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Liwa Fatemiyoun
Afghan Shia militia From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
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Liwa Fatemiyoun (Arabic: لِوَاء الْفَاطِمِيُّون, romanized: Liwā’ al-Fāṭimīyūn, lit. 'Fatimid Banner'; Dari: لواء فاطمیون), also known as Lashkar-e-Fatemiyoun (Arabic: فرقة فاطميون, romanized: Firqat al-Fāṭimīyūn; Dari: لشکر فاطمیون), Fatemiyoun Brigade, or Fatemiyoun Division,[3] is a Shia Afghan Hazara militia formed in 2013 to fight in Syria during the Syrian civil war on the side of the Syrian government prior to the collapse of the Assad regime.[45] The group's officially designated purpose, is the defense of the shrine of Zaynab bint Ali, and to fight "takfiri terrorists" in Syria, which would come to include the Islamic State (IS).[46][47] It is funded, trained, and equipped by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and fights under the command of Iranian officers.[4] Both the Fatemiyoun Brigade and the Iranian government downplay their relationship with one another, despite clear coordination and the brigade's operation under the auspices of the IRGC.[4] Liwa Fatemiyoun is also closely associated with Hezbollah Afghanistan.[4]
By late 2017, the unit was presumed to have numbered between 10,000 and 20,000 fighters.[3] According to Zohair Mojahed, a cultural official in the Fatemiyoun Brigade, the group suffered 2,000 killed and 8,000 wounded up to the end of 2017 while fighting in Syria.[48] A minimum of 925 deaths among the brigade's troops were documented based on monitoring of open source coverage of funeral services.[49] It has been reported that as many as 50,000 Afghans in total fought in Liwa Fatemiyoun.[50]
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History
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Background
The core of Liwa Fatemiyoun is constituted of former the fighters of the Afghan Shia militia groups like the Muhammad Army (Sepah e Muhammad), Tehran Eight, Hezbollah Afghanistan and Hezb-e-Wahadat which were active during the Soviet–Afghan War, Afghan Civil War (1992–1996), Afghan Civil War (1989–1992), and fought against the Taliban during the Afghan Civil War (1996-2001), until their collapse after the U.S Invasion of Afghanistan from which point onward some of them became part of the Afghan Army and fought against the Taliban insurgency during the War in Afghanistan (2001–2021). And also as the Abuzar Brigade, an Afghan Shia militia which voluntarily fought in the Iran–Iraq War on the side of Iran.[51][52] During the Iran–Iraq war, fighters of the Abuzar Brigade were stationed in the mountainous areas of Northwestern Iran, as they had experience in mountain and irregular warfare from their war with the Soviets.[53][54][55]
Iran is also known to have established branches of Hezbollah in Afghanistan and Pakistan, with several pro-Iranian groups operating in both countries during the Soviet–Afghanistan War.[24][56][57]
Operations of Liwa Fatemiyoun
Reports of pro-government Afghan fighters in Syria date back to October 2012.[4] They originally fought in the Iraqi Abu Fadl al-Abbas Brigade before eventually becoming a distinct brigade in 2013.[5] According to news sources affiliated with the IRGC, the group was founded on 12 May 2013.[58] The group's officially designated purpose, according to the Iranian government and affiliated news sources, is the defense of the shrine of Zaynab bint Ali, the granddaughter of Muhammad, and to fight "takfiri terrorists" in Syria, which would come to include the Islamic State (IS) and the Al-Nusra Front.[46][47] At some point before 2014, Liwa Fatemiyoun was "incorporated" with Hezbollah Afghanistan, a minor political party in Afghanistan.[4]
The Liwa Fatemiyoun became involved in multiple operations throughout Syria, including in Darra, Aleppo, and Palmyra. In March 2016, they fought in the recapture of Palmyra from the Islamic State.[59] In 2017, the unit helped countering a major rebel offensive in northern Hama Governorate,[37] and later aided a pro-government offensive in the Syrian Desert that aimed at reaching the Iraqi border.[38] In course of the latter campaign, Mohammad Hosseini (also known as "Salman") was killed as he stepped on an anti-personnel mine. Hussaini had served as the intelligence chief of Liwa Fatemiyoun's Hazrat-e-Fatemeh Zahra Brigade.[60] Following the successful conclusion of this offensive, the Liwa Fatemiyoun took part in the campaign to capture all of central Syria from the IS. Anwar Yawri, another commander of Liwa Fatemiyoun, was killed during these operations.[39] The unit later took part in the Eastern Syria campaign (September–December 2017), and helped to break the Islamic State's siege on Deir ez-Zor.[3]
