."^[163]^[164]^[165]^[166] That same month, the Justice and Peace Commission of Spain [es], under the leadership of the Bishop of Huelva, issued a document titled Si quieres la paz trabaja por la justicia asserting that "the structures of the Regime annul any possibility of true peace in Spain."^[167]^[168] Tensions culminated in January 1973 when the Episcopal Conference responded to Carrero Blanco’s entreaty for the Church to remain "our main support" with a declaration titled Iglesia y comunidad política (approved by 59 bishops against 20), advocating for the separation of Church and State, respect for human rights, and the promotion of democratic pluralism. That same month, a contentious encounter transpired between Pope Paul VI and the Minister of Foreign Affairs Gregorio López Bravo, during which the Pope silenced López Bravo and terminated the audience upon the latter’s criticism of Vatican policy toward Franco’s Spain.^[165] "The meeting precipitated a kind of rupture" between the Catholic Church and the Francoist regime.^[169]

In June 1973, an internal governmental memorandum cautioned that "religious progressivism and opposition to the Spanish regime coincide... with a value little less than synonymous." By that juncture, the "ultra" campaign against the "red bishops" and Tarancón (manifested through graffiti and posters bearing the slogan "Tarancón to the firing squad") had intensified, accompanied by increasingly frequent police actions, occasionally involving violent expulsions from parishes and Catholic centers. Fines, prohibitions on Catholic publications, and the detention of priests also escalated. The number of clerics confined in the Zamora Concordat Prison augmented, and in November 1973, coinciding with the visit to Spain of the Secretary of State of the Holy See Agostino Casaroli, a hunger strike was initiated, demanding amnesty, the closure of the prison, and a refusal by the Church to negotiate with the Francoist regime. This action received support from Catholic groups organizing lock-ins in the dioceses of Bilbao, San Sebastián, and Pamplona. On November 6, a violent disturbance erupted (involving the incineration of the altar and liturgical ornaments provided for Mass), inflicting severe damage upon the penitentiary and prompting the transfer of the six imprisoned priests to alternative facilities.^[170]^[171] Four days subsequently, approximately one hundred individuals from base communities (including fifteen priests) occupied the Apostolic Nunciature in solidarity (also demanding amnesty for all political prisoners and protesting the "Process 1001"). The bishops of Bilbao, San Sebastián, and Segovia jointly endorsed a missive calling for the concordat prison’s closure. The government issued a statement denouncing the Zamora incident as a sacrilege, eliciting a forceful rebuttal in El Norte de Castilla by the Bishop of Segovia, Monsignor Antonio Palenzuela [es]. Within governmental circles, there was deliberation regarding the expulsion of the Nuncio, Monsignor Dadaglio, deemed "complicit" in the Nunciature occupation, a situation resolved through the intervention of Madrid’s three auxiliary bishops, who adopted the protesters’ demands. The integrist Spanish Priestly Brotherhood [es] promptly issued a declaration on November 15, asserting that the traditional faith of Spanish society was being undermined. The preceding day, Cardinal Tarancón and Prime Minister Carrero Blanco convened to alleviate tensions (in notes on the meeting, Tarancón described Carrero as "an honorable man and a good Christian, though with a traditional mindset and somewhat anchored in pre-Second Vatican Council criteria"; he also noted: "I categorically refused to issue a public retraction disavowing my auxiliary bishops").^[172] On November 29, approximately one hundred individuals, predominantly priests and nuns, barricaded themselves within the Madrid Diocesan Seminary. Negotiations brokered by the archdiocese with the police ensured their departure without arrest.^[173]

The violent suppression of Church factions most estranged from the regime prominently featured the "ultra" parapolice entity Guerrilleros de Cristo Rey.^[91] "Left-wing propaganda insisted that the Public Order Forces protected these groups, but we lack conclusive proof: however, it was consistent that many regime loyalists applauded their actions," observes Luis Suárez Fernández.^[174] The Guerrilleros de Cristo Rey garnered the sympathy of the Spanish Priestly Brotherhood [es], an integrist organization uniting clergy opposed to the novel orientations of the Spanish Church emanating from the Second Vatican Council, whose doctrines they categorically rejected.^[91]

New government and assassination of Carrero Blanco

By mid-1973, the political inefficacy of the "immobilist continuity" espoused by Carrero Blanco and the "technocrats" became increasingly apparent,^[166] underscoring that Francoism "had entered a terminal phase of structural crisis attributable to its growing anachronism relative to the social and cultural transformations engendered by the robust economic development of the 1960s. By 1970, Spanish society diverged from its European counterparts solely in the peculiar and antiquated authoritarian character of its political system."^[175]

This deficiency was articulated by the Minister of the Interior, Tomás Garicano Goñi, in his resignation tendered to Franco in May 1973.^[176]^[177] He had previously submitted several confidential dispatches to the Caudillo lamenting the government’s "complacency" toward the violence perpetrated by "ultra" factions and advocating for "genuine openness."^[178]^[179] Garicano Goñi regarded the Movimiento Nacional as an "entelechy" incapable of preserving public order, which he deemed achievable only through "effective participation of all Spaniards of good will." He further cautioned, "I perceive the Prince’s prospects as dim if the state and political organization persist in their insularity."^[166]^[177] The immediate impetus for his resignation stemmed from the grave disturbances on May 2 in Madrid during the funeral of policeman Juan Antonio Fernández, assassinated the preceding day by the far-left Revolutionary Antifascist and Patriotic Front (FRAP), evocative of the incidents during the burial of Anastasio de los Reyes in 1936 [es]. Following the Mass, a cohort of policemen and civilians seized the coffin and conveyed it through the city center (with the collaboration of the Civil Guard Director, Lieutenant General Carlos Iniesta Cano). Several thousand individuals trailed, vociferating "Reds to the firing squad!" and demanding Garicano Goñi’s resignation. In the ensuing days, assaults on the minister (and the government collectively) intensified from the regime’s "hardline" constituencies (the Boletín de la Guardia de Franco [es] de Madrid accused the government of pursuing a "weak and timid policy" and denounced "leniency or a policy of soft measures by the authorities, showing consideration where none should be given"; meanwhile, Fuerza Nueva [es] asserted that "subversion can only be combated with its own weapons. It can only be defeated with the force of accomplished facts").^[180]^[181] During the Mass, far-right factions shouted invectives against "red priests" and Cardinal Tarancón, intoning "Tarancón to the firing squad," a refrain reiterated in subsequent years.^[182]

The governmental crisis precipitated by the resignation of the "openness" proponent Garicano Goñi further fortified Carrero Blanco, who was appointed Prime Minister by Franco, a role the Caudillo had never relinquished throughout thirty-seven years of dictatorship. "Franco was cognizant that his remaining lifespan was limited and deemed the appointee the optimal guarantor that the regime would preserve its essential attributes following his departure."^[183]^[177] Carrero assembled a cabinet of trusted confidants, and the sole concession he made, at the behest of Franco’s familial circle—his spouse, Carmen Polo de Franco, and his son-in-law, Cristóbal Martínez-Bordiú—who wielded increasing influence owing to his physical deterioration (at 81, he suffered from Parkinson's disease)—was to appoint Carlos Arias Navarro, a regime "hardliner" who had served as Director General of Security and Mayor of Madrid, as Minister of the Interior (Carrero had initially contemplated Fernando de Liñán).^[176]^[184]^[185]^[186]^[187]

Carrero increasingly aligned himself with the "hardline" faction of Francoism, as demonstrated by articles he published under a pseudonym, wherein he assailed those advocating for political associations, even if confined "within" the Movement.^[188] In his inaugural address, Carrero reaffirmed the new government’s commitment to "immobilism" by declaring: "If I were to summarize in a single word the action plan the government intends to follow, I would simply say: continue." Among the ministers appointed by Carrero was Julio Rodríguez Martínez, entrusted with the Education portfolio. His initial decree mandated that the university term commence in January rather than September, as per tradition (this measure was facetiously termed the "Julian calendar" in recognition of its proponent).^[189]^[190] Around this period, former minister Manuel Fraga Iribarne visited Franco prior to assuming the role of Spanish ambassador to the United Kingdom in London, observing that Franco appeared "increasingly detached from the vital capacities required by his great responsibility."^[191] Concurrently, coinciding with the new government’s inauguration, a grave labor dispute erupted in Pamplona, instigated by the clandestine "workers' commissions," precipitating a confrontation with the Church. A strike was proclaimed in solidarity with employees dismissed from Motor Ibérica, also demanding trade union freedom [es]. The strikers fortified themselves within the Church of El Salvador [es], and the Bishop of Pamplona declined to permit police eviction, even supplying sustenance to the entrenched workers through Cáritas. Within days, Motor Ibérica was compelled to concede terms to terminate the strike. This episode was interpreted as "a defeat for the system. It afforded the ecclesiastical hierarchy an opportunity to demonstrate that it too favored trade union freedom [es]."^[192]

