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Chemetco
American copper smelting company From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
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Chemetco was primarily a major U.S. secondary copper smelter in Hartford, Illinois, but gained public prominence after its closure for its long-term environmental violations. The plant had begun operation in 1969.[5] Discovery in 1996 of a concealed pipe discharging heavy metals and waste into a waterway for over a decade led to its prosecution and a guilty verdict on felony Clean Water Act charges, after which it ceased operations in 2001.[6][7]
The case became a landmark in environmental criminal law, as the Seventh Circuit's ruling in United States v. Chemetco, Inc. established that the number of violation days under the Clean Water Act is a sentencing factor to be determined by the court rather than a fact for a jury.
Its former site remains a Superfund cleanup project under long-term remediation managed by the U.S. EPA, with efforts targeting contaminated soils, slag piles, risks to groundwater, and residual hazardous waste.[8] It is also the focus of litigation involving hundreds of potentially responsible parties, including many Fortune 500 companies.
Federal investigations by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health found extensive worker exposure at the Chemetco smelter to toxic metals and sulfuric acid mist, including confirmed cases of chronic beryllium disease and widespread lead overexposure. These findings later became part of the broader assessment of Chemetco’s systemic pollution and safety failures.
Chemetco's environmental violations not only affected air, water and land, but were also enmeshed with properly managing materials and with its by-products. Damaging effects of its operation on marine and human life have been tracked to vulnerable communities many thousands of miles away. Modeling by Barry Commoner and Kimberly Clouchot identified Chemetco as one of the top individual North American dioxin sources impacting Nunavut in the Canadian Arctic, where airborne pollutants entered marine food webs and raised ecological and human health concerns.
The significance and manner of Chemetco's closure remain topical in industry circles.[9][10] The case has ever since been cited in environmental, legal, and public health literature as a prime example of large-scale industrial pollution in the United States. is Recent geochemical studies have traced distinctive isotopic signatures of copper, lead, and zinc contamination in nearby Horseshoe Lake directly to the smelter's period of operation, confirming the facility's long-term influence on the regional watershed.[11][12] Research in the field of environmental justice identifies Chemetco among the industrial sites contributing to disproportionate risks in the greater St. Louis area.[13]
At its peak, Chemetco employed about 300 people and turned over approximately $500 million per annum.[14]
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Location, history and operations
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Location
The Chemetco smelter was located at 3754 Chemetco Lane, Hartford, Illinois, about two miles south of the village of Hartford and just one mile east of the Mississippi River, within Madison County's American Bottom floodplain. The facility occupied roughly 41 acres of a 230-acre tract near the industrial corridor linking Metro East Illinois with the St. Louis metropolitan area across the river in Missouri. The highly industrialized Granite City lies directly opposite the site on the west bank of the Mississippi.[15][16]
Farmland borders the property on most sides, while Long Lake and the Cahokia Canal lie immediately next to it and drain toward the Mississippi River. The low alluvial terrain is prone to periodic flooding, which produces surface runoff and groundwater migration. The site's proximity to waterways such as the Cahokia Canal and Long Lake, and to aquifers that supply water to Hartford, Roxana, Wood River, and Edwardsville, has made it a focus of hydrological and contamination studies across the American Bottom region.[17][18]
The area is situated within the wider Mississippi River industrial belt and forms part of the historic manufacturing corridor that underpinned the economic development of the St. Louis region and the broader Midwest. Research and academic work from institutions such as Southern Illinois University Carbondale have examined the environmental and geological characteristics of the American Bottom, emphasizing its dual role as an industrial base and a sensitive ecological zone.[19][20]
Horseshoe Lake, a designated National Natural Landmark, is one nearby feature, and points to the mix of natural and developed landscapes that define the American Bottom region. This juxtaposition of industrial, ecological, and community interests continues to shape environmental management and research priorities in the lower Illinois–Mississippi corridor.[21]
History
Construction of the plant, originally with the name Chemico, began in 1969, with three 70-ton gas-fired converters installed, and a fourth of these was added later. For each converter, there was also a melting furnace.
The business was incorporated as a Delaware company and renamed Chemetco, Inc. in 1972.[22] Corporate records indicate that Chemetco underwent a change in ownership during the early 1990s. Company representative David Hoff stated, in sworn testimony at the Illinois Pollution Control Board, that John M. Suarez purchased the company in 1993.[23]
EPA records list Suarez as president and as the company contact in Potentially Responsible Party documentation for the Chemetco Superfund Site.[24]
Federal Election Commission filings name Suarez, along with Chemetco and Concorde Trading Company, in Matter Under Review 3541.[25]
John Suarez was not among the individuals charged when the company and several employees were indicted in 1999 for Clean Water Act violations.[26]
Explainer: Chemetco’s secondary copper smelting process
Chemetco operated as a secondary copper smelter, recovering copper from scrap and other recycled materials rather than from mined ore. At the Hartford plant, copper-bearing scrap and residues from a variety of industrial sources were first simply melted, using gas, in four large furnaces, to produce an impure molten metal known as black copper (typically containing 80–95 percent copper). This molten metal was then transferred to Chemetco’s Kaldo-type converters, where oxygen from air was blown through to oxidize and remove impurities such as iron and sulfur. The converters produced blister copper, named for the blistered surface that appears as gases escape while the metal cools.