Many of the group's commanders are veterans of previous Afghan conflicts: Sayyed Hakim, Hossein Fadaei Abdarchaya, Reza Khavari, and Seyyed Ibrahim. Hakim, killed in Syria in 2016, and was the last veteran of the Abouzar Brigade. In reality, once Tavassoli and his deputy Reza Bakhshi were killed in action in early 2015, Liwa Fatemiyoun was taken over entirely by the IRGC-QF. As of July 2018, at least 18 Quds Force officers have died in Syria alongside Liwa Fatemiyoun.[61]
In terms of numbers, the first group of 22 Afghan volunteers reportedly arrived in Syria at the end of 2012. As mentioned, a second group of 15 followed, then a third group of 22. The fifth contingent already included around 100 recruits. Liwa Fatemiyoun undoubtedly grew from the size of a brigade (called Liwa in Arabic) to that of a division (called Lashkar in Persian) in 2015, which implies a strength of around 10,000 men, but not all of whom were deployed in Syria. The range of 4,000 to 8,000 men seemed more plausible, with regular rotation of personnel between Iran and Syria. According to this account, the Afghans generally operated in units of 450 men (roughly the equivalent of a battalion), which seems plausible given what we see among other actors on the Syrian regime side. This unit format also allows them to be deployed to several locations in Syria simultaneously.[61]
Liwa Fatemiyoun continued to suffer losses in Syria. On December 6, 2018, a fighter was buried in Iran. On December 13, 2018, a deceased Afghan was also buried in Tehran Province. On December 27, 2018, an Afghan killed in Syria was buried in Mashhad. In January 2019, five Fatemiyoun fighters were also buried in Mashhad, Iran.[61]
Thus, while more conventional operations against the Islamic State had been over for a good year (as of 2019), Liwa Fatemiyoun remained deployed both in eastern Syria, near the Iraqi border, still occasionally fighting ISIS around Deir ez-Zor, Mayadin and al-Boukamal, but also in the west, within the province of Hama, probably around the last rebel and jihadist enclave. It was to be recalled that Liwa Fatemiyoun was engaged on the Hama front after the rebel/jihadist offensive of March 2017: it has therefore remained there. It is likely that the formation also uses its historic base camp south of Aleppo, and perhaps has other installations elsewhere, notably in Damascus. The deployment pattern, with at least three units (Deir Ezzor – Hama – Damascus) corresponds fairly closely to that seen in recent years. Liwa Fatemiyoun therefore remained a tool in the hands of the Revolutionary Guards for their projection into Syria, until 2024.[61]
Throughout their operations in Syria, Liwa Fatemiyoun has sustained numerous casualties. In October 2014, three fighters were captured by the rebel Islamic Front. Their fates are unknown.[62] On 7 May 2015, Iran commemorated 49 fighters of the group who were killed.[63] According to Spiegel Online, 700 members of the group are believed to have been killed in combat around Daraa and Aleppo as of June 2015.[64]
The Washington Institute estimated at least 255 casualties between 19 January 2012, and 8 March 2016.[65] While precise casualty figures are difficult to determine, the brigade is thought to have lost 925 fighters in Syria as of May 2020.[66] These numbers are likely to increase as the Iranian government continues to identify the remains of Fatemiyoun members, sometimes as long as 5 years after their death, and return their bodies to Iran.[67] According to Zohair Mojahed, a cultural official in the Fatemiyoun Brigade, the group suffered 2,000 killed and 8,000 wounded up to the end of 2017 while fighting in Syria.[48]
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On 21 November 2017, Iran declared victory over IS, and subsequently started to downsize Liwa Fatemiyoun. The first troops to be demobilized were the youngest and oldest, as well as those who had exhibited problematic behavior such as indiscipline. The demobilized fighters were sent back to Iran to return to their families and civilian life.[3]
In the course of the COVID-19 pandemic, Liwa Fatemiyoun reportedly began to produce masks and gloves in Iran and Syria, intending to distribute them to poor Syrians. Western observers suspected that this was supposed to boost the group's image and help it in recruiting new members.[68] By late 2020, Liwa Fatemiyoun was still operating in eastern Syria,[69] though only about 500 to 1,500 fighters strong.[30] By the time the Assad regime fell, this number had risen to 5,000 to 10,000.[15]
Experts differ on what role Liwa Fatemiyoun was fulfilling as of 2020, as the Syrian government had become relatively secure. Researcher Phillip Smyth argued that Liwa Fatemiyoun was supposed to act as Iran's "phantom force" of trained foreign soldiers, ready to be used for possible future interventions.