However, the new administration, which enacted no substantive measures (by late October, Fernández Miranda presented a draft Law of Political Associations that categorically rejected political parties and was never deliberated within the Council of Ministers),^[193] endured for a mere six months.^[194] On the morning of Thursday, 20 December 1973 (coinciding with the scheduled commencement of the "process 1001" trial against the leadership of the clandestine and illegal "workers' commissions"),^[195] ETA detonated a bomb buried beneath the asphalt on a central Madrid thoroughfare as Carrero Blanco’s official vehicle passed, resulting in his demise.^[196] The expeditious assumption of authority by Vice President Torcuato Fernández Miranda, amidst Franco’s shock upon receiving the news ("they have cut the last tie that bound me to the world," he confided to one of his aides),^[197]^[198]^[199] precluded extreme responses from the regime’s "ultra" factions, and military mobilization was averted.^[200]^[201]^[202]^[203] Lieutenant General Carlos Iniesta Cano, Director General of the Civil Guard, had dispatched a telegram to all commands directing the suppression of any "subversive" demonstrations "without the slightest restriction on the use of firearms."^[204] Fernández Miranda, supported by Interior Minister Carlos Arias Navarro and the senior military minister, Admiral Gabriel Pita da Veiga, and with the concurrence of the Chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Lieutenant General Manuel Díez Alegría, compelled Iniesta Cano to rescind the directive.^[205]^[206]^[207] As Javier Tusell observed, "if the event surprised anyone, it was merely due to its novelty at that juncture, which, regrettably, ceased to be exceptional in subsequent years. ETA had previously claimed a life only through the assassination of police commissioner Melitón Manzanas in the Basque Country, some time prior. [...] The days following Carrero’s assassination prolonged the profound impression his death had elicited within Spanish society."^[208] "It is indisputable that the government lacked intelligence regarding what was truly being orchestrated," underscored Luis Suárez Fernández.^[209]

The day subsequent to the assassination, a modest assembly of "ultra" Francoists convened at the site of the attack. Attendees bore Spanish flags, Falange banners, and those of the Traditionalist Communion. Blas Piñar, leader of Fuerza Nueva, addressed the gathering, censuring the government’s passivity in the face of "subversion."^[200] The lying in state was established at the Palace of the Presidency, where Cardinal Tarancón conducted a corpore insepulto [es] Mass (upon departing, "ultra" groups shouted "Tarancón to the wall!"; two ministers expressed outrage toward the leader of the Guerrilleros de Cristo Rey, Mariano Sánchez Covisa, whom they held accountable for "that shameful behavior during a time of mourning").^[210] The funeral, conducted in the afternoon of 21 December, was not attended by General Franco but was presided over by Prince Juan Carlos in naval attire (Franco "appeared utterly overwhelmed. He was unable to eat and secluded himself in his office"; "that night from the 20th to the 21st, he could not sleep").^[211]^[199] That day, a Council of Ministers chaired by Franco conferred the posthumous title of Duke of Carrero Blanco upon the slain admiral. Franco, visibly moved to tears, alluded to the "horrendous crime that has cost the life of our president."^[198] The Caudillo did attend the funeral held on the morning of Saturday, 22 December, at the Basilica of San Francisco el Grande. "A visibly aged Franco—who had just turned 81—and notably frail and tearful, conveyed the impression of presiding over the obsequies of his own political regime," remarked Borja de Riquer [es]. The ceremony was officiated by Cardinal Tarancón, who faced an attempted assault by "ultra" factions upon exiting, who also chanted "Army to power!"^[212] During the proceedings, Education Minister Julio Rodríguez Fernández conspicuously declined to acknowledge the cardinal. Subsequently, he volunteered to lead a commando to enter France and pursue the admiral’s assassins.^[198]^[206] Torcuato Fernández Miranda, as acting president of the government, compelled him to offer an apology to the Cardinal-Archbishop of Madrid.^[213]

The assault on Carrero Blanco precipitated the most severe political crisis throughout the entirety of the Franco regime, as it resulted in the demise of the individual Franco had designated to ensure the perpetuation of his regime following his own decease.^[201] Laureano López Rodó, then serving as Foreign Minister and one of Carrero’s closest collaborators for fifteen years, recorded in his memoirs: "I realized that his death marked the end of the Franco regime. [...] Franco, without Carrero, was a different Franco." Minister Gonzalo Fernández de la Mora contended that ETA "could not have dealt a harder blow to the continuity of the State of 18 July."^[214]^[215] ETA’s own proclamation claiming the regicide stated: "Carrero guaranteed the stability and continuity of Franco’s regime."^[199] According to historian Julio Gil Pecharromán:^[216]

With Luis Carrero Blanco died the dauphin, the figure of Franco's utmost trust, destined to ensure the continuity of the dictatorship. Also disappeared a military man with great prestige in the Armed Forces and a politician who not only seemed capable of imposing himself over the division within the Movement's ranks—including the ultras—but also of preventing the succession in the Head of State from altering, in a reformist sense, the markedly continuist course based on the principle of "everything tied up and well tied." In a way, that 20 December marked the beginning of the Transition.

In his customary New Year’s address, broadcast ten days subsequent to the attack, General Franco, alluding to the event, uttered a phrase that provoked bewilderment for its "unexpected and cruel" nature: "There is no evil that does not come with some good."^[217] According to Javier Tusell, the phrase may signify that Franco harbored a clear perception that "Carrero’s death also liquidated his team and that it was necessary to effect a significant change in the entirety of the governors [sic]. [...] It is highly probable that the negative judgments about the Carrero government that arose within his El Pardo circle greatly influenced him."^[218] Conversely, Carrero Blanco’s assassination exerted a profound impact on the "process 1001" against the leaders of the clandestine and illegal "workers' commissions," as the Public Order Tribunal imposed severe prison sentences, extending up to twenty years for "repeat offenders."^[219]^[220] On 6 January 1974, during the Epiphany Military Review, Franco delivered an oration wherein, after referencing the anguish of Carrero’s death, he characterized terrorism as "a new form of war" to which "Marxism" resorted "because it finds a weak Europe."^[221]

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Final Crisis of Francoism (1974–75)

Summarize

Perspective

As observed a few months subsequent to Franco’s death by Jorge de Esteban [es] and Luis López Guerra, "the structural incapacity of the Spanish state to address the exigencies of modern life became painfully manifest during the biennium 1974–1975, attributable to the global crisis resulting, inter alia, from the abrupt escalation in energy costs."^[222]

Government of Carlos Arias Navarro and the "Spirit of 12 February"

Influenced by his familial entourage, Franco appointed Carlos Arias Navarro as President of the Government in January 1974,^[223] effectively marginalizing the technocrats of Opus Dei definitively.^[224]^[225]^[226] According to Jorge de Esteban [es] and Luis López Guerra, upon their exclusion from power "it was already manifest that the technocratic model of pseudo-partial modernization was leading to an impasse... The reality is that they pursued economic development [es], yet eschewed its social and political ramifications."^[227]

To constitute his administration, Arias Navarro turned to the "families" of the regime, endeavoring to preserve a certain equilibrium between "immobilists" and "reformists" (among the latter were Pío Cabanillas and Antonio Barrera de Irimo as heads of the Ministries of Information and Tourism and Finance, respectively; among the former, the "ultras" José Utrera Molina and Francisco Ruiz Jarabo, Minister-Secretary General of the Movement and Minister of Justice, respectively).^[228]^[229]^[230]^[231]^[232] The civilian and military involutionist factions, spearheaded by the President of the Cortes, Alejandro Rodríguez de Valcárcel, exerted pressure upon Arias Navarro to appoint the camisa vieja and former minister José Antonio Girón de Velasco as Vice President of the Government, but Arias demurred (it appears Franco even contemplated designating Girón as president of the government).^[233]^[234]^[235] Conversely, Franco cultivated a close ("paternal," according to Paul Preston) rapport with the "ultra" minister Utrera Molina. In January 1974, when Utrera informed him of his intention to ideologically rearm the Movement, Franco responded: "On many occasions, we have erred by lowering our guard."^[236]

Nevertheless, Arias Navarro lacked a coherent personal political vision.^[228]^[229]^[237] Initially, he appeared to diverge from "immobilist" stances, and in the address presenting the new government to the Francoist Cortes on 12 February 1974, he articulated certain "opening" commitments—political associations "within" the National Movement, "organic" election of mayors and provincial council presidents, and legal recognition of labor disputes.^[229]^[238] Arias Navarro spoke of perpetuating the "perfective continuity" of the regime, seeking the "widening of participation channels" and "new formulas to give political projection to the real pluralism of our society."^[239] For the first time in Francoism, the "Crusade" was designated as a "civil war," though it was also affirmed that "the legitimacy of 18 July is not subject to reinterpretation or debate."^[240] According to Paul Preston, the discourse was crafted by two members of the "reformist" cohort Tácito [es], Gabriel Cisneros and Luis Jáudenes, at the direction of their superior, the "opening" Minister of the Presidency Antonio Carro, who had also positioned other group members as undersecretaries across various ministries.^[236] According to Luis Suárez Fernández, the text was composed by Antonio Carro and Pío Cabanillas and finalized by Cisneros.^[240]

