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Convoy QP 10

Arctic convoy of World War II From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Convoy QP 10
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Convoy QP 10 was an Arctic convoy of the Second World War, consisting of empty merchant ships returning from the Soviet Union after unloading. The convoy had 16 merchant ships and an escort of nine warships.[1] The convoy departed Murmansk on 10 April 1942 and arrived in Reykjavík on 21 April.[2] The convoy was attacked by German U-boats and aircraft, resulting in the loss of four merchant ships. Stone Street, was damaged by air attack and forced to turn back to the Kola Inlet. The convoy escorts shot down six German aircraft and damaged another during the voyage.

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Background

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Arctic convoys

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Hvalfjörður
Hvalfjörður
Hvalfjörður in Iceland

In October 1941, after Operation Barbarossa, the German invasion of the USSR, which had begun on 22 June, the Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, made a commitment to send a convoy to the Arctic ports of the USSR every ten days and to deliver 1,200 tanks a month from July 1942 to January 1943, followed by 2,000 tanks and another 3,600 aircraft more than already promised.[3][a] The first convoy was due at Murmansk around 12 October and the next convoy was to depart Iceland on 22 October. A motley of British, Allied and neutral shipping loaded with military stores and raw materials for the Soviet war effort would be assembled at Hvalfjörður in Iceland, convenient for ships from both sides of the Atlantic.[5]

By late 1941, the convoy system used in the Atlantic had been established on the Arctic run. A convoy commodore ensured that the ships' masters and signals officers attended a briefing before sailing, to make arrangements for the management of the convoy, which sailed in a formation of long rows of short columns. The commodore was usually a retired naval officer, aboard a ship identified by a white pendant with a blue cross. The commodore was assisted by a Naval signals party of four men, who used lamps, semaphore flags and telescopes to pass signals, coded from books carried in a bag, weighted to be dumped overboard. In large convoys, the commodore was assisted by vice- and rear-commodores who directed the speed, course and zig-zagging of the merchant ships and liaised with the escort commander.[6][b]

Signals intelligence

Bletchley Park

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Photograph of a German Enigma coding machine

The British Government Code and Cypher School (GC&CS) based at Bletchley Park housed a small industry of code-breakers and traffic analysts. By June 1941, the German Enigma machine Home Waters (Heimish) settings used by surface ships and U-boats could quickly be read. On 1 February 1942, the Enigma machines used in U-boats in the Atlantic and Mediterranean were changed but German ships and the U-boats in Arctic waters continued with the older Heimish (Hydra from 1942, Dolphin to the British). By mid-1941, British Y-stations were able to receive and read Luftwaffe W/T transmissions and give advance warning of Luftwaffe operations.[8]

B-Dienst

The rival German Beobachtungsdienst (B-Dienst, Observation Service) of the Kriegsmarine Marinenachrichtendienst (MND, Naval Intelligence Service) had broken several Admiralty codes and cyphers by 1939, which were used to help Kriegsmarine ships elude British forces and provide opportunities for surprise attacks. From June to August 1940, six British submarines were sunk in the Skaggerak using information gleaned from British wireless signals. In 1941, B-Dienst read signals from the Commander in Chief Western Approaches informing convoys of areas patrolled by U-boats, enabling the submarines to move into "safe" zones.[9] B-Dienst had broken Naval Cypher No 3 in February 1942 and by March was reading up to 80 per cent of the traffic, which continued until 15 December 1943. By coincidence, the British lost access to Atlantic U-boat communications with the introduction of the Shark cypher and had no information to send in Cypher No 3 which might compromise Ultra.[10]

Arctic Ocean

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Diagrammatic representation of the course of the Gulf Stream

Between Greenland and Norway are some of the most stormy waters of the world's oceans, 890 mi (1,440 km) of water under gales full of snow, sleet and hail.[11] The cold Arctic water is met by the Gulf Stream, warm water from the Gulf of Mexico, which becomes the North Atlantic Drift. Arriving at the south-west of England the drift moves between Scotland and Iceland; north of Norway the drift splits. One stream bears north of Bear Island to Svalbard and a southern stream follows the coast of Murmansk into the Barents Sea. The mingling of cold Arctic water and warmer water of higher salinity generates thick banks of fog for convoys to hide in but the waters drastically reduced the effectiveness of ASDIC as U-boats moved in waters of differing temperatures and density.[11]

