Battle of Chamdo

The Battle of Chamdo (or Qamdo; Chinese: 昌都战役) occurred from 6 to 24 October 1950.^[10][11] It was a military campaign by the People's Republic of China (PRC) to capture the Chamdo Region from a de facto independent Tibetan state.^{[12][13][14][15]} PRC victory led to the annexation of Tibet by the People's Republic of China.

Battle of Chamdo
Part of the Annexation of Tibet by the People's Republic of China and the Cold War
PLA troops crossing the Jinsha River prior to the battle.
Date 6–24 October 1950 Location Chamdo, Tibet (now Tibet Autonomous Region, China) 31.1372°N 97.1775°E / 31.1372; 97.1775 Result Chinese victory Territorial changes Annexation of Tibet by the People's Republic of China
Belligerents
Tibet	China
Commanders and leaders
Ngapoi Ngawang Jigme (POW)[1] Lhalu Tsewang Dorje[2]	Liu Bocheng Deng Xiaoping Zhang Guohua Fan Ming
Strength
Tibetan Army: 8,500[3]	People's Liberation Army: 40,000[4][5]
Casualties and losses
180 killed or wounded[6][7][8] ~3,000 captured 2,000 killed (PRIO estimate)[9] 3,341 killed, wounded, surrendered, captured, or defected (Chinese estimate)[2]	114 killed or wounded[6] 2,000 killed (PRIO estimate)[9]

Background

While political tensions existed between some Khampa groups and the Lhasa government, this did not translate into broad support for the People's Liberation Army (PLA). Most Khampa communities regarded the advance of Chinese forces as an external invasion, and resistance was limited chiefly by poor armament, lack of unified command, and strategic decisions made in Lhasa rather than by any sympathy toward Chinese rule.^[16][17]

Some Khampa leaders, such as the influential Pandatsang family, had previously opposed Lhasa’s authority and sought greater regional autonomy. Chinese Communist officials attempted to exploit these internal divisions and approached the Pandatsang brothers in 1950, proposing cooperation during the “liberation of Tibet.” The Pandatsangs ultimately declined and instead sent George Patterson to India to seek alternative support.^[18]

Despite early setbacks in 1950, Khampa fighters would later form the core of the Chushi Gangdruk resistance movement, which mounted sustained armed opposition to Chinese control throughout the late 1950s.^[19]

PLA enters eastern Kham

Western Kham and eastern Kham separated by a blue line in the Simla Convention map

After the defeat of major Kuomintang forces in the Chinese Civil War, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) turned its attention to the Republic of China territories in the hinterland. Eastern Kham was the Chinese-held part of Sikang and the gateway to Tibetan areas. The 18th Army of the PLA formed the leading detachment advancing toward Tibet with the 52nd Division as its main force, and arrived at Ya'an on 12 February 1950. In March, the People's Liberation Army arrived in Kangding (Tachienlu). By mid-April, the 18th Army had at least 30,000 passing through Kangding, and 10,000 Tibetans helped to build the road from Kangding to Garzê (Kandze), which was completed in August. The 18th Army of the PLA assembled at Garzê on 30 July, headquartered at Xinlong, and entered Litang from the east. The Qinghai Cavalry Detachment entered Gyêgu on 22 July, forming a north–south pincer on Chamdo.^[20]

Battle over Dengke

The first clashes between the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and Tibetan forces occurred in June 1950 at Dengke (also known as Dengo), a town located on the route between Garzê and Yushu, northeast of Chamdo. Tibetan officials had established a radio relay station there under the direction of former Chamdo governor Lhalu Tsewang Dorje. A detachment of PLA troops captured the town and destroyed the station, forcing Tibetan personnel to retreat.^[21]

In July, approximately 800 Khampa militiamen—including several hundred monastic fighters—carried out a counterattack on Dengke. Tibetan and Khampa oral accounts claim substantial casualties inflicted on PLA forces, although independent verification is limited and historians generally treat the casualty figures reported by both sides as exaggerated.^[22] Despite localized resistance, PLA forces gradually secured control over eastern Kham due to superior numbers, logistics, and weaponry rather than lack of Tibetan opposition.

Invasion and capture of Chamdo

After months of unsuccessful negotiations between Lhasa and Beijing, and simultaneous military buildups on both sides, the PLA began its main offensive on 6–7 October 1950 by crossing the Jinsha River at several points along the frontier controlled by the Lhasa government.^[23] Tibetan frontier forces resisted at multiple crossings but were outnumbered and outgunned.

By 19 October, coordinated PLA units captured Chamdo, the headquarters of the Tibetan governor of Eastern Tibet. Tibetan casualties are estimated in the hundreds, while figures claimed in Chinese military memoirs—such as the destruction or “liquidation” of several thousand Tibetan troops—are regarded as inflated and not confirmed by independent sources.^[24] Ngabo Ngawang Jigme, the governor of Chamdo, surrendered with approximately 2,700 soldiers, many of whom were subsequently disarmed and released.

The Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) estimates total casualties, including noncombatants, at around 2,000 on each side.^[25]

Although the PLA temporarily halted large-scale operations after the fall of Chamdo, its commanders used the victory to pressure Lhasa to send representatives to Beijing. The Tibetan delegation, instructed to seek guarantees for the Dalai Lama’s authority and internal autonomy, departed for Beijing later in October.^[26]

Following the invasion, resistance continued in several parts of Kham, where Khampa militias and local chieftains later formed the basis of the Chushi Gangdrug movement. Beginning in the mid-1950s, this force mounted sustained guerrilla resistance to PLA authority and eventually received covert support from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).^[27]

Aftermath

Main article: Annexation of Tibet by the People's Republic of China

After releasing the captured soldiers, Chinese broadcasts promised that if Tibet was "peacefully liberated", the Tibetan elites would not be denied their positions and power.^[28]

Some Khampa fighters continued their opposition. Local warlords later became united under a common objective and hence resulted in the formation of Chushi Gangdruk with assistance from the CIA.^[29]

According to contemporary author Melvyn Goldstein, the campaign aimed to capture the Lhasa army occupying Chamdo, demoralize the Lhasa government, and to exert pressure to get Tibetan representatives to agree to negotiations in Beijing and sign terms recognizing China's sovereignty over Tibet.^[30]

See also

• China portal
• Asia portal

• British expedition to Tibet (1903–1904)
• Chinese expedition to Tibet (1910)
• Sino-Tibetan War (1930–1932)
• Qinghai–Tibet War (1932)