First Mithridatic War

The First Mithridatic War (89–85 BC) was a large conflict in Anatolia and ancient Greece that opposed the Roman Republic and the Pontic kingdom ruled by Mithridates VI Eupator. Although the Roman general Sulla was largely victorious on the battlefield, factional struggle in Rome forced him to end the war on a precarious stalemate.

First Mithridatic War
Part of the Mithridatic Wars, Sulla's civil war
The Near East at the beginning of the war
Date late summer 89–85 BC Location Asia, Ancient Greece Result Sulla's victory Territorial changes Return to status quo ante bellum (treaty of Dardanus)
Belligerents
Roman Republic Bithynia Rhodes	Roman rebels	Pontus Athens Armenia
Commanders and leaders
Mn. Aquillius X L. Valerius Flaccus X C. Flavius Fimbria Nikomedes Braetius Sura	Sulla Lucullus	Mithridates VI Archelaus Neoptolemos Aristion X
Strength
in 89: 56,000 Bithynians 40,000 Romans and allies 2 legions in 86	5 legions in 87 7 legions after 86	250,000
Casualties and losses
100,000 Italian civilians (exaggerated)[1]	Unknown	c. 350,000 killed, including civilians (Roman estimate)[2] c. 200,000+ captured or enslaved (Roman estimate) [3]

The war began after more than a decade of geopolitical manoeuvring by Mithridates, who managed to considerably extend his realm despite constant Roman attempts to restrain him. In 90 BC, a Roman delegation headed by Manius Aquillius provoked Mithridates into war, as Aquillius hoped to receive its command. The following year, Mithridates rapidly captured the Roman province of Asia, exploiting local resentment of Roman tax collectors to massacre the Roman settlers. Taken by surprise while it was fighting a large revolt of its allies in Italy, Rome was initially unable to respond. This allowed Mithridates to encourage more defections from Greek cities, most notably Athens, where he installed the tyrant Aristion.

In Rome, the attribution of the command of the Mithridatic War led to civil strife, which was won by Sulla after he made a coup by marching his army on the city in 88 BC. However, once Sulla left Italy, his enemies Marius and Cinna seized power and declared him a public enemy. As a result, Sulla waged the war on his own as a rogue general. His campaign was swift: in 86 BC, he took Athens, then crushed Mithridates' general Archelaus in central Greece at the battles of Chaeronea and Orchomenos. Meanwhile, the official Roman government dispatched its own army to fight Mithridates, led by Lucius Valerius Flaccus, who was murdered by his lieutenant Fimbria. The latter then crossed into Asia and successfully conducted his own campaign against Mithridates.

At this point, Sulla realised that Fimbria could rob him of his victory, so he offered a generous peace to Mithridates called the treaty of Dardanos, restoring the situation to its pre-89 BC state. Soon after, Sulla convinced Fimbria's soldiers to defect and forced him to commit suicide, thus removing the last threat to his private empire in the East. In 83 BC, Sulla left Greece to fight the Cinno-Marians, against whom he won a civil war, which enabled his rule as dictator in Rome. However, Sulla's settlement of the East was short-lived; hostilities rapidly resumed in the Second Mithridatic War (83–81 BC), fought on the Roman side by Murena, the lieutenant that Sulla had left behind in Asia.

Sources

No contemporary account of Mithridates has survived. Modern historians have to use fragmentary or summarised versions of lost works, or histories written much later, none favourable to Mithridates.^[4][5] The most important source is the Roman history of Appian of Alexandria, a Greek author of the 2nd century AD, who is nevertheless not a good historian, prone to mistakes.^[6][7][8]

Another significant source is Plutarch, who wrote in the early 2nd century AD a set of famous biographies known as the Parallel Lives, which includes the lives of Roman commanders who played a role during the wars against Mithridates, most importantly Sulla, and also Marius, Lucullus, Sertorius, and Pompey.^[9] Plutarch provides excellent descriptions of Sulla's campaign in central Greece, as he was born in Chaeronea, where a major battle took place.^[10] The Greek geographer Strabo was born in Pontus in the 1st century and his family even served at the royal court, but his historical works are lost; he still often mentions Mithridates in his Geographica.^[11] Other important mentions are also found in the letters and speeches of Cicero, a contemporary of the events.^[12][13] The fragments of the Greek philosopher Posidonius are useful for the history of Athens during this period.^[14] Finally, some scraps of information can be retrieved from the later works of Justin, Frontinus, and the Viri Illustribus.^[15][16][17]

The major problem with most of these written sources is that they often derive from the lost Memoirs of Sulla—a key player of these events—who considerably arranged the facts to suit his propaganda, both against Mithridates and his rivals in Rome.^[18][19][20] He typically defamed his enemies, such as Fimbria, who is described in very unfavourable terms in all the sources, as they follow Sulla.^[21]

The Greek historian Memnon wrote a history of his city Heraclea Pontica (near modern Zonguldak in Turkey), where some action took place, which is likewise only available in fragments, but they show that Memnon did not use Roman sources and recounted events of the war differently from Appian.^[22]

Numismatics is another important source for the period, since Mithridates' coinage was extensive throughout his empire,^[23], as well as epigraphy, with many cities of the area inscribed treaties and statutes on stone.^[24] However, archaeology of northern Turkey has been poor apart from the excavations of the royal tombs in Amaseia.^[25] Mithridates also left monuments and inscriptions, such as the heroon he dedicated in Delos.^[26] Many statues and bust have been ascribed to him, but their attribution is often disputed among modern scholars; only one head is unanimously recognised as his, which is now in the Louvre Museum.^[27]