Furthermore, owing to the policy of Information and Tourism Minister Pío Cabanillas—a figure closely aligned with Manuel Fraga Iribarne, whose inclusion in the government was vetoed by General Franco^[215]—the press enjoyed enhanced latitude for critique, and the "moderate" opposition was "tolerated" (the Christian democrats Joaquín Ruiz Giménez and Fernando Álvarez de Miranda; the liberals Joaquín Satrústegui and Joaquín Garrigues Walker; the social democrat Dionisio Ridruejo; and the socialists Enrique Tierno Galván and Felipe González).^[241]^[242]^[243] "These were moments of significant dissemination and influence of manifestly democratic opinion periodicals, such as Cambio 16 or Triunfo, and newspapers like Ya, Informaciones [es], Tele/eXprés [es], or Diario de Barcelona."^[244] Conversely, Pío Cabanillas faced censure from the "ultras" for being photographed donning a barretina during a visit to Barcelona, where he had journeyed to deliver two addresses advocating the regime’s "opening," eliciting a highly critical editorial in the Movement’s official newspaper Arriba.^[245]

However, this novel "Spirit of 12 February [es]", as the press denominated it, endured for a mere fortnight (indeed, when the "ultra" Utrera Molina elucidated to Franco the implications of the "Spirit of 12 February," the alarmed leader remarked that "if the regime permits its substantial doctrine to be assailed and its servants fail to defend what is fundamental, one must contemplate a cowardly inclination toward suicide").^[236]^[246] By the month’s end, the Bishop of Bilbao, Monsignor Antonio Añoveros Ataún, was directed to depart Spain for having endorsed a sermon advocating the "just freedom" of the Basque people and a political system respectful of their "specific identity." The government adjudged the pastoral letter a "grave assault on national unity." Cardinal Tarancón and the Episcopal Conference upheld Monsignor Añoveros and contested the government’s authority to expel a bishop, threatening excommunication for any individual issuing such a directive. Pope Paul VI supported Tarancón and Añoveros, and Franco himself ultimately intervened to instruct Arias Navarro to relent. "The incident was construed as a political setback for the government, which had been compelled to yield to the resolute stance of the Church and the Holy See," observes Borja de Riquer [es].^[247]^[248]^[249]^[250]^[251] That the government had descended into "ridicule," as the "technocrat" Laureano López Rodó recorded in his memoirs, or had committed "a misstep" and failed "the test of strength," as the "reformist" Manuel Fraga Iribarne noted, was substantiated by the fact that three ministers teetered on the brink of resignation.^[252]

On 2 March, mere days following the onset of the "Añoveros case [es]", the anarchist Catalan Salvador Puig Antich, condemned to death by a court-martial for causing a policeman’s death, was executed by garrote vil (alongside the "Polish" Heinz Chez [es], accused of slaying a Civil Guard officer), notwithstanding protests rigorously suppressed by police and pleas for clemency from across the globe (including Pope Paul VI).^[247]^[248]^[253] In the preceding weeks, "ultra" constituencies had pressured the government against commuting the sentence, also attributing to it the fortification of the anti-Francoist opposition and the public disturbances that had transpired. The death penalty had not been enforced in Spain since 1966.^[238]^[254] The international outcry over Puig Antich’s case resonated with those provoked by the "Burgos trials" (1970) and the trial and execution of Julián Grimau (1963).^[255]

The anachronism and isolation of Francoism became conspicuous when, on 25 April 1974, a military coup prevailed in Portugal, terminating the Salazarist dictatorship, the eldest in Europe (and three months thereafter, the Greek military junta collapsed). "Personalized dictatorships appeared not to endure beyond their founders" (António de Oliveira Salazar had perished in 1970).^[256] One of the government’s initial actions was to confiscate the special edition of the periodical Cuadernos para el Diálogo dedicated to the events in Portugal (the cover headline proclaimed: "Portugal, the end of a dictatorship").^[257] For their part, the "ultra Francoists" promptly warned that the occurrences in Portugal would never transpire in Spain and denounced the "false liberals infiltrated" within the state, assailing the press’s "opening" and the draft legislation on Movement associations.^[258]

Offensive of the "Bunker"

On 28 April 1974, the newspaper Arriba published an article by the former Falangist minister José Antonio Girón de Velasco, a preeminent figure within the "bunker,"^[259] denouncing Arias Navarro’s "opening" as a "betrayal" of the Principles of the National Movement [es]. (In an effort to compel his dismissal, Girón had personally informed Franco that "Arias had betrayed the regime").^[260] This was termed the "gironazo." In the article, Girón de Velasco invoked the Francoist triumph in the Civil War to vigorously oppose any alteration:^[261]^[262]

What is intended in the name of some strange freedom is to forget the sacred commitment we made to the Spanish people, we who one day found ourselves in the inescapable duty to take up arms and saw our best comrades die so that Spain might live. To forget this... would constitute a betrayal on our part, and on the part of those who incite us with their actions to do so, a crime we will not forgive. We proclaim the right to wield against the red flags the flags of hope and realities we raised on 18 July 1936, even if opposed by false liberals or those who, infiltrated in the Administration or spheres of power, dream of the shameful ringing of the bell for the liquidation at auction of the Regime of Francisco Franco...

The "gironazo" elicited widespread approbation from all "ultra" constituencies (Fuerza Nueva endorsed the thesis of preserving the memory of the "sacrifice of the dead"), and Girón faced no dismissal from his positions on the Council of the Realm nor the National Council of the Movement, an omission interpreted as tacit endorsement by Franco.^[263]^[264] On the same day Girón’s article appeared in Arriba, Nuevo Diario [es] published an interview with Lieutenant General Tomás García Rebull [es], another prominent "ultra," wherein he asserted that "as a Falangist, I do not accept associations of any kind" because "associations inevitably lead to political parties, and for me, parties are the opium of the people, and politicians their vampires." He further alleged that behind Carrero Blanco's assassination lay Freemasonry. When pressed for evidence, he replied: "Well... based on what I see. Many times I wonder: but where does this come from? And I always say: nothing, Freemasonry. I even think we’ve exported Freemasons."^[265]^[255] Evidently, García Rebull’s article formed part of a stratagem by "ultra" generals for Carlos Iniesta Cano, on the verge of retirement, to succeed the "liberal" Manuel Díez Alegría as Chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and for Ángel Campano to assume the Directorate-General of the Civil Guard vacated by Iniesta Cano. This plan was to be followed by a purge of all officers suspected of liberalism. Upon being apprised by the Army Minister Francisco Coloma Gallegos of the scheme, the government president visited Franco to intervene or tender his resignation. "Franco, who regarded military regulations and seniority as sacrosanct priorities, supported Arias, and Iniesta was compelled to retire at the designated time, 12 May," affirmed Paul Preston.^[266]

A few days subsequent to the "gironazo," Gonzalo Fernández de la Mora, the ideologue of the "technocrat" immobilists, likened Arias Navarro to General Dámaso Berenguer whose government "had confined itself to observing the dissolution of the state and its gradual replacement by what was advocated, not by the country, but by frivolous minorities or those resentful of the [Miguel Primo de Rivera] Dictatorship" in ABC.^[267] Concurrently, Blas Piñar in his contributions to Fuerza Nueva [es] branded the "aperturists" as "traitors" and accused the government of feebleness against "subversion." At a public gathering convened at Fuerza Nueva’s headquarters, he surpassed Girón’s rhetoric, declaring that "despite the war communiqué [es] that led to the laying down of arms, the war has not concluded, and peace, regrettably, commences never and must be secured through everyone’s endeavor."^[268]

Two months following Girón’s article in Arriba, the Chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Lieutenant General Manuel Díez Alegría, regarded as a "liberal" ("a clear representative of the army’s more professional and less political sector"),^[269] was relieved of his command after an official sojourn to Romania where he had conferred with the communist dictator Nicolae Ceaușescu, who maintained close associations with Santiago Carrillo, Secretary General of the clandestine and illegal Communist Party of Spain (with whom Díaz Alegría refused to convene).^[270]^[271] Franco expressed irritation upon learning of the trip.^[272] "The dismissal transpired, in a manner, under the influence of the Portuguese events, that is, out of an exaggerated apprehension that Díez Alegría might emerge as a new António de Spínola (one of the military figures who led the transition in the neighboring country), following an article in El Alcázar by a writer concealing his identity under the pseudonym 'Jerjes'"^[273] launched a severe critique against him."^[274] Indeed, Díez Alegría had begun receiving monocles as gifts, akin to those employed by General Spínola.^[275] A few days prior, the "ultra" minister Utrera Molina had advocated the necessity to "ideologically rearm the system against the offensive of a distorting and dissolving thought and the reality of growing subversion."^[269] The subsequent year, military intelligence apprehended eleven officers accused of leading the Democratic Military Union [es] (UMD), a clandestine military organization established in August 1974 in Barcelona that, emulating the Portuguese model, sought to enlist younger army officers in support of a democratic transformation in Spain—but its scope remained exceedingly limited and secured the allegiance of approximately two hundred fifty lieutenants, captains, and commanders.^[276]^[277]^[278] Among those detained were the apparent UMD leaders, Commanders Julio Busquets [es] and Luis Otero [es].^[279] The "precipitate wave of denials of any significance" to the matter proved highly revealing. More forthright was the Chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Lieutenant General Carlos Fernández Vallespín, who declared that "to address the crux of the matter, since the Portuguese revolt, there have been elements dreaming of staging a 25 April here."^[280]