In its early years, Chemetco refined the blister copper on site in an electrolytic tankhouse, producing high-purity cathode copper. The blister was cast into heavy plates called anodes, which were suspended in tanks of copper sulfate solution and connected to a heavy electric current. Over several days, pure copper dissolved from the anodes and was deposited onto thin starter sheets, producing cathode copper of 99.99 percent purity to yield a commodity-grade product, which is also the form used in electrical wire and other finished products.
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Chemetco's role in U.S. Secondary copper industry collapse
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The permanent closure of Chemetco's Hartford facility in 2001 signaled the end of large-scale secondary copper smelting in the United States. The company ceased operations on October 31, 2001, following criminal convictions for environmental violations and mounting financial pressures, and Chemetco then filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy protection on November 13, 2001.[27][28] The plant at this stage had an output of 95,000 metric tons and was operating at roughly 30% below capacity before closure.
Chemetco's shutdown was the end point of an industry contraction that had eliminated secondary smelters operated by Southwire in Georgia and South Carolina, as well as Cerro Copper Products' facility in Sauget, Illinois.[29][30] Between 1997 and 2001, approximately 200,000 metric tons of secondary refining capability was effaced: refined secondary copper output in the United States fell to zero.[31]
One significant factor in the overall industry decline was the compression of margins. Copper prices remained below historical peaks through the late 1990s and early 2000s, trading between approximately $1,600 and $2,500 per metric ton before falling to around $1,600 per metric ton by 1999.[32] In U.S. dollar terms, copper averaged between roughly 70 cents per pound and $1.50 per pound during this period and prices were was notably weak from 1998 through to 2001.[33][34]
As well, operational costs increased substantially during this period. Energy costs were on the rise, and although Chemetco's ability to use complex scrap feed materials came with some advantages, it also required specialized handling of diverse waste streams. This placed it on a collision path with regulatory authorities. Environmental compliance expenses escalated throughout the 1990s as facilities faced increasingly stringent air quality standards, hazardous waste disposal requirements, and water pollution controls.[35][36] Secondary smelters such as Chemetco were operating at faced elevated fixed cost burdens, further reducing profitability.
Overall, then, Chemetco's exit from the market was the final point in a cycle of closures mediated by market pressures and the substantial capital investments required to meet evolving environmental standards that operators found economically unviable.[37] With Chemetco's elective bankruptcy came the end of infrastructure for U.S secondary copper refining at scale, and an increased U.S. reliance on imported refined copper and semi-processed scrap feedstock.
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Operation
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Main products
Chemetco was primarily a secondary smelter of copper anodes and cathodes. Its peak historic capacity was about 125,000 tonnes of refined copper annually, from an average of 250,000 tonnes of scrap copper and residues.
Subsidiary products and precious metals
The smelter also produced lead and tin ingots.[38][39] Independent evaluations of the tankhouse sludges confirmed gold, silver, and other metals.[40]
Feedstock and input materials
From the receiving yard, Chemetco's furnaces were charged with a wide spectrum of feed materials, with an average copper recovery of about 50%. At the upper end of purity were grades of clean copper scrap, with a very high recoverable copper content. Alongside these came bronzes, containing significant amounts of lead and tin, and brasses, in which zinc was the major secondary component. Zinc had no commercial value to the company, except for a short period early in its history when it was used to manufacture a chemical product. At the lower quality end of the materials coming in were complex residues, sweeps, and low-grade scrap with only modest copper content and a variety of contaminants, including oil, for example.
Grabs mounted on large gantries above the receiving yard kept the furnaces supplied continuously, day and night, with successive charges put in and tapped out to maintain production.
Smelting and refining
Material from the furnaces was first smelted into ‘black copper,’ a product containing around 70 per cent copper. This was then refined using oxygen in top-blown rotary converters (TBRC), also known as 'Kaldo' converters, and the slag, containing lead, tin and zinc, was poured off. Three out of four converters had been introduced with expertise from Metallo-Chimique of Beerse, Belgium, Chemetco's parent company. The rationale for their adoption was to process complex alloyed feeds more effectively than conventional copper smelting methods.
From the converters, the copper was cast into ‘anodes’ of approximately 98–99 per cent purity.[40]
Tankhouse and electrolytic refining
These anodes had two possible pathways. They could be further refined in Chemetco's own tankhouse into copper cathodes of 99.99 per cent purity or better, made to internationally recognised specifications and traded against COMEX contracts.[40] There were step-down transformers supplied by overhead cables slung on pylons on site, and heavy rectifiers to supply DC power to the tankhouse. This contained sulfuric acid and was where, using electrolysis and DC current, the formation of cathodes from anodes took place. Impurities as well as precious metal content dropped out as sludge during this process.
