Azerbaijani separatism in Iran

In 1918, with the efforts of the Musavat Party, Pan-Turkist political elites from the Republic of Azerbaijan began introducing Pan-Turkism to Iranian Azerbaijanis and advocating for the incorporation of Iranian Azerbaijan into the Republic of Azerbaijan.^[3] The Baku-based Musavat party addressed the topic of Iranian Azerbaijan for the first time in an editorial that was published in their Açiq Söz newspaper in January 1918. The author accused the Persian ruling class and Russian expansionists of dividing the Azerbaijani nation and vowed that the Azerbaijanis would unite again.^[4]

The local Baku chapter of the Iranian Democrat Party responded to these irredentist claims by publishing the bilingual newspaper Azarbayjan, Joz-e la-yanfakk-e Iran ("Azerbaijan, an Inseparable Part of Iran") on 10 February 1918.^[5]When the Musavat party established the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic in May 1918, it forced the newspaper to close.^[6]

In 1945, the Soviet Union helped establish the Azerbaijan People’s Government in Tabriz under Sayyid Ja’far Pishevari, a local Marxist and Azerbaijani nationalist.^[7] Although Azerbaijanis had always been highly integrated in the Iranian political, clerical, and military elite, there were many Azerbaijanis who wanted to secede from Iran.^[8] The early 20th century saw the rise of Turkic nationalist ideologies emanating from the CUP-led Ottoman Empire and later Kemalist Turkey, which began to influence intellectual circles in Tabriz and other Azerbaijani cities.^[9]

The Azerbaijan People's Government lasted less than a year. With Soviet troops withdrawing in 1946, the Iranian army reasserted control, and the movement collapsed. Many of its leaders fled to the Soviet Union or were executed. Despite its short lifespan, the republic left a lasting symbolic legacy among modern Azerbaijani separatists in Iran.^[10]

Following the 1946 conflict, the Pahlavi monarchy clamped down on minorities across Iran, especially Azerbaijanis and Kurds. Publications, schools, and cultural institutions in Azerbaijani or Kurdish were banned or heavily censored. Official state ideology emphasized Iranian supremacy, and while it partially tolerated Kurds due to their Iranian origins, it framed Turkic peoples as inferior or foreign invaders.^[11] Even after the 1953 coup, which intensified central control, Azerbaijanis continued to rise within the military and bureaucracy. The Iranian government suppression of Kurdish and Arab uprisings deterred similar movements in Iranian Azerbaijan. However, underground networks promoting pan-Turkism or Azerbaijani unification quietly persisted in Tabriz and other cities, often with support from Iranian Azerbaijani communities in Turkey and the Republic of Azerbaijan.^[12]^[13]

The collapse of the Soviet Union and independence of Azerbaijan was a turning point for Azerbaijani separatism in Iran. While the Iranian government officially celebrated shared Shia and cultural ties with the newly independent Azerbaijan, it remained wary of Pan-Turkist or irredentist sentiment that could challenge Iran.^[14]

After the 1979 Islamic Revolution, many ethnic minorities expressed hope for cultural autonomy. However, the Islamic Republic maintained the centralized authority of the previous governments. The teaching of Azerbaijani in schools remained banned, and local attempts at decentralization were suppressed.^[15] Many leaders of the Islamic revolution were Azerbaijani, including Ali Khamenei.^[16] However, demands for increased cultural rights, especially education in the Azerbaijani language, were repeatedly denied. Movements demanding autonomy or full separatism began reemerging in the late 1990s and early 2000s.^[17]

In the 1990s, Iranian Azerbaijani secular nationalists became the basis of Pan-Turkism and Pro-Turkey politics among Iranian Azerbaijanis.^[18] Along with the spread of Turkish media after the 2000s, nationalism also increased among Iranian Azerbaijanis, with various Iranian government attempts at countering it. Tractor S.C. acted as a base for Azerbaijani nationalism, as well as racism particularly towards Persians and Kurds.^[19] Tractor S.C. supporters regularly carried flags of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the flag of Turkey inside the stadium.^[20] In 1992, Azerbaijan elected Abulfaz Elchibey, whose pro-Turkish and anti-Iranian rhetorics alienated Iran.^[21]^[22] Turkish and Azerbaijani support of Azerbaijani separatism in Iran had been the source of tensions between Azerbaijan, Turkey and Iran.^[23]^[24] During the Nagorno-Karabakh war in 2020, Iran arrested several pro-Azerbaijan activists in Iranian cities, including some Turkish citizens.^[25] In December 2020, Erdoğan recited a controversial poem that sparked a diplomatic crisis with Iran.^[26] Iran boycotted Turkish products due to the poem.^[27]

Many Iranian Azerbaijani organizations began publishing underground material advocating for cultural and language rights, as well as federalism or secession and unification with the Republic of Azerbaijan. The organizations largely operated from exile, often in Baku or Europe, but many sympathizers remained active in Tabriz, Ardabil, and among Azerbaijani internal migrants in Tehran.^[28]

Pan-Turkism became a dominant political current in Azerbaijan and Turkey. Pan-Turkist networks did maintain connections with Iranian Azerbaijani separatists, although they were often exaggerated by the Iranian government.^[29]

Following the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, there was a surge of nationalist sentiment among Iranian Azerbaijanis, many of whom sympathized with the Republic of Azerbaijan. This led to demonstrations against the Iranian support of Armenia and calls for unity between "Northern and Southern Azerbaijan".^[30]

Iranian security services closely monitored cross-border Azerbaijani networks and periodically arrested individuals accused of ties to foreign separatist groups. Iran considered Pan-Turkism one of the most threatening out of all separatist movements in Iran, especially due to potential support from Turkey and Azerbaijan.^[31]

The Republic of Azerbaijan had generally avoided direct support for Azerbaijani separatism in Iran, although pan-Turkist NGOs and media based in Azerbaijan played a major role in spreading nationalist narratives.^[32]

In March 2025, Iran and Turkey both summoned ambassadors after Hakan Fidan accused Iran of supporting Kurdish militias, causing outrage in Iran.^[33] Many interpreted the Turkish statements as threats to support Azerbaijani separatists in Iran if Iran continued with the alleged support for Kurdish militias.^[34]

Azerbaijani separatism in Iran

History

See also

References

Wikiwand - on