In winter, polar ice can form as far south as 50 mi (80 km) off the North Cape and in summer it can recede to Svalbard. The area is in perpetual darkness in winter and permanent daylight in the summer and can make air reconnaissance almost impossible.[11] Around the North Cape and in the Barents Sea the sea temperature rarely rises about 4° Celsius and a person in the water will die unless rescued immediately.[11] The cold water and air makes spray freeze on the superstructures of ships, which has to be removed quickly to prevent ships becoming top-heavy. Conditions in U-boats were, if anything, worse, the boats having to submerge in warmer water to rid the superstructure of ice. Crewmen on watch were exposed to the elements, oil lost its viscosity, nuts froze and sheared off. Heaters in the hull were too demanding of current to be run continuously.[12]

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Prelude

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Kriegsmarine

German naval forces in Norway were commanded by Hermann Böhm, the Kommandierender Admiral Norwegen. Two U-boats were based in Norway in July 1941, four in September, five in December and four in January 1942.[13] By mid-February twenty U-boats were anticipated in the region, with six based in Norway, two in Narvik or Tromsø, two at Trondheim and two at Bergen. Hitler contemplated establishing a unified command but decided against it. The German battleship Tirpitz arrived at Trondheim on 16 January, the first ship of a general transfer of surface ships to Norway. British convoys to Russia had received little attention, since they averaged only eight ships each and the long Arctic winter nights negated even the limited Luftwaffe effort that was available.[14]

Luftflotte 5

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A Focke-Wulf Fw 200 Kondor of KG 40

In mid-1941, Luftflotte 5 (Air Fleet 5) had been re-organised for Operation Barbarossa when Luftgau Norwegen (Air Region Norway) was headquartered in Oslo. Fliegerführer Stavanger (Air Commander Stavanger) the centre and north of Norway, Jagdfliegerführer Norwegen (Fighter Leader Norway) commanded the fighter force and Fliegerführer Kerkenes (Oberst [colonel] Andreas Nielsen) in the far north had airfields at Kirkenes and Banak. The Air Fleet had 180 aircraft, sixty of which were reserved for operations on the Karelian Front against the Red Army. The distance from Banak to Arkhangelsk was 560 mi (900 km) and Fliegerführer Kerkenes had only ten Junkers Ju 88 bombers of Kampfgeschwader 30, thirty Stukas, ten Messerschmitt Bf 109 fighters of Jagdgeschwader 77, five Messerschmitt Bf 110 heavy fighters of Zerstörergeschwader 76, ten reconnaissance aircraft and an anti-aircraft battalion.[15]

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A Ju 88 similar to the ones that attacked Convoy QP 10

Sixty aircraft were far from adequate in such a climate and terrain where "there is no favourable season for operations" (Earl F. Ziemke).[16] The emphasis of air operations changed from army support to anti-shipping operations as Allied Arctic convoys became more frequent.[15] Hubert Schmundt, the Admiral Nordmeer [de] noted gloomily on 22 December 1941 that the number long-range reconnaissance aircraft was exiguous and from 1 to 15 December only two Ju 88 sorties had been possible. After the Lofoten Raids (Operation Claymore) Schmundt wanted Luftflotte 5 to transfer aircraft to northern Norway but its commander, Generaloberst Hans-Jürgen Stumpff, was reluctant to deplete the defences of western Norway.[17]

Some air units were transferred, a catapult ship (Katapultschiff), MS Schwabenland, was sent to northern Norway and Heinkel He 115 floatplane torpedo-bombers, of Küstenfliegergruppe 1./406 was transferred to Sola. By the end of 1941, III Gruppe, KG 30 had been transferred to Norway and in the new year, another Staffel of Focke-Wulf Fw 200 Kondors from Kampfgeschwader 40 (KG 40) arrived. Luftflotte 5 was also expected to receive a Gruppe comprising three Staffeln (squadrons) of Heinkel He 111 torpedo-bombers. Reinforcements increased the number of first-line aircraft from 152 aircraft in January to 175 in February and 221 in March.[17]