Anodes were also themselves a saleable semi-finished product, and in later years the company regularly shipped anodes by rail to ASARCO's refinery in Amarillo, Texas, for electrolytic treatment.[41]
Introduction of Kaldo /Top-blown rotary converter (TBRc) technology to secondary copper smelting
Kaldo/TBRC innovation in secondary copper smelting
Period: 1960s–1980s Companies: Metallo-Chimique (Belgium), Chemetco (USA) Technology: Kaldo (Top-Blown Rotary Converter, TBRC) Origin: Developed for steelmaking (1950s) and adapted for non-ferrous by the 1960s Innovation type: Flowsheet innovation – integration of existing furnace technology into a new process route for secondary copper Significance: Allowed melting, oxidation and reduction in one rotating vessel, reduced energy use and improved handling of mixed scrap Status by 1980s: Established but distinctive, innovative within secondary copper but not new to metallurgy
In steelmaking, Kaldo furnaces, which were top-blown oxygen converters, were in established use by the 1960s, for example in the UK, Japan and the United States (TBRC).[42][43] They can be visualized as a massive cement-mixer-like container into which oxygen was blown under pressure, with raw materials easily charged for smelting.
Chemetco (as with its parent, Metallo Chimique) claimed in its marketing literature to be the first to use the technology systematically for secondary copper smelting. A 1976 TMS paper reports that Metallo had used TBRCs for secondary copper since 1968, with a parallel installation described as being in Alton, Illinois [in fact, neighboring Hartford] identified as Chemetco’s site.[44] While the Kaldo/TBRC principle was already well known, Chemetco appears to mark the first large-scale, continuous application of it in secondary copper refining. Comparable trials were underway elsewhere in Europe, notably at Boliden’s Rönnskär smelter in Sweden and at Norddeutsche Affinerie in Hamburg, Germany, but parent company Metallo’s implementation was one of the earliest and most fully developed examples.[45][46]
By the 1980s the novelty was not the equipment itself but the 'flowsheet', which is pyrometallurgical jargon for the integrated sequence of process stages.
Conventional routes used a reverberatory furnace and Peirce–Smith converters. The Kaldo/TBRC combined these steps in one rotating vessel, giving finer control of oxidation, slag chemistry and removal of gases and volatile products.[47] This process integration was a form of flowsheet innovation and made secondary smelting more flexible and efficient.
Thus, Chemetco’s 1980s claims of innovation were demonstrably true in the sense of applying and optimising existing steel technology for secondary copper recycling.[48]
Competitors
Secondary copper smelting competitors
During Chemetco’s operating years (1970–2001), direct competitors in the United States secondary copper smelting market included Cerro Copper Products in Sauget, Illinois, Franklin Smelting in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and Southwire operations in Carrollton, Georgia and Gaston, South Carolina.[49]
Noranda (Canada)
Chemetco’s primary North American rival was Noranda’s Horne Smelter in Rouyn-Noranda, Quebec. The Horne facility processed copper concentrates and recycled materials, including huge quantities of electronic scrap, and supplied anodes to its integrated Canadian Copper Refinery (CCR) in Montreal.[50][51]
The Horne Smelter produced copper anodes of about 99.1 percent purity, while Chemetco’s output ranged between 98 and 99 percent.[52] Noranda refined its own anodes to 99.99 percent cathodes at CCR, whereas once Chemetco closed its tankhouse, it relied on ASARCO in Amarillo, TX, for final refining.
Note on primary smelters
Kennecott (Utah) and Freeport-McMoRan (Miami, Arizona) are primary smelters using ore concentrates. Each occasionally processed limited high-grade scrap but did not compete directly for the mixed secondary and electronic scrap feedstocks that sustained Chemetco’s operations.[53]
Characterization of by-products
Chemetco operated under state and federal environmental regulations that governed the handling of secondary materials and industrial residues. In a significant hearing in front of the Illinois Pollution Control Board (PCB) the company petitioned for an 'amended standard' that would allow it to slurry its bunker material, which it described as 'zinc oxide,' then blend it with copper and tin fines before shipment overseas.[54] Chemetco presented this process as a means of recovering metal value from material it characterized as a product.
The PCB reviewed the proposal, took comments from regulators and nearby landowners, and ultimately denied the petition for an amended standard.[54] The decision left the bunker material subject to existing waste management requirements rather than reclassification as a recoverable product. The case illustrates how Chemetco's operational approach to by-product recovery was tested and limited within the regulatory framework that governed its activities.
Analysis of what Chemetco described as 'zinc oxide' by-product
Laboratory analyses by the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) determined that the material referred to by Chemetco as 'zinc oxide' was not a product at all. Rather, it was a hazardous by-product containing extremely high concentrations of lead, cadmium, and copper, along with trace elements such as antimony, cobalt, nickel, and mercury.[18]
EPA laboratory testing found that Chemetco's by-product failed Toxicity Characteristic Leaching Procedure (TCLP) standards for lead and cadmium, classifying it as hazardous waste under federal regulations.[18] The agency's analyses concluded that the material posed significant risks due to toxicity as well as its potential for leaching.
EPA-confirmed metal and metalloid content
All samples analyzed failed EPA regulatory thresholds for lead and cadmium.[18]
Comparison with pure zinc oxide
EPA's characterization established that Chemetco's 'zinc oxide' could not be marketed or exported as a recyclable product and instead required management as hazardous waste.[18] This distinction underscored the difference between genuine industrial zinc oxide and the metal-rich residues generated by Chemetco's refining operations.
The unusable waste generated by Chemetco accumulated in a massive pile in one corner of the site for decades. It is visible in the aerial photograph and tagged by U.S govt. [See photo above.]
