原则主义派（波斯语：اصولگرایان，罗马化：Osul-Garâyân），也被称作伊朗保守派[11][12]、保守-强硬派[13]或伊朗右翼[12][14][15]，伊斯兰革命之后与改革派构成两大主要政治阵营。某些欧美媒体称其为“强硬派”，通常指的是阵营中的某些极右派系[16]，但阵营也包含部分中间倾向的派系 [17]。
Quick Facts 原则主义派, 议会领袖 ...
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Quick Facts 行政部门, 总统 ...
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在伊朗政治中，“原则”指的是支持伊朗最高领袖，并倡导保护伊斯兰革命早期的守旧派意识形态。[18]侯赛因·穆萨维指出，伊朗原则主义派构筑了伊朗绝大多数的右翼/保守主义，倾向于宗教主义，且比起改革派，他们与库姆的教权组织有更多联系。[19]原则主义派声明，会始终保持对伊斯兰教和守旧派伊斯兰革命的忠诚，服从最高领袖的命令和法基赫的监护。[20]该阵营反对国际社会方面否认、改变当今伊朗守旧派政治体制的现状[7]，且还大力支持目前伊朗国内的守旧派政权之形式。[21]
目前原则主义派在专家会议、宪法监督委员会和司法机构中占据主导权。[20]
More information 年份, 候选人 ...
| 年份
|
候选人
|
得票
|
%
|
排名
|
| 1997
|
阿里·阿克巴·纳塔格-努里
|
7,248,317
|
24.87
|
2nd
|
| 2001
|
阿赫马德·塔瓦克里
|
4,387,112
|
15.58
|
2nd
|
| 2005/1
|
马哈茂德·艾哈迈迪内贾德
|
5,711,696
|
19.43
|
2nd
|
| 穆罕默德·巴吉尔·卡利巴夫
|
4,095,827
|
13.93
|
4th
|
| 阿里·拉里贾尼
|
1,713,810
|
5.83
|
5th
|
| Total |
11,521,333 |
39.19 |
决胜投票
|
| 2005/2
|
马哈茂德·艾哈迈迪内贾德
|
17,284,782
|
61.69
|
1st
|
| 2009
|
马哈茂德·艾哈迈迪内贾德
|
24,527,516
|
62.63
|
1st
|
| 穆赫辛·礼萨伊
|
678,240
|
1.73
|
3rd
|
| Total |
25,205,756 |
64.36
|
当选
|
| 2013
|
穆罕默德·巴吉尔·卡利巴夫
|
6,077,292
|
16.56
|
2nd
|
| 赛义德·贾利利
|
4,168,946
|
11.36
|
3rd
|
| 穆赫辛·礼萨伊
|
3,884,412
|
10.58
|
4th
|
| 阿里·阿克巴·韦拉亚提
|
2,268,753
|
6.18
|
6th
|
| Total |
16,399,403 |
44.68 |
失败
|
| 2017
|
埃卜拉希姆·赖西
|
15,835,794
|
38.28
|
2nd
|
| 莫斯塔法·米尔-萨利姆
|
478,267
|
1.16
|
3rd
|
| Total |
16,314,061 |
39.44 |
失败
|
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下面列出了伊朗目前还在活跃的原则主义党派：
- 两个社会（非正式）
- 伊玛目和领袖路线追随者阵线
- 伊斯兰革命稳定阵线
- 发展与正义党
Mehdi Mozaffari, What is Islamism? History and Definition of a Concept, Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions, 2007, 8 (1): 17–33, doi:10.1080/14690760601121622, In fact, Iranian ‘Islamists’ of our day call themselves ‘Usul gara’, which literally means ‘fundamentalist’, but in a positive sense. It designates a ‘person of principles’ who is the ‘true Muslim’.
Behrooz Ghamari-Tabrizi, Women's Rights, Shari'a Law, and the Secularization of Islam in Iran, International Journal of Politics Culture and Society (New York), 2013, 26 (3): 237–253, doi:10.1007/s10767-013-9143-x, “Principlism” or osul-gera’i first appeared in the Iranian political lexicon during the second-term presidency of Mohammad Khatami as an alternative to eslāh-talabi or reformism. Although principlists do not share a uniform political platform, they all believed that the reformist movement would lead the Republic towards secularism. One of the most common elements of their political philosophy is the comprehensiveness of the shari‘a. The responsibility of the Islamic state is to determine ways of implementing the mandates of Islam, rather than the reformist project of reinterpreting the shari‘a to correspond to the demands of contemporary society.