Air-sea rescue

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Example of a Heinkel He 59 search and rescue aircraft (1940)

The Luftwaffe Sea Rescue Service (Seenotdienst) along with the Kriegsmarine, the Norwegian Society for Sea Rescue (RS) and ships on passage, recovered aircrew and shipwrecked sailors. The service comprised Seenotbereich VIII at Stavanger, covering Bergen and Trondheim with Seenotbereich IX at Kirkenes for Tromsø, Billefjord and Kirkenes. Co-operation was as important in rescues as it was in anti-shipping operations if people were to be saved before they succumbed to the climate and severe weather. The sea rescue aircraft comprised Heinkel He 59 floatplanes, Dornier Do 18 and Dornier Do 24 seaplanes. Oberkommando der Luftwaffe (OKL, the high command of the Luftwaffe) was not able to increase the number of search and rescue aircraft in Norway, due to a general shortage of aircraft and crews, despite Stumpff pointing out that coming down in such cold waters required extremely swift recovery and that his crews "must be given a chance of rescue" or morale could not be maintained.[18]

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Convoy and escorts

Convoy QP 10 consisted of 16 merchant ships (convoy commodore D. A. Casey) with a local escort, from 10 to 12 April, of the Soviet destroyers Gremyashchiy, Sokrushitelny and the Halcyon-class minesweepers Gossamer, Harrier and Hussar as far as 30° East, where they were to transfer to the incoming Convoy PQ 14.[19] From 10 to 21 April, the oceanic escort consisted of the HMS Liverpool, the destroyers HMS Oribi, Punjabi, Fury, Eclipse and Marne, the Halcyon-class minesweeper HMS Speedwell and the ASW trawlers HMT Blackfly and Paynter. Between Iceland and Norway a Home Fleet distant covering force consisted of the battleships HMS Duke of York and King George V, the aircraft carrier HMS Victorious, the cruisers HMS Kent and Nigeria and 12 destroyers, in case of a sortie by the German heavy ships in Norway.[1] A flank guard was arranged with the Soviet Navy that included the submarines K-1, K-2, K-3, S-101 and Shch-401 that was to close on the coast as the convoys progressed.[1]

Voyage

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10–12 April

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SS El Occidente

Convoy QP 10 departed Murmansk at 17:00 on 10 April, accompanied as far as longitude 30° east by the local escorts as well as the oceanic escort. Attacks on the convoy began during its departure from Murmansk by U-boats and aircraft. On 11 April, the Soviet Air Forces (Voenno-Vozdushnye Sily, VVS) attacked the Luftflotte 5 base at Kirkenes with little effect. Junkers Ju 88 bombers of III./KG 30 attacked the convoy and the merchant ship Empire Cowper was hit by three 500 lb (230 kg) bombs. Paynter rescued survivors as the ship sank sank and Harpalion shot down one of the Ju 88s.[20] On 12 April, the German destroyers Z7 Hermann Schoemann, Z24 and Z25 of the 8th Destroyer Flotilla, sortied against the convoy but failed to find it.[1]

12/13 April

At 01:00 during the night of 12/13 April, the convoy was attacked by U-435 (Korvettenkapitän Siegfried Strelow). After a torpedo attack on Punjabi that missed, U-435 evaded the escorts and torpedoed the Russian freighter Kiev. At 03:30, U-435 hit the Panamanian El Occidente which sank almost immediately. Near dawn an attack by U-209 failed but at around 05:00, Ju 88s of III./KG 30 returned and circled the convoy for about an hour before attacking, causing damage to its steering gear and breaking the rudder, making the ship unmanageable. The crew of Harpalion tried to jury-rig a replacement but their attempts were halted by four Ju 88s that strafed the ship's deck with machine-gun fire and the ship was scuttled by Fury. Thick fog and a westerly gale later in the day, forced an end to the German attacks. Hermann Schoemann, Z24 and Z25 made another attempt to find the convoy but turned back because of the weather.[2]