Computerized monitoring and operations
The company shared a WANG mainframe computer system with proprietarty software and shared buying, receiving, shipping and other commercial systems using this Metallo Chimique, in Beerse, Belgium,.[40] and with Elmet, S.A, in Spain.
Logistics and transportation
ransportation and Triangle Metallurgical Corporation
A railhead adjoining the site connected Chemetco directly into national freight networks and this was used to receive scrap and residues and for the shipment of semi-finished copper products. A large parking lot enabled semi-trailers to queue up and deliver material and also take away finished product.
Supply network and warehouse affiliates
Chemetco was associated with a network of warehouses around the United States, whose function was to buy consignments of scrap locally, aggregate it, and then send it to the main Hartford smelter. [55] Concorde Trading Company was a principal trading affiliate, and related companies Tri-Me Trading company handled logistics, sorting, and haulage of scrap to the Hartford smelter.
These firms were jointly owned by John M. Suarez and Bill Wegrzyn, who were associated with Chemetco’s management during the late 1980s and early 1990s. In 1993, ownership of Chemetco itself passed to Suarez, who maintained operations through the same group of affiliated trading and transport companies. In a nationwide array of regional warehouses, scrap that had been bought from a buying office at the smelter was collected into warehouse lots using nationally and internationally recognised 'grades' of metal..[1][2] It was then 'shipped' to Hartford, with lots tracked in a proprietary computer system. Within that network, the numerous Concorde-branded facilities, including Concorde Hartford HQ, Concorde Greensboro, Concorde Mississippi, Concorde Nashville, Concorde Oakland Warehouse, Concorde Tulsa, and Ann Concorde Anniston, are named in federal litigation.[3][4] Those Concorde sites are characterized in court filings as affiliated suppliers to the Hartford smelter.[3]
Buying and price calculation
Chemetco's commercial practice was to pay its suppliers only for the copper content of their material, with prices quoted by buyers calculated daily. These were linked to the day's copper futures valuation on COMEX or the London Metal Exchange. The presence of tin, lead, zinc, or precious metals such as gold and silver was not recognised in the price offered for copper-bearing material, so any additional value from these components accrued to Chemetco. This pricing structure underpinned the company's willingness to take in such a broad range of low-grade feedstocks.
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Occupational health hazards
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Chemetco’s operations exposed employees to a range of industrial health risks, which were subsequently identified through federal investigation. The most detailed assessment came from a National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) Health Hazard Evaluation, conducted between 1982 and 1984, following a request from United Steel Workers Local 7866, which represented plant employees.[56]. These included a finding of chronic beryllium disease, as well as mass personal exposure to lead far in excess of regulatory standards.
Chronic beryllium disease
NIOSH investigators confirmed one case of chronic beryllium disease in a 31-year-old furnace operator who had worked at the plant for two and a half years. The employee developed the following symptoms: progressive shortness of breath, loss of 60 pounds (U.S, 27 Kg metric) and showed severe loss of lung function, with resting arterial oxygen levels of 50 mm Hg, or moderate hypoxemia. Lung biopsy results indicated non-caseating granulomatous inflammation, and lymphocyte transformation testing confirmed beryllium sensitization. The worker was diagnosed with chronic berylliosis requiring lifelong steroid treatment.[56]
The affected worker was found to be charging small quantities of metal scrap into a sample furnace without respiratory protection, and further, his job classification did not require such equipment. NIOSH found that historical beryllium concentrations at the facility exceeded recommended occupational limits, with 17 percent of company air samples from 1981 above NIOSH exposure standards.[56]
Lead and other exposure hazards
NIOSH reported widespread exposure hazards across plant operations. Personal air monitoring detected lead concentrations ranging from 20.8 to 1,079 µg/m³. More than half of the samples (52 percent) exceeded the OSHA permissible exposure limit of 50 µg/m³, and 36 percent exceeded 200 µg/m³. NIOSH described these levels as “potentially toxic concentrations of lead.”[56]
NIOSH also noted that several production areas lacked local exhaust ventilation and that workers performing charging, sampling, and scrap handling often did not use respiratory protection. Dust and metal fumes were identified as consistent exposure sources throughout smelting and refining operations.[56]
NIOSH also identified additional exposure hazards involving arsenic, lead contamination in eating areas, and sulfuric acid mist in the electrolytic tankhouse.[57]
Arsenic exposure assessment and health impact on workers at the Chemetco smelter
Arsenic contamination originated from the metallic feedstocks processed through Chemetco’s secondary copper smelting operation. Copper-bearing alloys commonly contained arsenic as an impurity. During high-temperature smelting, arsenic trioxide was formed, then became volatile and concentrated in flue dust, creating multiple exposure pathways throughout the facility.[57]
Personal air monitoring by NIOSH recorded 10% of samples exceeding the NIOSH recommended exposure limit of 2.0 µg/m³ for arsenic. Excedances occurred across several job categories, indicating that arsenic exposure was not confined to specific work areas but represented a facility-wide occupational hazard.[57] Chemetco's corporate offices were co-located with the smelting operation, hence administrative, commercial and managerial staff would have faced such hazards.