The perception that one was witnessing the terminal crisis of Francoism intensified in July 1974 when General Franco was admitted to hospital due to thrombophlebitis, necessitating the temporary delegation of his powers to Prince Juan Carlos (who would assume the Head of State role for forty-six days).^[281]^[282] The decision by Franco’s personal physician Vicente Gil to hospitalize him provoked the displeasure of the Caudillo’s son-in-law, who was not consulted (the Marquis of Villaverde, also a physician, was in the Philippines at the time for professional reasons^[283] and had also attended the Miss World pageant).^[284] His life was deemed imperiled, and a priest administered the last rites. Yet he recuperated^[285]^[269] and on 15 August departed the hospital to spend several days recuperating at the Pazo de Meirás. On the 28th, he received the "ultra" minister Utrera Molina, who spoke of purported plans to incapacitate him, rendering it imperative to reclaim his authority. Franco concurred (characterizing it as a "miserable pretension") and responded: "I am not a dictator clinging to not losing prerogatives, but it is not the first time Spain has demanded my sacrifice. After a prudent interval and the corrections I deem urgent, I will reconsider my decision. [...] Do not forget that, in the final instance, the Army will defend its victory" (Utrera also alluded to the possibility of Juan Carlos introducing radical changes post-mortem, to which Franco rejoined: "When I die, everything will be different, but there are oaths that bind").^[286]^[287] On 30 August, following a Council of Ministers convened at the Pazo de Meirás under Juan Carlos’s presidency, the Interior Minister José García Hernández advised Franco: "My general, it is time to alleviate your responsibilities and entrust the helm to other hands." "You know that is not feasible," Franco replied. Three days thereafter, the re-assumption of his powers was publicly announced.^[288] Prince Juan Carlos received the news while dining in Mallorca with his father, Don Juan de Borbón, and others, and expressed irritation at the manner of its execution and the absence of prior notification.^[289] In the background loomed the crisis unfolding in the Spanish Sahara colony due to Hassan II’s intention to annex it into Morocco (he had designated 1974 as the year of "Sahara liberation"). This constituted one of the rationales Franco later cited for reclaiming his authority.^[290]

During the two months of his convalescence, the "ultras" once again advanced the candidacy of Alfonso de Borbón y Dampierre, married to Franco’s eldest granddaughter, thereby also enjoying familial backing (the law permitted the Generalissimo to rescind his 1969 decision in favor of Juan Carlos).^[291] Indeed, the Marquis of Villaverde, Don Alfonso’s father-in-law, remarked to Vicente Gil, who had insisted Franco sign the temporary cession of the Head of State role: "What a poor service you have rendered my father-in-law! What a fine service you have done that little boy Juanito!" (the Marquis ensured Vicente Gil’s replacement by Dr. Vicente Pozuelo Escudero as Franco’s personal physician; one of Pozuelo’s initial decisions was to officially disclose that Franco suffered from Parkinson’s disease).^[292] Meanwhile, the French, German, and British ambassadors apprised their respective governments that they discerned no prospect for the dictatorship’s continuity post-Franco’s demise, having initiated contacts with the moderate democratic opposition. The regime’s sole remaining ally was the United States, keenly interested in renewing the military bases treaty and ensuring Spain’s stability following the Caudillo’s departure, banking on the continuity that Juan Carlos’s monarchy would afford.^[293]

On 13 September, shortly after resuming his powers, a savage ETA assault claimed 12 lives—wounding over 80—all civilians. They had planted a bomb in the Rolando café on Madrid’s Correo Street, proximate to the Puerta del Sol, a locale frequented by police from the nearby Directorate-General of Security.^[294]^[295]^[296] Franco commented to his physician upon hearing the tidings: "either we end them, or they will end us."^[296] The Rolando café bombing was exploited by the extreme right to exert pressure on the government, whose president defended himself by critiquing the attitude of "certain sectors, prone to clinging to nostalgia." Blas Piñar, leader of Fuerza Nueva, responded with an article entitled "Mr. President," published on 27 September in the magazine of the same name [es] (then of limited circulation),^[296], stating (it was dubbed the "piñarazo" for its resemblance to the "gironazo" of 28 April):^[297]^[298]

Mr. President, we exclude ourselves from your policy. [...] We cannot, after what you have said, collaborate with you, not even in opposition... We do not want to obey or accompany you. But take note of those who accompany you and where they lead you. Consider whether they guide or push you. And do not lament at the end if you see that this type of democratization you so urgently seek rises upon a legion of corpses, of which those pulled from the rubble on 13 September, from the very heart of Spain’s capital, are a preview and advance when that democratization begins.

A few weeks thereafter, the National Confederation of Ex-Combatants [es], presided over by Girón, presented its members as "combatants of Spain." "We proceed from the irrevocable fact of 18 July 1936 [es]... We are not ex-combatants. We are combatants of Spain and the national revolution. [...] For all this, we aspire for the political regime to which we are loyal to fulfill its revolutionary commitment. In this order, peace is attainable. But without justice, peace is neither attainable nor desirable." On 16 November, Girón himself, on behalf of the Confederation, again employed threatening rhetoric: "We bear the same responsibility that, for reasons of honor, drove us to the mountains in 1936. [...] We are compelled by the duty to obstruct those who seek to wrest our victory."^[299] On 27 November, Franco received them at the Palacio de El Pardo, with Girón at the forefront, and the Caudillo addressed them: "You are on active duty and in active service, and you are rendering the Fatherland a most significant service, namely the vigilance of peace, the confirmation of this peace, and national unity." He counseled them: "Close ranks, keep them intact, preserve your combative spirit."^[300]

The bunker’s pressure precipitated the "reformist" Pío Cabanillas’ dismissal on 29 October (to "balance" his administration, Arias Navarro attempted to have the "ultra" ministers Utrera Molina and Ruiz Jarabo removed as well, but Franco demurred because both were "very loyal").^[301] It was rumored that the "ultras" had presented Franco with an extensive dossier featuring photographs of women in bikinis from Spanish periodicals ingeniously intermingled with erotic foreign magazine images, alongside details on the Reace case [es], in which Nicolás Franco was implicated, for which the minister was held accountable. This latter point purportedly irked Franco the most. "What utility is there in everyone asserting Cabanillas is very clever if he could not prevent my brother’s name from appearing in the press? I do not wish to see Cabanillas in a Council of Ministers again," he is alleged to have remarked.^[302]^[303] Cabanillas’ departure from the government precipitated an unprecedented occurrence in Francoism, as in solidarity, "reformist" minister Antonio Barrera de Irimo and several senior administration officials of the same inclination resigned, many of whom would emerge as prominent figures in the democratic transition (Francisco Fernández Ordóñez, Marcelino Oreja, Juan Antonio Ortega y Díaz-Ambrona, Juan José Rosón, etc.).^[304]^[305]^[301]^[286] "There is no doubt that Cabanillas’ replacement, which dragged along an entire team, was Franco’s own decision," asserts Luis Suárez Fernández.^[306] Subsequent to Pío Cabanillas’ exit from the Ministry of Information and Tourism, the government’s policy toward the press stiffened, frequently invoking "its prerogatives to suspend a newspaper or demand the withdrawal of an article."^[307]

The dismissal of Cabanillas and the "cascade of resignations" that ensued,^[286] signified the termination of the "reformist" agenda during Franco’s lifetime and affirmed the schism within the Francoist political elite, evident in December when political associations "within" the Movement received approval,^[308] as the majority of "reformists" rejected them.^[309]^[310] The ultimately ratified Associations Statute (on 16 December 1974, by 95 votes in favor and 3 abstentions)^[311] had been drafted by José Utrera Molina, who revived the project from a decade earlier by José Solís Ruiz, discarding Arias’s "aperturist" Antonio Carro’s proposal that did not provide for Movement oversight of associations. Moreover, the approved Statute prohibited associations from possessing a regional character, mandating support from at least 25,000 individuals residing in a minimum of 15 provinces.^[312]^[286]^[313] "To secure the text’s approval, a very explicit sanction from Franco was requisite, evidence that, despite his condition, he remained the decisive and unappealable authority," affirmed Javier Tusell.^[314] Indeed, to dissuade him from the opposition he had expressed, a Note entitled Guarantees Contained in the Draft Statute of the Right to Political Association was presented, emphasizing that all its articles conformed "with the Principles of the National Movement and other Fundamental Laws."^[315] In his traditional New Year’s message, Franco declared that the Associations opened "a new and hopeful prospect that will offer all Spaniards of good and clean intent the opportunity for more active political participation" and also invoked "the need to remain united." "We have progressed together in far more critical junctures than the present ones and have invariably surmounted them with an integrative will, with confidence, and, above all, with that faith and love for the Fatherland that made us forget everything to maintain, at all costs, unity."^[316]

The "ultras" also contested the associations for opposing reasons. On 20 December 1973, they convened a gathering before the Church of San Jerónimo el Real in Madrid, where a funeral for Carrero Blanco was being conducted, attended by Juan Carlos and the entire government. Participants voiced slogans such as "We do not desire an opening, we demand a firm hand!" and "Long live 18 July, down with 12 February!", accompanied by the customary "Tarancón to the wall!" (Arias Navarro was greeted upon his arrival with the cry "Butter, butter!").^[317] In a televised address on 27 February 1975, subsequently renowned as the "little light of El Pardo" speech, President Arias Navarro conclusively interred the nascent "spirit" proclaimed a year prior:^[318]^[319]

To all those who might harbor doubts about possible weaknesses or discouragements, I would furnish them with the means to dispel their doubts forthwith: let them approach the El Pardo Palace. There persists a little light ever illuminated in the office of the Caudillo, where the man who has devoted his entire existence to the service of Spain remains, without mercy for himself, resolute at the helm, charting the course of the ship...