Accordingly, Symth and ex-Herat Province governor Abdul Qayoum Rahim claimed in 2020 that Liwa Fatemiyoun had begun deployment to other localities around the Middle East without providing firm evidence.[30]
Symth and Rahim also claimed that the constant fighting had turned Liwa Fatemiyoun into an elite force, as most of its less capable fighters had been killed or demobilized, leaving only the most experienced and radical ones. Other security analysts argued that there was no evidence for further mass foreign deployments, and that Liwa Fatemiyoun was overall diminishing in numbers and suffering from low morale, as the Iranian government had proven to be slow in granting promised benefits to its fighters.[30]
In January of 2024 the American Air force did an air strike on an abandoned warehouse which formally belonged to Liwa Fatemiyoun claiming it was being used to manufacture missiles used against US troops in the Middle East.[70]
During the 2024 Syrian opposition offensives, it was reported that 25 pro-Assad/Iran-backed militiamen were killed during the clashes with at least 15 of them being non-Syrian militiamen. These fighters were likely the last members of Hezbollah, Zanabiyoun, and Fatemiyoun, to have died in Syria before their withdrawal.[71]
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Organization, supplies and equipment
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Liwa Fatemiyoun is led by IRGC-QF commanders and supplied by the Iranian military.[3][72][73] Its troops are recruited from Afghans living in Iran,[3][72][6] as well as Afghan refugees already residing in Syria.[7][74] The recruits are typically Shia Hazaras, an ethnic group from central Afghanistan primarily from Hazaristan in central Afghanistan.[7][4][72] The Iranian recruiters for Liwa Fatemiyoun are usually members of the IRGC's Basij. In August 2016, Iranian official Qurban Ghalambor was arrested by the Afghanistan government for recruiting fighters for the brigade.[72]
It has also been reported that the group had recruited former and dissented Shia Afghan soldiers from the Afghan National Security Forces such as the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police.[75] After the 2021 Taliban offensive, many former Afghan soldiers fled to Iran, bringing equipment such as Humvees, M548s, and Navistar 7000 series heavy trucks, which were given to the Iranian Army (some of which went to the 55th Airborne Brigade) in exchange for their stay in Iran.[76][77][78] These troops were likely recruited into the Fatemiyoun Brigade afterwards.
In Afghanistan, pro-Iran affiliates mainly recruit fighters from the Shia Afghan youth in Kabul and from the Shia majority areas of Afghanistan, such as the city Herat. Those recruiting for Iran in Dasht-i-Barchi, Kabul, usually work "off-grid" and "under the radar". The recruiters who are recruiting for Iran, after recruiting some recruits, send some of their newly recruited recruits to Iran through travel agencies based in Herat and Kabul.[79]
The Afghans are promised Iranian citizenship and salaries of $500–$800 per month in return for fighting (usually a 3-month-long deployment to Syria).[3][43][4][80] Many are refugees[43] and some criminals who choose recruitment over imprisonment or deportation,[80][64][62] though the Iranian government generally claims that they are religiously motivated volunteers.[3] The first Liwa Fatemiyoun troops sent to Syria were told that they were fulfilling their "Islamic duty" by defending the shrines of Damascus.[30][74] After their recruitment, the recruits of Liwa Fatemiyoun have been reported to go through a training course for five-weeks, and their military training mostly takes place in Iran's Yazd Province along with some other places.[45] There have also been reports of newly deployed recruits reportedly being sent to receive training in and around the Syrian city of Aleppo in North-Western Syria.[45] Monthly salaries peaked at about $1,500, from-and-to 2017-2018 but have since dropped to less than a third of that amount because of Iran's economic crisis -- partly a result of sanctions -- and the collapse of Iran's national currency.[81]
After completing their service, many ex-Liwa Fatemiyoun fighters were frustrated that the Iranian government proved slow in fulfilling all their demands. Most importantly, fighters struggled to secure the promised benefits such as salaries, housing, and jobs due to Iran's difficult economic situation and cases of Iranian officials stalling in regards to payouts. The families of fallen fighters have also struggled to secure benefits and visas.[30][81]
As early as July 2017, a researcher on Afghanistan reported the presence of a militant network of up to 4,000 individuals and led by Liwa Fatemiyoun veterans, active in Hazarajat, Kabul, and Mazar-i Sharif, and which is already reportedly conducting armed operations against groups hostile to the Hazaras in Wardak province.[61]
Other veterans, on the other hand, are trying to resume a normal life in Herat, while others are increasing their re-enlistments under financial pressure to earn money.[61]