Epidemiological studies of copper smelter workers have documented a threefold increase in respiratory cancer mortality linked to arsenic exposure, with long-term employees showing up to an eightfold increase in lung cancer mortality compared with expected rates. These data establish arsenic as a carcinogenic hazard in copper smelting operations.[57]
Exposure at Chemetco occurred primarily through the inhalation of dusts and as noted, arsenic trioxide vapors generated during furnace charging and smelting. Workers in furnace operations, material handling and maintenance experienced the highest risks.[57]
NIOSH also identified additional exposure hazards involving arsenic, lead contamination in eating areas, and sulfuric acid mist in the electrolytic tankhouse.[58]
Contamination of eating areas at the Chemetco smelter
The NIOSH evaluation found evidence of contamination extending into non-production areas, including locations used for food and beverage consumption.[58]
Surface sampling in the facility’s lunchroom revealed lead concentrations ranging from 17 to 68 µg/100 cm². These levels indicated a secondary exposure pathway through ingestion, as workers could transfer contaminated material from surfaces to their hands and mouths.[58]
NIOSH identified the contamination as evidence of inadequate hygiene and containment practices. Effective industrial hygiene programs require physical separation between production and food areas, as well as decontamination procedures to prevent cross-contamination. The documented levels exceeded acceptable limits for food-consumption spaces and demonstrated that standard handwashing was insufficient to remove lead residues from skin.[58]
The presence of contamination in administrative areas suggested broader facility contamination. NIOSH concluded that if eating areas showed measurable levels of heavy metals, production areas, worker clothing, and protective equipment likely carried substantially higher contamination loads.[58]
Chemetco's tankhouse workers: adverse health effects
The tankhouse operation, where copper anodes underwent electrolytic refining to produce high-purity cathodes, presented additional hazards from sulfuric acid mist generated during electrowinning.[58]
Oxygen bubbles formed at anode surfaces during the process. When these bubbles burst, they released fine aerosol droplets of sulfuric acid that dispersed through the tankhouse air. This mist produced persistent exposure conditions affecting all personnel in the area.[58]
NIOSH medical examinations documented respiratory and skin effects among all seven tankhouse employees evaluated and found each worker reported nasal irritation and symptoms including sore throat and burning eyes. Fissuring of the skin on the hands was also common, and was caused by contact with acid-contaminated surfaces and airborne mist.[58]
Personal air monitoring measured sulfuric acid concentrations from 30.7 to 191 µg/m³. Although these values were below 20 percent of the OSHA permissible exposure limit, investigators noted that they still produced measurable symptoms among exposed workers. The findings indicated that existing exposure standards were below what was needed to prevent health effects in this environment.[58]
NIOSH classified sulfuric acid mist as a confirmed human carcinogen and noted that even low-level chronic exposure could contribute to elevated risks for laryngeal and lung cancer. The consistent presence of respiratory and skin irritation among tankhouse workers suggested that long-term employment under such conditions could lead to progressive health deterioration.[58]
Systemic occupational health deficiencies
The findings of the NIOSH Health Hazard Evaluation showed profound and systemic failures in occupational health protection at Chemetco. Documented overexposures to arsenic, lead, and sulfuric acid, combined with contamination of eating areas, demonstrated that the facility lacked effective exposure controls and hygiene measures.[58]
NIOSH concluded that worker exposures exceeded recognized safety limits for multiple hazardous substances, resulting in adverse health effects including respiratory irritation, skin damage, beryllium sensitization, and elevated blood lead levels. These findings indicated that Chemetco fell very short of the standard needed to maintain conditions consistent with fundamental occupational health and safety standards.[58]
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Labor relations
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In 1996, Geri Heinemeier (née Champion) filed a lawsuit against two companies, Chemetco, Inc. and Tri-Me Transportation, Inc., claiming she was sexually harassed, discriminated against because of her age, and fired in retaliation after reporting the harassment.[59]
Heinemeier v. Chemetco, Inc. (246 F.3d 1078 (7th Cir. 2001)) was a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit concerning joint-employer liability under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. The court held that factual disputes about shared control of employment conditions prevented summary judgment. Instead, they required a jury to decide whether both companies concerned functioned as the plaintiff’s employers.[60]
Before the case went to trial, the district court had ruled in favor of Chemetco, deciding that it could not be held responsible because Heinemeier was legally employed by Tri-Me, not by Chemetco. The rest of the case continued against Tri-Me alone, and a jury found in Heinemeier’s favor. She was awarded about $411,000 in damages for sexual harassment and in retaliation.[61]
Heinemeier then appealed the ruling that had originally dismissed Chemetco from the case. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with her, finding that there was enough evidence for a jury to decide whether Chemetco and Tri-Me both acted as her employers. The appeals court sent the case back to the district court for further proceedings.[62]
The appellate court explained that a company can be treated as an employer even if it does not issue paychecks, if it shares control over pay, benefits, or working conditions. It found that Chemetco and Tri-Me were closely connected in their operations, and that a jury could reasonably find that both companies employed Heinemeier under the 'economic reality' test used in employment discrimination cases.[63]
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Environmental problems
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Long before an illegal waste pipe was uncovered, Chemetco already had a thick compliance file. EPA and IEPA documents describe repeated violations through the 1980s and early 1990s. One EPA briefing put it plainly: “... a long history of criminal and civil environmental noncompliance.”[64][65]