Impact of the "Oil Crisis" and the rise in social and political conflict

By late 1973, the international economic crisis, initially precipitated by a dramatic escalation in oil prices (from $3 to $11.6 per barrel), had commenced. However, the Arias Navarro administration confined itself to subsidizing gasoline and diesel prices to preclude the increase from impacting consumers. This measure failed to avert a 70% price surge and also contributed to an expanding trade deficit, already substantial, as oil imports continued to rise due to unabated consumption—unlike the European Economic Community countries, which had implemented energy-conservation measures. Furthermore, the balance of payments transitioned from a surplus of 500 million in 1973 to a deficit of 3,268 million in 1974, markedly diminishing foreign exchange reserves (tourism revenues had diminished, and foreign investments had declined). GDP growth decelerated (from 8% in 1973 to 5.7% in 1974 and 1.1% in 1975), and inflation ascended precipitously (from 11.2% in 1973—already double the OECD average—to 15.7% in 1974 and 17% in 1975), heralding the emergence of the economic phenomenon known as "stagflation".^[320] Moreover, as the crisis afflicted other European nations, numerous emigrants lost their employment and were compelled to return to Spain, augmenting unemployment.^[321] The government eschewed necessary adjustment measures "because they would have entailed freezing wages and increasing unemployment at a juncture when it required the greatest possible popularity," according to Luis Suárez Fernández.^[322]

The deteriorating economic circumstances translated into heightened social conflict. The incidence of strikes multiplied fivefold compared to 1970, notwithstanding the absence of legal recognition for the right to strike (according to official statistics, there were 2,290 strikes in 1974 and 3,156 in 1975, the highest tally in Francoist history).^[323] However, strikers not only sought wage increments or improved working conditions but increasingly demanded trade union freedom [es], acknowledgment of the right to strike, and cessation of dismissals and repression (approximately 25,000 workers lost their positions in 1974 for supporting strikes, while others faced arrest and imprisonment for "illegal activities").^[324]^[325] Solidarity strikes with other workers in dispute with their employers were commonplace.^[326] General strikes also transpired in specific cities (such as Pamplona in January 1975 in solidarity with workers at Potasas de Navarra), regions (like the Baix Llobregat in July and December 1974), or provinces (on 11 December 1974 in Vizcaya and Guipúzcoa). Strikes were frequently accompanied by other forms of mobilization, such as workplace occupations; assemblies and lock-ins in churches, universities, and Vertical Syndicate facilities; protest marches; hunger strikes; and so forth. They garnered support from diverse social sectors (public declarations, recitation of manifestos, alternative concerts or popular festivals, etc.). Internal reports from Francoist authorities expressed apprehension. One from the Barcelona civil government noted: "Opposition groups, though small compared to the working masses, are increasingly empowered among their peers and exert growing influence." The sole response they deemed effective was repression: between 1969 and 1975, twenty workers perished from gunfire by public order forces.^[327]

Conflict was not confined to the labor sphere but also manifested in the university, neighborhood, professional, and cultural domains. The student movement amplified its activism to the extent that it has been asserted that the regime lost "the battle of the university." "The institution existed in perpetual abnormality, involving frequent police incursions into campuses and the closure of entire centers and universities, such as the indefinite closure of the University of Valladolid [es] in February 1975." To this was added the movement of non-tenured professors (PNNs), who initiated a strike in early 1975, paralyzing academic life for the remainder of the 1974-1975 academic year. They demanded job stability, enhanced salaries, and participation in university governance to achieve genuine autonomy.^[328] The community association also gained traction, particularly in the neighborhoods of major cities and towns within their metropolitan areas, many of which still had half their streets unpaved. The number of community associations increased markedly, as did the protests and mobilizations they orchestrated, often aimed at securing democratic municipal governments (mayors were appointed directly or indirectly by the government). Numerous associations faced suspension for several months by governmental decree.^[329]

Professional associations also grew increasingly critical. Among them, the bar associations distinguished themselves, led by the Madrid Bar Association [es], presided over by Antonio Pedrol Rius [es], which called for a regime of freedoms and the establishment of a rule of law in Spain. As early as 1970, the Lawyers' Congress convened in León had articulated this demand. The associations of degree holders mobilized somewhat later, but in 1974, a candidacy sponsored by the clandestine Communist Party of Spain (PCE) and Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE) prevailed in the Madrid Association of Degree Holders.^[330]

The cultural sphere also witnessed notable mobilization. Intellectuals, artists, professors, actors [es], singers, and others led strikes and lock-ins, in addition to endorsing manifestos in favor of freedom. "They ventured to appear publicly as overt adversaries of the dictatorship, despite the risk of arrests, fines, and exclusion from public media (television, radio)." This was accompanied by a proliferation of publications and books advocating democracy, to the extent that "the process of cultural delegitimization of Francoism, already underway by the late 1960s, accelerated markedly in the 1970s, so that by the time of the dictator’s death, democratic critical thought was clearly predominant in the realm of high culture. [...] In 1975, a genuine chasm existed between the culture of official Spain and the cultural patterns of authentic Spain."^[331]

A few months subsequent to Franco’s demise, Jorge de Esteban [es] and Luis López Guerra attributed the elevated level of social conflict, more so than to the economic crisis’s impact, to "the lack of adaptation of state institutions to the current economic-social structure. A socially pluralistic, industrialized nation cannot be governed in the same manner as an economically underdeveloped, socially stagnant one... Hence, the failure to resolve key issues [the constitutional, Church-State relations, fiscal, social integration, regional integration, etc.] led to a deterioration in coexistence among Spaniards."^[332]

On the other hand, historians have deliberated to what extent the burgeoning labor and social conflict proved decisive in the ultimate crisis of the Francoist dictatorship. Borja de Riquer [es] has posited that "the continuous transgression of legality and public order, the so-called 'subversion,' was addressed solely with repressive policies, which further augmented the political destabilization of the Arias Navarro government. In this manner, social mobilization exerted a highly decisive influence on the final crisis of Francoism by deteriorating the government’s and regime’s image, both domestically and internationally, and increasing internal dissent, while also contributing to the anti-Francoist politicization of a segment of Spanish society."^[333]

Growth of the Anti-Francoist opposition

Although widespread political passivity persisted among the majority of the populace, fostered by decades of dictatorship,^[334] the significant escalation in social and political conflict—not merely among workers but also in universities, the cultural sphere, neighborhood settings, and even the Catholic ecclesiastical domain—"resulted in a noticeable expansion of the democratic opposition, which, despite persistent and severe government repression, augmented its social support."^[335] A 1974 survey revealed that 60% of respondents favored a democratically elected government.^[336] Evidence of the opposition’s growth was the dramatic increase in cases adjudicated before the Public Order Tribunal, rising from 1,695 in 1972 to 2,382 in 1974 and 4,317 in 1975. Additionally, military courts processed 305 civilians between 1974 and 1975, all prosecuted for exercising freedoms of expression, association, and demonstration recognized in any democratic state.^[337] The organization Justice and Peace [es], led by Joaquín Ruiz Giménez, a former Francoist minister and founder of Cuadernos para el Diálogo, launched a campaign for amnesty. By 1974, it had amassed 160,000 signatures of support.^[337]

As Franco’s death appeared increasingly imminent, the anti-Francoist opposition began to converge toward unifying their diverse proposals to terminate the dictatorship, a feat never accomplished in its history.^[338]^[339] The model largely emulated was that of the Assembly of Catalonia, a unitary platform established in Barcelona in November 1971, which united all anti-Francoist Catalan parties and organizations, including communists (Unified Socialist Party of Catalonia in Catalonia). Its rallying cry, "Freedom, Amnesty, and Statute of Autonomy," was adopted by the broader opposition.^[340] By 1974, it was present in forty Catalan localities, with over one hundred groups and entities joining (in fact, the arrest of its Permanent Commission members—113 individuals in October 1973 and 67 in September 1974—did not debilitate it, enabling it to promote campaigns such as "Why the 1932 Statute" or "We Want Democratic Municipalities").^[341]