Mohseni, Payam. Factionalism, Privatization, and the Political economy of regime transformation. Brumberg, Daniel; Farhi, Farideh (编). Power and Change in Iran: Politics of Contention and Conciliation. Indiana Series in Middle East Studies. Indiana University Press. 2016: 47. ISBN 978-0253020680. Melody Mohebi, The Formation of Civil Society in Modern Iran: Public Intellectuals and the State, Palgrave Macmillan: 129–131, 2014, ISBN 978-1-137-40110-6 Robert J. Reardon, Containing Iran: Strategies for Addressing the Iranian Nuclear Challenge, RAND Corporation: 81–82, 2012, ISBN 978-0833076373 Mehdi Moslem, Factional Politics in Post-Khomeini Iran, Syracuse University Press: 135, 2002, ISBN 9780815629788 Said Amir Arjomand; Nathan J. Brown. The Rule of Law, Islam, and Constitutional Politics in Egypt and Iran. SUNY Press. 2013: 150. ISBN 978-1-4384-4597-7. “Conservative” is no longer a preferred term in Iranian political discourse. Usulgara', which can be clumsily translated as “principlist” is the term now used to refer to an array of forces that previously identified themselves as conservative, fundamentalist, neo-fundamentalist, or traditionalist. It developed to counter the term eslahgara, or reformist, and is applied to a camp of not necessarily congrous groups and individuals.
Haddad Adel, Gholamali; Elmi, Mohammad Jafar; Taromi-Rad, Hassan. Political Parties: Selected Entries from Encyclopaedia of the World of Islam. EWI Press. 2012-08-31: 108. ISBN 9781908433022. Robin B. Wright (编), The Iran Primer: Power, Politics, and U.S. Policy, US Institute of Peace Press: 37, 2010, ISBN 978-1601270849 Masoud Kazemzadeh, Intra-Elite Factionalism and the 2004 Majles Elections in Iran, Middle Eastern Studies, 2008, 44 (2): 189–214, doi:10.1080/00263200701874867, In Western sources, the term ‘hard-liners’ is used to refer to the faction under the leadership of Supreme Leader Ali Khamanehi. Members of this group prefer to call themselves ‘Osul-gara’. The word ‘osul’ means ‘fundamentals’, or ‘principles’ or ‘tenets’. And the suffix ‘gara’ means ‘those who uphold or promote’. The more radical elements in the hard-line camp prefer to call themselves ‘Ommat Hezbollah’. ‘Ommat’ is a technical Arabic-Islamic term referring to people who are Muslim. ‘Hezbollah’ literally means ‘Party of Allah’. Before the rise of Ahmadinejad to the presidency in 2005, many official sources in the Islamic Republic referred to this group as ‘mohafezeh-kar’ (‘conservative’). Between 1997 and 2006, many Iranians inside Iran used the terms ‘eqtedar-gara’ (authoritarian) and ‘tamamiyat-khah’ (totalitarian) for what many Western observers have termed ‘hard-liners’. Members of the reformist faction of the fundamentalist oligarchy called the hard-liners ‘eqtedar-gara’.
Banafsheh Keynoush, Iran after Ahmadinejad, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy (New York), 2012, 54 (3): 127–146, doi:10.1080/00396338.2012.690988, What is important, however, is that the principlist camp now increasingly represents not just hardliners but also more centre-right factions.
Seyed Hossein Mousavian, The Iranian Nuclear Crisis: A Memoir, Brookings Institution Press: 486, 2012, ISBN 9780870033025 Etel Solingen (编), Sanctions, Statecraft, and Nuclear Proliferation, Cambridge University Press: 222, 2012, ISBN 9781107010444 Thaler et. al. Mullahs, Guards, and Bonyads: An Exploration of Iranian Leadership Dynamics. Sacramento, CA: RAND Corporation. 2010. ISBN 978-0-8330-4773-1.