Water
Acting on an anonymous tip-off from a security guard, on 18 September, 1996, an Illinois EPA inspector found a concealed 10-inch pipe with water bubbling up from it in a ditch near the truck parking lot.[66] EPA and IEPA came to the conclusion that it had been in use since the mid-1980s to carry process water and metal-laden runoff into Long Lake, which drains toward the Mississippi River.[67] Under the Clean Water Act, it is a felony to pollute a navigable waterway. After the plant's closure, Hazmat-protected environmental investigators found long-term releases of copper, lead, cadmium, zinc and other contaminants extending to great depth in soils as well as in surface waters.[68]
Samples taken at multiple sites showed cadmium, copper, lead, and zinc and many other metals of concern at highly elevated levels, sometimes 'spiking out' test equipment. Investigators and prosecutors concluded that the pipe had been used to dispose of the accumulating piles of ‘zinc oxide’, which had been debarred from being sold as a recyclable material and instead, tagged as a hazardous waste.[69][70]
After the site was impounded and detailed risk assessment had taken place, it was shown in a Hazard Ranking System (HRS) document that the site's surface-water pathway scored highly based. It was found that runoff from waste units migrated miles downstream.[71]
The score was focussed on observed releases to Long Lake; however, records show that the Cahokia Diversion Channel, a canal, was within the same drainage system. A watershed plan for the American Bottom later listed the Chemetco site among Superfund sources within the Cahokia Creek (Cahokia Canal) basin.[71][72]
Pre-1996 violations
EPA and IEPA records describe a pattern of violations stretching back way before the 1996 discovery. Superfund briefings note a “....long history of criminal and civil environmental noncompliance” at the site.[64][65] IEPA preliminary and expanded site inspection work put together a history of multiple violations from the 1980s onward. A DOJ notice shows that a Clean Air Act civil case was lodged in 1999.[73]
Air
The state of Illinois entered into a consent order with Chemetco in 1988, then again in 1993. This set objectives for compliance with national ambient air quality standards for lead, particulate limits, and permit conditions.[74] These were ignored. The plant operated without a permit for its entire history.
IEPA later documented violations of the Illinois primary lead standard in 1997 and again from 1998 through 2001.[75]
In November 1999, the United States lodged a Clean Air Act consent decree requiring Chemetco to pay a civil penalty and undertake 'injunctive measures.' These included a requirement to install a Continuous Particulate Mass Monitor system (CPMS).[73] The company did not do so.[64]
A local resident testified in 1997 how acid mist and 'blue smoke' episodes from the tankhouse affected the air quality at her home and farm.[69] Industrial-hygiene investigators in the early 1980s documented respiratory and skin irritation among tankhouse workers. These symptoms were found to be best explained by exposure to sulfuric acid fumes.[76]
Long-range dioxin and furans deposition to Nunavut [77][78][79][80][81]
The Commission for Environmental Cooperation study, led by Barry Commoner and others in 2000, modeled emissions from more than 44,000 North American dioxin sources, including over 5,000 individual facilities such as smelters and incinerators. Within that large inventory, Chemetco ranked among the highest single contributors to measured deposition at two Arctic receptor sites. The study’s chemical fingerprinting and atmospheric transport analysis demonstrated that dioxins emitted by Chemetco were deposited at Coral Harbour and Sanikiluaq, Nunavut. Chemetco’s emissions accounted for about three to four percent of total dioxin deposition recorded at those locations, which is a substantial share given the number of sources evaluated. I
In the model, the ten largest individual sources together accounted for 18–26 % of total deposition, meaning that Chemetco’s 3-4 %share placed it within that top group. This is roughly two hundred times higher than the mean contribution per facility.
This finding is consistent with the Chemetco's admission that it used low grade materials to charge its furnaces, and inspection of inventories shows material such as insulated wire and computer scrap being charged into the furnaces in quantity.[83]
Dioxin contamination on site from incinerator ashes
Chemetco was recognised as a potential dioxin site as early as 1987. Records show that Chemetco intentionally charged its furnaces with large quantities of incinerator ash from one supplier over a period of time. This was the by-product of burning PVC-covered electrical wire to reveal the bare copper beneath, and a very concentrated source of dioxins and furans. The practice drew attention to the fact that Chemetco was capable of putting material with no copper content whatsoever into its furnaces for commercial reasons. A contemporaneous report noted how dioxin and furans would end up in flue gases emitted by the plant, and from there to be concentrated in scrubber sludge, where it could again be redistributed on land.
Land and soil
The Federal EPA points out the existence of a large iron-silicate slag pile and stockpiles of ‘zinc oxide’ scrubber sludge generated over decades by the flue-gas cleaning system. These materials contain lead, cadmium, copper, and zinc and contribute to runoff and soil contamination.[68] EPA estimated about 452,000 cubic yards of slag and 62,000 cubic yards of scrubber sludge present at the site.[71] An inspector described the slag heap as a 'monumental pile of hazardous waste' and it became known within the IEPA as ‘Mount Slagmore.’[64]
In 1997, Chemetco petitioned the Illinois Pollution Control Board to treat the 'zinc oxide' bunker as recyclable feedstock rather than solid waste. The Board's order described the material's origin in the scrubber system, noted its significant lead and copper content, and rejected Chemetco's request, leaving the stockpile regulated as waste.[69] Chemetco had by this time discharged huge quantities of the material into Long Lake and surrounding wetlands. As noted, this created a sludge metres deep.[68]
Practices leading to the discovery of dioxin on the site have been noted in the previous section and led to alarm by the authorities and detailed investigation of the risk to human health in the vicinity.