The Afghan fighters are repatriated to Iran by Iranian C-130s.[61]
Though some Afghan sub-commanders of Liwa Fatemiyoun are veterans of several wars, including the Iran–Iraq War (1980-1988), Soviet-Afghan War (1979-1989), First Afghan Civil War (1989–1992), Second Afghan Civil War (1992-1996), Third Afghan Civil War (1996–2001),[3] and even the War in Afghanistan (2001–2021),[75] new recruits of the unit generally lack combat experience.[6] The recruits are given just a few weeks of training, armed, and flown to Syria via the Iran–Iraq–Syria air bridge. These soldiers are used as shock troopers, spearheading numerous important pro-government offensives alongside Iranian, Iraqi, Pakistani, and Hezbollah troops. Some have more specialized training (reconnaissance, snipers) which is allegedly delivered by Hezbollah instructors.[61] Most of them operate as light infantry, although some receive more thorough training and can work as tank crews.[82] Liwa Fatemiyoun has been reported to use tanks and vehicles such as the T-72M1, T-72AV, T-62M, MT-LB armored vehicles (including ones with modified with a ZU-23 cannon), the Iranian Safir light vehicles with a 106 mm recoilless gun or Type 63 MRL, numerous technicals, and even T-90 tanks.[61]
Parts of Liwa Fatemiyoun have been trained by the Russian Armed Forces[3][61][32] and Wagner Group.[61][32] As the unit is often used in those war zones where the most intense fighting takes place[3] due to its sometimes inadequate training,[6] observers believe that Liwa Fatemiyoun fighters often act as "cannon fodder".[3][6] By 2020, analysts such as Philip Symth argued that the "cannon fodder" troops of the unit had been mostly weeded out, leaving only a hardened core of fighters.[3]
Employment by Iranian Companies
In 2024, it was reported that members of Fatemiyoun (both serving and retired) along with former Afghan National Security Force troops (mostly from the defunct Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police), were being employed by the Arshin Kooh company, which has links to Iran's IRGC (more specifically, its Aerospace Force), and is engaged in producing concrete walls and constructing roads in the Beris area of Chabahar, a port on the Arabian Sea, in the Sistan and Baluchestan province. Reports revealed that, senior IRGC officials ordered the transfer of many of these Afghan workers from Chabahar to Negur, after such practices were exposed.[83]
The supervisor of the Afghan forces, Hekmat, a member of the Fatemiyoun group, has been reported to have signed a monthly contract worth 10 billion Iranian rials (over 16,000$) with Arshin Kooh for the repair and maintenance of their machinery, with Hekmat employing at least 20 Afghan workers under his command.[83] In addition to the machinery contract, Hekmat is said to oversee at least 50 workers in the concrete wall section, earning as many as 600 million Iranian rials (1,000$) per day.[83]
The average Afghan workers make more money than that which local Balochi workers, because of these contracts. According to a report, Balochi truck drivers earn 240 million rials ($400) for 24 days of work, while non-local drivers receive 360 million rials ($600), through their contracts, for the same period.[83] This due to the contracts of companies employing Afghans migrants having a better pay than those of companies employing local Balochis.
Former Sunni Afghan soldiers were also employed by the IRGC's paramilitary volunteer militia, the Basij, after receiving special identification cards.[83]
Relationship with Hezbollah Afghanistan
According to researcher Phillip Smyth, Liwa Fatemiyoun and Hezbollah Afghanistan were originally different groups, but showed such great overlap in ideology and membership by 2014 that they had become "incorporated".[4] In contrast, researcher Oved Lobel continued to regard Liwa Fatemiyoun and Hezbollah Afghanistan as separate organizations in 2018, though both were part of Iran's "regional proxy network".[56] Other sources such as Jihad Intel and Arab News have treated the two as the same organization.[7][84] Researcher Michael Robillard called Liwa Fatemiyoun a "branch of Hezbollah Afghanistan".[85]
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Accusations of war crimes
According to Human Rights Watch, Liwa Fatemiyoun has recruited child soldiers, some of whom were as young as 14.[86][75] Liwa Fatemiyoun has also glorified children who fought and died serving and fighting for the group in Syria as martyrs.[61]
Designation as terrorist organization
In 2019, the United States and Canada each declared the Fatemiyoun a terrorist organization.[87] According to then Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin, the designation of the Fatemiyoun as a terrorist organization was part of an "ongoing pressure campaign to shut down the illicit networks the Iranian regime uses to export terrorism and unrest across the globe.”[88]
See also
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