Antifrustrationism

Antifrustrationism is an axiological position proposed by German philosopher Christoph Fehige,^[1] which states that "we don't do any good by creating satisfied extra preferences. What matters about preferences is not that they have a satisfied existence, but that they don't have a frustrated existence."^[2] According to Fehige, "maximizers of preference satisfaction should instead call themselves minimizers of preference frustration."^[2]

Core principles

Antifrustrationism argues that the moral value of an outcome depends not on the maximization of preference satisfaction, but rather on the prevention of preference frustration. Fehige asserts that pleasure is only valuable to the extent that it alleviates an existing frustrated preference. Conversely, the creation of new satisfied preferences does not contribute to moral value, since those preferences did not exist beforehand and thus were not previously frustrated.^[2]

This perspective contrasts with classical utilitarianism, which considers the creation of new satisfied preferences to be a positive outcome. Fehige maintains that "we have obligations to make preferrers satisfied, but no obligations to make satisfied preferrers."^[2]

Philosophical context

Antifrustrationism shares similarities with, but is distinct from, several other ethical theories:

Negative utilitarianism: Both positions prioritize the reduction of suffering over the promotion of happiness. However, negative preference utilitarianism—which aims to minimize frustrated preferences—is more directly linked to antifrustrationism, whereas classical negative utilitarianism focuses on minimizing suffering in general.^[3]

Epicurean and Buddhist ethics: These traditions emphasize contentment and the absence of suffering as the foundation of well-being. According to some interpretations, the removal of pain, fear, and discomfort constitutes a sufficient condition for a good life, a view compatible with antifrustrationism.^[4]

Philosophical pessimism and Schopenhauer's philosophy: Schopenhauer argued that human life is characterized by unceasing striving and that satisfaction is merely the temporary cessation of suffering. While antifrustrationism does not necessarily endorse Schopenhauer’s metaphysical pessimism, it aligns with his view that preventing suffering is more valuable than creating happiness.^[3]

Implications and criticism

Antifrustrationism has been invoked in population ethics, particularly in debates about whether bringing new beings into existence can be morally justified. Some ethicists, such as David Benatar, defend an asymmetry between pleasure and suffering, arguing that while suffering is a harm, the absence of pleasure is not necessarily a deprivation.^[4]

Critics argue that antifrustrationism may lead to counterintuitive conclusions, such as deeming an empty world—where no preferences exist—as morally superior to a world where individuals experience both moderate pleasure and minor suffering. Others question whether pleasure is truly instrumental rather than intrinsically valuable, challenging the idea that happiness only matters if it counteracts frustration.^[4]

See also

• Antinatalism
• The Asymmetry (population ethics)
• Buddhist ethics
• Deprivation
• Frustration
• Negative utilitarianism
• Painism
• Pessimism
• Stoicism
• Suffering-focused ethics