14–21 April

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HMS Oribi, photographed on 30 May 1946

A reconnaissance aircraft found the outbound Convoy PQ 14 on 14 April and there were fitful air attacks from 15 to 17 April that had no effect. Attacks on Convoy QP 10 by U-376, U-377 U-403 were seen off by the escorts but on 17 April, U-376 nearly hit Edinburgh of Convoy PQ 14, to the east of Bear Island.[1] As Convoy QP 10 crossed Convoy PQ 14, it was joined by six ships from the outbound convoy that had to turn back because of ice and weather damage.[21] The convoy underwent no more attacks and reached Reykjavík in Iceland on 21 April.[2]

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Aftermath

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Analysis

The convoy lost two ships to bombers, one was severely damaged and two ships were sunk by U-435 but these successes cost the Luftwaffe six bombers shot down by the anti-aircraft fire of the escorts and on damaged, a sign of their increasing efficiency. On 13 April, Adolf Hitler, stressed to Grand Admiral (Großadmiral) Erich Raeder, the Oberkommando der Marine, (Commander-in-Chief of the Kriegsmarine) that "attacks on on the Murmansk convoys are most important at the moment". On 17 April, Vice-Admiral Henry Moore, the Vice-Chief of the Naval Staff, reported that the losses of Convoy QP 10 and the reciprocal Convoy QP 14 was more than 20 per cent and as the weather improved, convoy losses could only increase. The recent reinforcement in front-line aircraft of Luftflotte 5, from 152 aircraft in January to 175 in February and 221 in March. The increased number of submarines also required a parallel increase in the escorts and this would only be possible if the frequency of Arctic convoys was reduced to three in two months and no more than 25 ships per convoy.[22]

Subsequent events

The Admiralty view of the summer of 1942 caused dismay in the US Government, as there was a queue of ships waiting to be convoyed to the USSR, exacerbated by the six early returns from Convoy PQ 14. The US had dispatched 63 ships to Iceland in April but only seven ships reached the USSR that month, against forty in March and the US government had expected 107 ships to reach the Arctic ports in May. The Admiralty view that smaller convoys be dispatched due to a shortage of escorts caused much awkwardness between the US president, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, that abated somewhat when Convoy PQ 15 departed Iceland with 35 ships. The Admiralty claimed that 75 ships sailing over two months could meet western supply commitments if loaded carefully but this took no account of losses and the US perforce were forced to reduced their ambitions and only 21 ships left the US for Iceland during May and June; some ships being sent to the Persian Gulf instead.[23]

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Allied order of battle

Convoyed ships

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Ships from Convoy PQ 14

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Murmansk

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Soviet submarine flank guard

Oceanic escort

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Home Fleet

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German order of battle

U-boats

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Luftwaffe

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Kriegsmarine

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Notes

  1. In October 1941, the unloading capacity of Arkhangelsk was 300,000 long tons (300,000 t), Vladivostok in the Pacific 140,000 long tons (140,000 t) and 60,000 long tons (61,000 t) from the Persian Gulf.[4]
  2. By the end of 1941, 187 Matilda II and 249 Valentine tanks had been delivered, comprising 25 percent of the medium-heavy tanks in the Red Army, making 30–40 per cent of the medium-heavy tanks defending Moscow. In December 1941, 16 percent of the fighters defending Moscow were Hawker Hurricanes and Curtiss Tomahawks from Britain and by 1 January 1942, 96 Hurricane fighters were flying in the Soviet Air Forces (Voyenno-Vozdushnye Sily, VVS). The British supplied radar apparatus, machine tools, Asdic and commodities.[7]
  3. Convoys had a standard formation of short columns, number 1 to the left in the direction of travel. Each position in the column was numbered; 11 was the first ship in column 1 and 12 was the second ship in the column; 21 was the first ship in column 2.[25]
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Footnotes

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