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Impact and legacy
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Geochemical research has examined the broader consequences of Chemetco's operations in the St. Louis–Madison County region.[84] There has also been academic study in the field of environmental justice.[84]
Environmental injustice impacts in St Louis Metropolitan area
On a metropolitan scale, Chemetco appeared among facilities analyzed in studies of environmental risk and inequality in the St. Louis region. Those analyses used U.S. EPA Toxic Release Inventory data to map industrial emissions and found that such facilities were concentrated near lower-income communities, raising environmental-justice concerns.[84][85][86]
The spatial analysis conducted by Abel (2008) identified Chemetco's Hartford smelter among the region's major industrial point sources in the EPA's Toxic Release Inventory dataset. In that study, 319 manufacturing sites were evaluated for potential air-pollution exposure risk, and Chemetco appeared within the upper tier of modeled emissions for the St. Louis metropolitan area.[85]
Together, these metropolitan-scale assessments and later geochemical investigations illustrate how the effects of Chemetco's operations extended from the regional level, through patterns of industrial inequality, right down to measurable ecological impacts in local waterways.
Geochemical research has examined the broader consequences of Chemetco's operations in the St. Louis–Madison County region.[87] Academic study in the field of environmental justice has also put Chemetco's activities within its ambit and concluded an unequal concentration and distribution of adverse outcomes from heavy industry including that of Chemetco.[87]
Chemetco fingerprinted in back-trajectories of heavy metals
Scientists have described aspects of Chemetco's environmental legacy in Madison County, particularly at Horseshoe Lake, through rigorous geochemical methods.[88] These have allowed researchers to trace back-trajectories of heavy metal contamination pointing directly to the smelter.[89]
Horseshoe Lake
Horseshoe lake, an oxbow feature of great ecological significance and a National Natural landmark, lies within the American Bottom region approximately 4–5 miles south-southwest of the Chemetco site, and about four miles east of St Louis, bordering with Granite City. The dominating drainage direction is largely west-to-southwest toward the Mississippi River. Horseshoe Lake is a focal site for state and federal conservation programs.[87] Beyond its ecological importance, Horseshoe Lake functions as a recreational and educational resource for the St. Louis metropolitan region, from where it attracts anglers and bird-watchers.
The lake's proximity to industrial zones and its role as a receiving body for urban and industrial runoff have made it a key site for environmental monitoring and geochemical study assessing heavy-metal contamination across the lower American Bottom region.[89]and field researchers from regional universities.[88]
Wastewater and surface runoff from Chemetco's contaminated property historically migrated 'miles downstream', into waterways that ultimately feed into Horseshoe Lake during flood retention operations.
Geochemical attribution and methods
Specific methods used for back-trajectory of heavy metals
- Sediment core stratigraphy and dating: Researchers extracted and dated cores from multiple locations in Horseshoe Lake, allowing them to resolve when enrichment of metals such as copper, zinc, and lead occurred. Comparison of sediment layers before and after Chemetco's operational period provided a timeline for contamination events.
- Trace metal concentration profiling: Concentrations of metals were measured at successive sediment depths to ascertain enrichment patterns. The sharp increase of certain metals soon after the start of smelting operations was a primary indicator of anthropogenic—rather than natural—origin.
- Multi-isotopic fingerprinting: Geologists performed isotopic analysis, particularly of lead (Pb) and copper (Cu), to match the ratios in contaminated sediment to those in known emissions from modern smelting practices, including those documented from Chemetco. Stable isotope “fingerprints” provide a source-specific signature that is difficult to misattribute and can be compared to published databases of isotopic ratios for various industrial sources and background levels.
- Principal component and multivariate statistical analyses: Statistical assessments, including Principal Component Analysis (PCA) and factor analysis, were used to group corresponding patterns in metal concentrations and isotopic fingerprints, further separating industrially derived signals from natural background or prehistoric inputs.
- Geoaccumulation index (Igeo) and spatial analysis: Indices such as Igeo quantified the degree of metal enrichment relative to local background. When mapped spatially using GIS-based analysis, these findings revealed contamination plumes concentrated near the Chemetco site and dispersing through the watershed.
A direct quotation from the literature affirms how:[89]
'...Isotope ratios in these post-1970 sediment layers clearly indicate a signature consistent with modern copper smelting and not with prehistoric metallurgy, providing compelling evidence for the attribution of contamination to the Chemetco facility.
Supporting methods from the broader field emphasize that 'the stable isotope technology is widely used in the tracing or apportionment of heavy metal pollutants in soil and sediments,' and that combining 'multi-isotope ratios, principal component analysis, and spatial analysis' allows accurate source identification in complex landscapes.[90]
These robust geochemical methods provide clear scientific attribution connecting Chemetco's operational period and emissions to the persistent heavy-metal contamination observed throughout the Horseshoe Lake watershed.
