Ronald Dworkin

Ronald Myles Dworkin FBA QC (/ˈdwɔːrkɪn/; December 11, 1931 – February 14, 2013) was an American legal philosopher, jurist, and scholar of United States constitutional law.[3] At the time of his death, he was Frank Henry Sommer Professor of Law and Philosophy at New York University and Professor of Jurisprudence at University College London. Dworkin had taught previously at Yale Law School and the University of Oxford, where he was the Professor of Jurisprudence, successor to philosopher H.L.A. Hart.

Quick facts: Ronald Dworkin, Born, Died, Alma mater, ... ▼

Ronald Dworkin
Dworkin in 2008
Born	Ronald Myles Dworkin (1931-12-11)December 11, 1931 Providence, Rhode Island, U.S.
Died	February 14, 2013(2013-02-14) (aged 81) London, England
Alma mater	Harvard University (AB, JD) Magdalen College, Oxford (BA)
Era	Contemporary philosophy
Region	Western philosophy
School	Analytic Legal interpretivism
Institutions	Yale University University of Oxford University College London New York University
Doctoral students	Jeremy Waldron
Main interests	Jurisprudence political philosophy
Notable ideas	Law as integrity fit and justification in law[1] right answer thesis legal interpretivism rights as trumps[2]

An influential contributor to both philosophy of law and political philosophy, Dworkin received the 2007 Holberg International Memorial Prize in the Humanities for "his pioneering scholarly work" of "worldwide impact."[4] According to a survey in The Journal of Legal Studies, Dworkin was the second most-cited American legal scholar of the twentieth century.[5] After his death, Harvard legal scholar Cass Sunstein said Dworkin was "one of the most important legal philosophers of the last 100 years. He may well head the list."[6]

His theory of law as integrity as presented in his book titled Law's Empire, in which judges interpret the law in terms of consistent moral principles, especially justice and fairness, is among the most influential contemporary theories about the nature of law. Dworkin advocated a "moral reading" of the United States Constitution,[7] and an interpretivist approach to law and morality. He was a frequent commentator on contemporary political and legal issues, particularly those concerning the Supreme Court of the United States, often in the pages of The New York Review of Books.