Thus, on 29 July 1974 (while Franco was hospitalized), Santiago Carrillo, general secretary of the clandestine Communist Party of Spain (by far the most entrenched anti-Francoist party in Spain, far surpassing the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party), introduced the Democratic Junta in Paris—the initial fruit of the nationwide opposition convergence process. Alongside the PCE (which formalized its 1970 "pact for freedom" proposal),^[342]^[343] it encompassed the Socialist Party of the Interior led by Enrique Tierno Galván—soon to be redesignated Spanish Socialist Workers' Party—the Carlist Party—a faction of Carlism that had shifted toward the "self-managed socialism" propounded by Carlos Hugo, Duke of Parma—and two prominent "Juanists" monarchists, Antonio García Trevijano and Rafael Calvo Serer—apparently the idea’s proponents following their unsuccessful endeavor to have Juan de Borbón issue a complete rupture with the Francoist regime (and indirectly with his son, Prince Juan Carlos, Franco’s successor).^[344]^[345]^[346] It also incorporated certain far-left communist groups, such as the Workers' Party of Spain, and the increasingly PCE-influenced "Workers' Commissions". The Democratic Junta’s program rested on a "democratic break" with Francoism through citizen mobilization (modeled on the process pursued in 1930-1931 to terminate the monarchy of Alfonso XIII [es]).^[347]^[348] In Spain, the Democratic Junta was clandestinely presented in a Madrid hotel in January 1975. Its objective was to establish a provisional government to restore freedoms, grant a comprehensive amnesty for all political prisoners, decree separation of church and state, and conduct a referendum on the form of government, monarchy or republic.^[349]^[350] Concerning the scope of the amnesty, Santiago Carrillo declared in a Paris address that it should extend to both sides of the civil war, "and not only for those who fought in the war, but also for those who fought afterward and for those who killed us afterward."^[351]

However, the PCE failed to integrate opposition forces unwilling to accept communist hegemony—led by the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party and the Team of Christian Democracy—which also diverged from the Democratic Junta on a pivotal issue: they were prepared to endorse Juan Carlos’s monarchy if it ushered in a fully democratic political system, unlike the Junta’s rejection of "Franco’s successor". These groups constituted their own unitary entity in June 1975, denominated the Platform of Democratic Convergence, comprising the PSOE—having revitalized its program and leadership at the Suresnes Congress [es] in October 1974, where a young Sevillian labor lawyer, Felipe González, was elected new secretary general, supplanting the veteran Rodolfo Llopis—and the Team of Christian Democracy led by José María Gil-Robles y Quiñones (the former CEDA leader during the Second Spanish Republic) and Joaquín Ruiz Giménez, alongside the Basque Nationalist Party, the social democratic faction of ex-Falangist Dionisio Ridruejo, and several far-left communist groups such as the Communist Movement of Spain (MCE) and the Revolutionary Workers' Organization (ORT).^[347] The Platform proved more radical than the Democratic Junta in recognizing the "right to self-determination" of "nationalities and regions with ethnic, historical, or cultural identity." The Democratic Junta confined its program to "recognizing, under Spain’s unity, the political personality of the Catalan, Basque, and Galician peoples and the regional communities that democratically request it."^[352]

One dilemma confronting the democratic opposition was the stance to adopt regarding ETA’s terrorist assaults, which claimed thirty-four lives in 1974 and 1975—eighteen police and civil guards, and sixteen civilians (indeed, within the organization itself, a debate had emerged on the role of violence in the anti-Francoist struggle, culminating in the schism between "milis" and "poli-milis" following the brutal Café Rolando bombing in Madrid on 13 September 1973). The majority of Basque and Spanish democratic forces opposed "armed struggle" while denouncing the violence of Francoist repression. However, they acknowledged ETA’s popular support among certain Basque social sectors, particularly after the "Burgos Trials" of December 1970. "With not a few ambiguities," their adopted position was to avoid condemning ETA’s terrorism.^[353] Nevertheless, the PCE did censure the assassination of Carrero Blanco, with even more forceful condemnation subsequent to the Café Rolando bombing, though ETA did not claim responsibility until years later.^[354]

On the other hand, Javier Tusell has observed that in these final years of Francoism, "a kind of intermediate zone" materialized between the "moderate" opposition and the "reformist" sector of the regime, "comprising individuals who, from within the regime, sought to attain democracy, or opponents who, because they favored that reformist path, did not differ substantially from their supposed adversaries. This intermediate world played a very significant role in the Spanish transition to democracy." According to Tusell, the Tácito [es] group, formed in mid-1973, constituted the most substantial of this "intermediate zone."^[355] Among the Tácito group were Fernando Álvarez de Miranda, Luis Apostua [es], and Íñigo Cavero.^[356]

Final agony of the dictatorship

In early March 1975, Arias Navarro undertook a restructuring of his government, capitalizing on the resignation of Vice President and Labor Minister Licinio de la Fuente (who withdrew from office owing to the president’s opposition to regulating labor conflicts, including a modest acknowledgment of the right to strike).^[357]^[358] Threatening to resign, Arias Navarro ultimately persuaded Franco to accept the departure of the two "ultra" ministers, José Utrera Molina and Francisco Ruiz Jarabo, with the former succeeded by the "aperturist" Fernando Herrero Tejedor, whose trusted associate, Adolfo Suárez, assumed the vice-secretary role.^[359]^[358]^[310]^[360] This adjustment accentuated the politically neutral, albeit moderately aperturist, character of the administration. However, in June, Herrero Tejedor perished in a vehicular accident, and Arias, at Franco’s insistence,^[361] appointed José Solís Ruiz as his successor, who had forsaken "aperturism."^[318]^[362]^[363] A few weeks thereafter, Girón and Rodríguez de Valcárcel, in collaboration with the "El Pardo circle," made a final endeavor to convince Franco to dismiss Arias Navarro or at least prolong Rodríguez de Valcárcel’s tenure as president of the Council of the Realm and the Francoist Cortes. "But Franco was already scarcely capable of reacting and unable to enact any measures."^[364] Arias Navarro contemplated resignation—he even drafted a resignation letter dated 25 July—but was dissuaded by ministers Solís and José García Hernández.^[365]

Solís was entrusted with developing the decree-law on associations within the "Movement community," and in August, he inaugurated the National Register of Associations—the "window"—to which the following adhered: Spanish People's Union, an association established by the government, with Solís as its principal advocate and Adolfo Suárez, a trusted confidant of the deceased Herrero Tejedor, as president (initially designated Alliance for the People, AP, it sought to perpetuate the National Movement, with its statutes presented to Franco himself);^[366] Spanish National Union, led by the Traditionalist Antonio María de Oriol y Urquijo; Institutional Front, chaired by Ramón Forcadell; Spanish National Front [es], directed by the Falangist camisa vieja Raimundo Fernández-Cuesta; Spanish Social Reform, headed by the Falangist Manuel Cantarero del Castillo [es]; Democratic Spanish Union [es], presided over by the conservative Catholic Federico Silva Muñoz; the National Association for the Study of Current Issues [es] (ANEPA), led by the likewise Catholic Leopoldo Stampa; and the Proverist Association, chaired by Manuel Maysounave.^[367]^[368]

Meanwhile, the "reformist" faction rejected the restrictive framework offered by associations within the "Movement community" and opted to establish study societies, precursors to future political parties. The most notable was FEDISA (Federación de Estudios Independientes), founded by Manuel Fraga Iribarne—who later established GODSA [es]—and including Pío Cabanillas, José María de Areilza, Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo, Francisco Fernández Ordóñez, and Marcelino Oreja Aguirre, the latter also a member of the Christian-democratic Tácito [es] collective. The liberal Joaquín Garrigues Walker founded the Libra Study Society.^[344]^[368]^[369] "The political associations were born predestined to fail. By then, Fraga, serving as ambassador in London, and the Tácitos were issuing vague pronouncements regarding the desirability of a 'gradual democratic evolution' culminating in the election of a chamber by universal suffrage," though they also repudiated "the political break advocated by the democratic opposition."^[368] Journalist Luis María Ansón [es], in the pages of ABC on 20 May, cautioned of "a rumor of rats abandoning the regime’s ship," as the situation had entered a phase of "save-yourself-who-can, unconditional surrender."^[370] The government, meanwhile, persisted in defending its program of "evolutionary continuity," whose "four basic foundations" were "popular will, Constitution, Monarchy, and Army," as elucidated by the Minister of the Presidency [es] Antonio Carro before the Francoist Cortes on 28 July.^[371] A few days prior, Franco had addressed a delegation from the National Brotherhood of Provisional Ensigns [es]—in reference to his denunciation of the anti-Francoist opposition (the previous day, the Revolutionary Antifascist Patriotic Front [FRAP] had killed a policeman): "I believe you ascribe too much significance to barking dogs. In reality, they constitute minuscule minorities that precisely demonstrate our vitality and test the strength and resilience of our homeland." He then exhorted them to defend the Civil War victory to the death.^[372] Around the same period, the government prohibited the entry of Juan de Borbón, father of Prince Juan Carlos, into Spain for a discourse in which he declared: "I consider it an inescapable duty to persevere in our attitude until those who truly possess the authority to steer the state aright are convinced they must do so, so that the Spanish people, as is just, finally attain access to national sovereignty."^[363]