See also section on impact of airborne Dioxin reaching vulnerable receptor communities in Nunavut
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Prosecution and conviction
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Discovery of the concealed discharge
Between 1986 and 1996 Chemetco operated a secondary copper refining facility at Hartford, Illinois, which was later found to have discharged untreated wastewater through a hidden pipe into wetlands leading to the Mississippi River.[91] The pipe was not shown on site diagrams and its exposed sections were covered with straw, but after a tip-off, it was discovered by an IEPA field manager on September 18, 1996, along with a valve which enabled it to be shut-off at the distal end. Its existence had allowed the plant to bypass permitted outfalls and monitoring systems for about a decade, resulting in unreported releases of heavy metals including lead and cadmium.[92]
Charges, plea, and sentencing
Chemetco, its president, and several employees were indicted for conspiracy, knowing violations of the Clean Water Act, and making false statements to federal officials.[93] The company pleaded guilty to conspiring to violate and knowingly violating the Act, and entered a plea of nolo contendere to making false statements, admitting that the concealed pipe had been used during the charged period.
Sentencing turned on the number of days of illegal discharge, as criminal penalties under 33 U.S.C. §1319(c)(2) are assessed 'per day of violation.' The government argued for 949 violation days, covering every day of rainfall as well as the discovery date, while Chemetco's experts contended that the valve controlling the pipe was not continuously open and that as few as 71 days were affected. The presentence report used a starting point of 711 days, however after an evidentiary hearing, the district court found 676 days of violation and imposed a $3,327,500 fine, together with probation and remedial obligations.[91]
Legal precedent and appeal
On appeal, Chemetco argued that the number of violation days, which determined the magnitude of the fine, should have been found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt under the Supreme Court's decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000).[94] The Seventh Circuit held that the number of days was a sentencing factor, not an element of the offense, and therefore could be decided by the judge on a preponderance of the evidence.[91] The ruling affirmed Chemetco's sentence and established a binding precedent within the Seventh Circuit on the treatment of per-day penalties under the Clean Water Act. Subsequent legal analyses have cited the case as a leading authority in environmental criminal law and sentencing.[95]
The decision clarified that where a statute imposes penalties 'per day of violation,' without setting an upper statutory maximum, district courts may determine duration and corresponding fines judicially, even when the financial range in dispute is extensive.[91]
The company's criminal conviction and subsequent bankruptcy left the Hartford site abandoned, leading to its eventual designation and management under federal
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Denis L. Feron
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Denis L. Feron was a billionaire Belgian industrialist and served for several decades as Chemetco's president. Before establishing the Hartford plant in 1970, Feron owned Metallo Chimique in Belgium. It was under his direction that Chemetco expanded to become one of the largest secondary copper producers in North America.
In April 1999, Feron and six junior employees acting under his direction were indicted on federal charges for long-term violations of the Clean Water Act. These centered on the concealed pipeline that discharged contaminated wastewater into wetlands near the Mississippi River.[96] Feron did not appear in court and left the United States, remaining abroad during the ensuing proceedings. Because there was no extradition agreement with Belgium, he was at liberty to escape trial.
In December 2008 the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's Criminal Investigation Division placed him on its 'Most Wanted' fugitives list, describing him as a corporate officer who had evaded prosecution for nearly a decade.[97]
Feron voluntarily returned in 2010 and entered a pretrial diversion agreement in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Illinois. As part of the settlement he paid US$500,000 in restitution toward site cleanup. Once payment was completed, the charges against him were dismissed.[98][99]
Superfund
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The former Chemetco facility was added to the EPA's National Priorities List on March 2, 2010.[100] The listing made the site eligible for long-term cleanup under the federal Superfund program.
Following the company’s bankruptcy in 2001, there was no viable owner to carry out cleanup. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (IEPA) conducted early stabilization work, including demolition of several structures and fencing off the main industrial area.[101] A 2015 Administrative Order on Consent (AOC) established the framework for a Remedial Investigation and Feasibility Study (RI/FS) to define the contamination and evaluate cleanup options.[102]
The site remains under EPA oversight with restricted access. It still contains large amounts of waste material, including slag and residues from copper smelting operations.[101] Elevated levels of copper, cadmium, lead, and zinc are present in soil, sediment and water on and near the site.[101]
Since the site was tagged for Superfund remedy, large volumes of metal-bearing material have been processed and removed under EPA and trustee supervision. This included recovery and sale of copper-rich slag and other residues for recycling.[101]In February 2018, the Chemetco Site PRP Group filed what is described as a 'contribution complaint' in the United States District Court (Chemetco Site PRP Group v. A Square Systems, Inc., et al., Civil Action No. 3:18-cv-00179). The group was made up of companies that had earlier entered into a settlement with the EPA to contribute to site cleanup.[103] The complaint named more than 300 firms shown to have supplied copper-bearing scrap or waste between 1969 and 2001. The PRP Group sought to recover part of its contribution and to share liability for future cleanup costs under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA).
The defendants ranged from small regional scrapyards to Fortune 500 multinational corporations. The litigation is notable for its scale, involving hundreds of defendants across multiple industries.
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References
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See also
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