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Austro-Hungarian entry into World War I
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
On 28 July 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia because of the Assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand. Within days, long-standing mobilization plans went into effect to initiate invasions or guard against them and Russia, France and Britain stood arrayed against Austria and Germany in what at the time was called the "Great War", and was later named "World War I" or the "First World War". Austria thought in terms of one small limited war involving just the two countries. It did not plan a wider war such as exploded in a matter of days.
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The British historian John Zametica argued that Austria-Hungary was primarily responsible for starting the war, as its leaders believed that a successful war against Serbia was the only way it could remain a Great Power, solve deep internal disputes caused by Hungarian demands and regain influence in the Balkan states.[1] Others, most notably Christopher Clark, have argued that Austria-Hungary, confronted with a neighbor determined to incite continual unrest and ultimately acquire all of the Serb-inhabited lands of the empire (according to the Pan-Serb point of view, they included all of Croatia, Dalmatia, Bosnia, Hercegovina and some of the southern counties of the Hungary (roughly corresponding to today's Vojvodina)) and had a military and government that were intertwined with the irredentist terrorist group known as "The Black Hand", saw no practical alternative to the use of force in ending what amounted to subversion from Serbia directed at a large chunk of its territories. In that perspective, Austria had little choice but to credibly threaten war and force Serbian submission if it wished to remain a Great Power.[2]
The view of the key figures in the "war party" in the Tsarist government and many military leaders in Russia that Germany had deliberately incited Austria-Hungary to attack Serbia to have a pretext for war with Russia and France, was promoted by the German historian Fritz Fischer from the 1960s onwards but is no longer accepted by mainstream historians. One of the key drivers of the outbreak of war were two key misperceptions that were radically at odds. The key German decision-makers convinced themselves that Russia would accept an Austrian counter-strike on Serbia and were neither ready for nor seeking a general European war, but they instead engaged in a bluff,[3] especially because Russia had backed down in earlier crises in 1908 and again over Albania in October 1913.[4] At the very same time, the most important Russian decision-makers viewed any decisive Austrian response as necessarily dictated by and fomented in Berlin and therefore proof of an active German desire for war against Russia.
There had been no serious joint planning with Germany before the war started and little during the war itself, as leaders in Vienna distrusted German ambitions.[5]