In April, the conflict with the Catholic Church intensified when the Episcopal Conference approved (by seventy votes to eleven) the document La Reconciliación en la Iglesia y en la Sociedad. Carta pastoral Colectiva del Episcopado Español [The Reconciliation in the Church and in Society. Collective Pastoral Letter of the Spanish Episcopate], which unequivocally stated that "in our homeland, the progressive endeavor to create appropriate political structures and institutions must be sustained by the will to overcome the deleterious effects of the Spanish Civil War that then divided citizens into victors and vanquished, and which still constitute a grave impediment to full reconciliation among brethren." This marked a complete reversal of the Collective Letter of the Spanish Bishops on the Occasion of the War in Spain of 1937, wherein the Catholic Church justified the military uprising and legitimized the rebel side’s struggle by designating the war a "Crusade."^[154] The document also advocated the necessity of establishing freedom of political parties, trade union freedom [es], and recognition of the right to strike.^[373] The following month, the National Justice and Peace Commission [es] commenced drafting a document, published shortly thereafter, rejecting the Francoist regime as authoritarian and undemocratic and advocating a "break" with it (calling for universal suffrage, amnesty, guarantees of rights, the dissolution of the Francoist Cortes for being unrepresentative, and freedom of parties and unions). It also demanded a new Joint Assembly akin to that of 1971, open to all faithful to participate in the Church’s life and governance.^[374]

During those months, labor conflict continued to escalate as a consequence of the economic crisis, which deteriorated further with rising inflation (17% in 1975) and unemployment (700,000 unemployed, 5% of the active population), coinciding with two financial scandals (Reace case [es] and SOFICO [es]).^[375] This precipitated the most significant wave of strikes and worker mobilizations in Francoist history,^[376] including new sectors such as resident medical interns (MIR), who initiated a strike in May.^[377] The subsequent month, "unitary democratic candidacies" promoted by the "Workers' Commissions" and other clandestine organizations prevailed in union elections in large enterprises and industrial regions with a robust combative tradition, as well as elsewhere.^[378]^[379] The civil governor of Barcelona, Rodolfo Martín Villa, acknowledged that for the government, they constituted "a success in participation and a political failure to the extent that the general impression was that they had been won by a trade union opposition whose core was the Communist Party of Spain." In certain localities, such as Cornellà de Llobregat, the newly elected union representatives occupied Vertical Syndicate offices, expelling Falangist leaders. Leaders of the Catalan "Workers' Commissions" spoke of undertaking "the political assault on the Vertical Syndicate with the intention of dismantling it as an instrument of employer and fascist regime interests."^[378]

Additionally, terrorist activity intensified, both from ETA—with eighteen fatalities in 1974 and sixteen in 1975—and from the Revolutionary Antifascist Patriotic Front (FRAP)—with three lethal attacks in 1975. This, in turn, heightened repression, including the reimposition of a state of emergency in Vizcaya and Guipúzcoa on 25 April 1975. On 22 August 1975, a decree-law "on the prevention and prosecution of terrorism and subversion against social peace and personal security" was promulgated, reinstating military jurisdiction as in the early Francoism period and suspending Articles 15 and 18 of the Fuero de los Españoles [es], which addressed the inviolability of the home and the 72-hour limit on detentions. The government deemed "the clemency shown in the Burgos Council to have been an error" and believed it essential "to induce the violent to cease their activities through fear of exceedingly severe reprisals."^[380] The anti-Francoist opposition’s rejection of the decree was joined by Cardinal Tarancón, who regarded it as a misstep.^[381] This repressive escalation particularly targeted the Basque Country.^[382]^[383]^[384] Between 1973 and 1975, approximately 6,500 Basque citizens were detained, many reporting mistreatment and torture at police stations or Guardia Civil barracks.^[385]

Under the anti-terrorism legislation, between 29 August and 17 September 1975, three ETA militants and eight FRAP members (including two pregnant women) were subjected to various courts-martial and sentenced to death.^[386]^[387]^[388] This provoked substantial public outcry both within and beyond Spain, as well as clemency appeals from prominent European political figures—including Pope Paul VI^[389] and Queen Elizabeth II of the United Kingdom. Notwithstanding this, Franco declined to commute the death sentences of two ETA militants (Ángel Otaegui [es] and Juan Paredes Manot [es]) and three FRAP members (José Luis Sánchez Bravo [es], Ramón García Sanz [es], and Humberto Baena [es]), and the five were executed by firing squad on 27 September 1975. This act, characterized as "brutal" by most European press, further intensified international condemnation of Francoism, leading to numerous anti-Francoist demonstrations in major European cities (the Spanish embassy in Lisbon was stormed by a crowd, with Portuguese police offering no resistance). Moreover, the ambassadors of fifteen Western European nations withdrew from Madrid, plunging the Francoist regime back into an isolation and reprobation reminiscent of the immediate post-World War II period.^[390]^[391]^[387] Pope Paul VI expressed "his vibrant condemnation of such harsh repression that disregarded the appeals raised from all quarters against those executions." "Unfortunately, we have not been heeded," he concluded.^[388] The President of Mexico, Luis Echeverría, called for Spain’s expulsion from the United Nations.^[392]^[387] The European Economic Community suspended negotiations with Spain.^[393] The Permanent Commission of the Episcopal Conference, presided over by Cardinal Tarancón, issued a statement condemning terrorism but asserting that "repressive measures alone are insufficient" and that "a loyal political opposition or criticism of the government... cannot legitimately be considered a criminal act."^[394] In the Basque Country, a general strike was declared, followed by over 200,000 workers.^[386]^[395] "If, as the Caudillo had declared, the pardon following the Burgos Trials had been a sign of the regime’s strength, the executions of 27 September 1975 were the sign of its final decline," asserted Paul Preston.^[387]

In response, on 1 October 1975 (the thirty-ninth anniversary of General Franco’s ascent to power),^[387] the Movement organized a rally in support of Franco [es] in Madrid’s Plaza de Oriente. In his address, a frail Franco, nearly voiceless, once again spoke of a "Masonic and leftist conspiracy" against Spain.^[396] The speech "could not have been more pathetic and significant. He was, like his regime, utterly anchored in the past," observed Borja de Riquer [es].^[392] "Franco’s words on this occasion, though well received, assumed a profoundly pathetic tone and, above all, demonstrated that he was anchored in a past that seemed exceedingly remote to most Spaniards," emphasized Javier Tusell.^[397] It marked the last occasion General Franco appeared in public:^[398]^[399]^[400]

The attacks on several of our representations once again demonstrate what we can expect from certain corrupt countries. [...] All the protests that have taken place stem from a Masonic and leftist conspiracy in the political class, in collusion with communist-terrorist subversion in society, which, if it honors us, debases them. [...] Evidently, being Spanish has once again become something in the world today.

That same day, a communist group of obscure origin assassinated four policemen in Madrid, subsequently identifying itself as the First of October Anti-Fascist Resistance Groups (GRAPO). The "Democratic Junta" and the "Platform" issued their inaugural joint statement, pledging to "make a united effort to enable the urgent formation of a broad, democratically organized coalition, without exclusions, capable of guaranteeing the unrestricted exercise of political freedoms."^[340]

Death of Franco

Political Testament of Franco
Spaniards: As the hour approaches for me to render my life before the Almighty and face His unappealable judgment, I beseech God to receive me benignly into His presence, for I have sought to live and die as a Catholic. In the name of Christ I take pride, and it has been my constant will to be a faithful son of the Church, within whose bosom I shall die.
I ask forgiveness of all, as I wholeheartedly forgive those who declared themselves my enemies without me considering them as such. I believe and hope I have had no others but those who were enemies of Spain, which I love until my last moment and which I promised to serve until my final breath, now near.
I wish to thank all those who have collaborated with enthusiasm, dedication, and selflessness in the great endeavor of making Spain united, great, and free.
For the love I feel for our homeland, I ask you to persevere in unity and peace, and to surround the future King of Spain, Don Juan Carlos de Borbón, with the same affection and loyalty you have shown me, and to offer him at all times the same support and collaboration I have received from you.
Do not forget that the enemies of Spain and Christian civilization are alert. You must also be vigilant, and for this, set aside, in the face of the supreme interests of the homeland and the Spanish people, all personal life.
Do not cease to achieve social justice and culture for all men of Spain, and make this your primary objective. Maintain the unity of Spain’s lands, exalting the rich multiplicity of its regions as a source of the nation’s strength.
I would like, in my last moment, to unite the names of God and Spain and embrace you all to shout together, for the last time, on the threshold of my death: Up with Spain! Long live Spain!

Fourteen days subsequent to the large rally in Plaza de Oriente, General Franco fell gravely ill. On 30 October, cognizant of his critical condition—having already endured four heart attacks—^[401] he transferred his powers to Prince Juan Carlos under Article 11 of the Organic Law of the State, fearing for his life (a priest had administered the last rites to Franco on 25 October).^[402] On 3 November, he underwent a life-or-death operation for peritonitis in an improvised operating theater at the El Pardo Palace,^[403] and was subsequently transported to Madrid’s La Paz Hospital, where he underwent another procedure two days later to excise two-thirds of his stomach to halt the bleeding.^[404]^[405]^[406]^[407]^[408]

While this transpired, Prince Juan Carlos, acting as interim head of state, was compelled to address the severe crisis unfolding in the Spanish Sahara due to the Green March of Moroccan civilians organized by King Hassan II of Morocco to compel Spain to relinquish control of the territory he claimed as part of his sovereignty (the Permanent Court of Arbitration had ruled in early October against Morocco’s claims and in favor of the right to self-determination of the Sahrawi people). While the Spanish government negotiated with Morocco (Franco, prior to his life-or-death operation at El Pardo, had instructed Arias Navarro to dispatch Solís to Rabat),^[402]^[409] Prince Juan Carlos visited the Sahara, assuring the defending troops that the withdrawal would be conducted "in good order and with dignity." On 14 November, the Madrid Accords were signed, under which Spain withdrew from the colony and transferred its administration to Morocco (the northern half) and Mauritania (the southern half). Both nations committed to respecting the Sahrawi population’s will within the framework of the United Nations.^[410]^[411]^[412] "It was undoubtedly an emergency agreement that manifested the utmost weakness of an eroded regime." "The withdrawal constituted a true symbol of the end of Franco’s dictatorship, which concluded with the ignominious handover of the last Spanish colonial territory while the very military figure who had most aspired to construct a great Spanish empire in Africa departed," concluded Borja de Riquer [es].^[413]

Since his admission to La Paz Hospital on 4 November, Franco was sustained using all available medical procedures while enduring a protracted agony (when regaining consciousness, he would murmur "how arduous it is to die").^[414] He underwent another operation on 15 November.^[415] He expired in the early hours of 20 November, "surrounded by his closest family and accompanied by the incorrupt arm of Saint Teresa of Ávila [es] and the mantle of the Virgin of the Pillar [es]."^[406] He died at 3:20 am, though the official announcement listed 5:20 am. The two-hour discrepancy represented the time required to initiate "Operation Lucero," the mobilization of security forces and the military to prevent incidents upon the announcement of the Generalissimo’s death. Certain opposition leaders were placed under surveillance, while others were detained for a few hours.^[416]

Early that morning, Prime Minister Carlos Arias Navarro announced Franco’s death on television (his precise words were: "Spaniards. Franco has died. The exceptional man who, before God and history, assumed the immense responsibility of the most demanding and sacrificial service to Spain, has given his life, consumed day by day, hour by hour, in the fulfillment of a transcendent mission")^[417] and then recited his final message, known as Franco’s political testament. Its concluding paragraph states: "I would like, in my last moment, to unite the names of God and Spain and embrace you all to shout together, for the last time, on the threshold of my death: Up with Spain! Long live Spain!" "Arias breaks down, scarcely able to complete the sentence, sobbing, crying," observes Alfonso Pinilla García.^[418]

Shortly thereafter, Arias Navarro clashed with Cardinal Tarancón, president of the Spanish Episcopal Conference, because the latter declined to permit the 84 Spanish bishops to officiate Franco’s funeral on the grounds of the Royal Palace of Madrid. "If it were the pope, perhaps, perhaps one could consider it. But, concerning a head of state, it did not seem appropriate," Tarancón stated years later. Arias Navarro was so incensed that he refused to engage with Tarancón when the latter visited El Pardo Palace to officiate the initial mass for the deceased head of state.^[419]

The funeral chapel was established on 21 November in the Hall of Columns, Royal Palace of Madrid [es], with the casket uncovered. Lengthy queues formed to view it.^[420] No heads of state or government attended the subsequent funeral, save for the Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet, a great admirer of Franco, and King Hussein of Jordan.^[421]^[406] Conducted on 23 November and officiated by 15 bishops, the homily was not delivered by Cardinal Tarancón, president of the Spanish Episcopal Conference, but by the Primate of Toledo, Monsignor Marcelo González Martín, who delivered an impassioned eulogy of Franco’s historical legacy. After honors were rendered by units of the Brunete Armoured Division, commanded by General Jaime Milans del Bosch, the casket was conveyed to the Valley of the Fallen, where it was interred at 2:11 PM, "amid a mixture of sensations: profound sorrow for some, great relief for others, and deep concern for nearly all."^[406]^[422]

On 22 November, Prince Juan Carlos was proclaimed king before the Francoist Cortes [es], after swearing to uphold the Principles of the National Movement [es]. On 27 November, a ceremony exalting the new monarch transpired, attended by numerous foreign dignitaries (including Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, President of the French Republic; Walter Scheel, President of the Federal Republic of Germany; Nelson Rockefeller, Vice President of the United States; and the Prince Philip, Duke of Edinburgh, consort of Queen Elizabeth II), in contrast to Franco’s funeral. "A new historical phase commenced, replete with uncertainties, doubts, and hopes," cautioned Borja de Riquer [es].^[423] "The monarchy of Don Juan Carlos remained an unknown in 1975," stated Javier Tusell.^[424] A few months following Franco’s death, Jorge de Esteban [es] and Luis López Guerra inquired: "To what extent will the psychological influence of the civil war on victors and vanquished (categories that remain valid because, until now, there has been no reconciliation) condition the political life of the future?"^[425] They also pondered "whether the Army will assume a prominent role in Spanish political life; and, if the answer is affirmative, what manner of stance it will adopt."^[426]

Assessment of Franco and His Regime by Historian Javier Tusell^[427]
A person of duty-bound character, prudent and adept, Franco was also a dictator insensitive to the sufferings of the vanquished, incapable of concluding a civil war and deified by the sincere conviction that he was a providential man for his country. Some of his adherents have attributed to Francoism the modernization of Spanish society or even the establishment of a monarchy like that of 1975, but in reality, it delayed economic development, and the type of monarchy implanted after 1975 diverged significantly from what Franco had envisioned for Spaniards. What is evident, however, is that if the regime bearing his name had been totalitarian, the former would not have been feasible, and the transition to democracy without severe social traumas would have been considerably more arduous. Ultimately, if Francoism lacked legitimacy in its final phase, there existed a legality that was upheld, despite being a dictatorship, thanks to a relatively independent bureaucracy. Thus, the highest praise that can be accorded the regime lies in what it *was not*, that is, totalitarian.

Indeed, what would be termed sociological Francoism retained strong roots within a significant portion of Spanish society, and the anti-Francoist opposition lacked the strength to overthrow the dictatorship. However, according to Borja de Riquer, "it had succeeded in weakening it to the point of rendering its continuity impossible after Franco’s death," such that "when the dictator expired, a large segment of Spanish society favored a regime of political freedoms"—a survey conducted after his death indicated that 70% of Spaniards desired the introduction of a free and secret universal suffrage system.^[428] "As a result of social, religious, and cultural transformations, as well as the opposition’s own endeavors, there had been a growing infusion of democratic principles into society, permeating it and rendering its demands and aspirations for the future markedly different from what the regime’s laws prescribed," noted Javier Tusell.^[429]

Carme Molinero [es] and Pere Ysàs [es] have observed that "the end of Franco’s life occurred when the dictatorship was immersed in a profound crisis. Strict continuity offered no solution to stabilize the political situation or to avert, perhaps irreversibly, damage to the monarchical institution. Aperturist and reformist attempts had repeatedly faltered due to a combination of the limitations of their proposals, their inability to garner broad support, and the hostility of those who rejected any change, however limited, perceiving it as a threat to the regime’s destruction. Nevertheless, it would be the option pursued, albeit more ambitiously and decisively after the Caudillo’s death. On the other hand, the rupturism sustained by significant mobilization lacked the strength to precipitate the dictatorship’s collapse but was sufficient to render continuity and reformism unviable. This constituted the complex political situation in Spain at the close of autumn 1975."^[430] Writer and columnist Manuel Vázquez Montalbán described the situation "when Franco disappears" as "a correlation of weaknesses."^[431]

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Notes

[1]
"Possessing robust health and evident lucidity until the mid-1960s, the memoirs of collaborators such as Fraga and López Rodó suggest a notable deterioration thereafter. The extent of this decline is difficult to pinpoint... He could alternate within minutes between appearing as an attentive elderly figure offering insightful remarks and a disoriented individual disconnected from his surroundings. [...] A hallmark of Parkinson's disease was the apparent weakening of his resolve, diminishing his former ability to mediate between competing factions. Additionally, he seemed increasingly susceptible to influence... Another effect of the disease was heightened inexpressiveness, rendering him a sphinx-like figure to many visitors. [...] Like many aged individuals, he witnessed the collapse of a world to which he had been deeply attached. [...] He remained entrenched in a mindset of National Catholicism... He never endorsed political pluralism, let alone its legal organization... There is also no evidence that he anticipated significant post-mortem changes to his regime" (Tusell, 2007, pp. 240-241).
"Franco's decline manifested in his increasing withdrawal from political duties. [...] Until nearly seventy, he engaged in tennis with [the doctor] Vicente Gil [es] or rode through the forests near the [El Pardo] palace. These activities ceased. Friday meetings, whether of the council of ministers or the delegated commission, were reduced by the late 1960s to morning sessions held biweekly. He no longer opened meetings with extensive reviews of national and international affairs but sat silently throughout. [...] Medications for Parkinson's disease rendered him increasingly indecisive" (Preston, 1998, p. 929; 938).

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