Origins of the war

Pontic expansion

Rome entered for good in Asia Minor in 133, when the last king of Pergamon, Attalus III, bequeathed his kingdom to the Republic. The province of Asia was created in its place in 129, which put the Roman borders close to several kingdoms located in the area.^[28] The largest of those was that of Pontus, ruled by the Mithridatids, a dynasty of Persian origin, claiming descent from Darius the Great.^[29][30] Their control of the Greek city-states of the northern coast of Anatolia added a significant Hellenistic touch to the kingdom.^[31]

Mithridates VI Eupator became king c. 120 at 13.^[32][33] At his majority, he started an expansionist policy towards the coast of the Black Sea and the interior of Asia minor. In 107 he obtained Lesser Armenia and Colchis, an area rich in timber used for building ships, but the details of these acquisitions are unknown.^[34] He provided military assistance against the Scythians to the Greek cities of the Black Sea, such as Apollonia Pontica, Olbia, Odessus, and Tyras, which made alliances with him. After he was bequeathed the Bosporan Kingdom (in modern Crimea), Mithridates controlled all the eastern shore of the Black Sea by the end of the 2nd century.^[35] Mithridates also expanded into Asia Minor, thanks to his alliance with Nicomedes III of Bithynia. The two kings first invaded Paphlagonia in 108–107 and shared the land between them.^[36][37] The same year, Mithridates occupied a part of Galatia, the area in central Anatolia populated by three Celtic tribes.^[38][39] He also murdered the king of Cappadocia c.100 and placed his son on its throne^[40], but this time Rome reacted and forced Mithridates and Nicomedes III to release Paphlagonia and Cappadocia, on which throne Ariobarzanes was placed.^[41][42]

After this setback, Mithridates turned to his eastern neighbour Armenia, where a new king ascended to the throne in 95: Tigranes II, to whom he gave his daughter Cleopatra in marriage.^[43][44] In exchange, in 92, Tigranes II invaded Cappadocia, expelled Ariobarzanes, and gave the land to Mithridates. This new aggression prompted Rome to intervene again; as propraetor, Lucius Cornelius Sulla was sent there and engaged Cappadocian troops led by the Pontic general Archelaus.^[45] At the same time, Mithridates took possession of Bithynia by expelling his nephew Nicomedes IV—the son of his former ally—, then removed Ariobarzanes from Cappadocia a second time after Sulla had left.^[46][47] The Social War that had started between Rome and its former Italian allies in 91 emboldened Mithridates to conquer his neighbours, defying Roman orders.^[48]

Aquillius' embassy (90–89 BC)

At the end of 90, after hearing the complaints of the kings in exile Ariobarzanes and Nicomedes IV, the senate sent a new embassy, headed by Manius Aquillius, a former consul, the son of the homonymous consul of 129 that had won the war against Aristonicus.^[49][50][51] Aquillius and Manlius Mancinus, another ambassador, were notably Gaius Marius' friends.^[52] After having restored the two kings without a fight, the embassy requested that they attack Pontus; deep in debts with Rome, Ariobarzanes complied and ravaged Pontus up to Amastris to recover his wealth.^[53][54] Mithridates did not oppose him, but still started recruiting soldiers from the Black Sea area. The king wanted to gain time and sent his ambassador Pelopidas to last chance negotiations with Aquillius in Pergamon, which took place in the spring of 89.^[55][56] These negotiations were marred with sophistry and spurious agreements; Mithridates listed his claims over Cappadocia and Bithynia and presented himself as a victim of Ariobarzanes' pillage, while the latter detailed how Mithridates breached the treaties and prepared for war.^[57] In a second meeting several weeks later, as Aquillius had already sided with Nicomedes, Pelopidas accused him of acting for his own benefit and threatened to go directly before the senate, which angered the commissioners and ended the talks, making war inevitable.^[58]

Aquillius wished the negotiations to fail, by compelling Pelopidas to leave the talks twice. His intentions were likely to force a war to which he would have been appointed commander.^[59] Although Mitridates' aggressive expansion was a major factor, modern historians put most of the immediate responsibility of the war on Aquillius,^{[60][61][62][63]} who "act[ed] out of greed and personal ambition", against the will of the senate.^[64] T. J. Luce suggested that Aquillius was working on the behalf of his friend Gaius Marius, who was eyeing a comeback at the centre of Roman politics by getting the command of the war against Mithridates. Marius had conspicuously made a private trip in the area in 98, during which he met Mithridates.^[65][66]

A minority opinion on the origins of the war is given by Kallet-Marx, who thinks that the blame placed on Aquillius found in the work of Appian initially came from the lost Memoirs of Rutilius Rufus, a former consul who was forced into exile in Mytilene after he confronted some publican friends of Marius in Asia. Kallet-Marx instead thinks that the commissioners only wanted to restore the two kings and were taken by surprise by Mithridates’ reaction into a full-scale war.^[67]

Phase 1: Mithridates' conquest of Asia and Greece (89–88 BC)

Failure of Nikomedes' offensive

Tetradrachm of Nikomedes IV, minted in 91–90 BC.

War began in the late summer of 89.^[68] Rome adopted a defensive position, by blocking the roads in order to prevent Mithridates from leaving Pontus: Aquillius was in Paphlagonia, on the main road to Pontus; the proconsul of Asia Gaius Cassius was at the border between Bithynia and Galatia, to the northeast of Ancyra (modern Ankara); the praetor Quintus Oppius guarded Lycaonia, on the road to the Euphrates river. The Roman navy commanded by Minucius Felix and Popilius Laenas also blockaded the Bosporan straits with their navy.^[69][70][71] There was no Roman legion in Asia, only local levies.^[72]

According to Appian, Mithridates could rely on a massive army of 240,000 men, 40,000 horsemen.^[73] Rome had less than half that number, although Nikomedes could provide 50,000 men and 6,000 cavalry.^[74] Army numbers are nevertheless suspicious as ancient authors have the tendency to exaggerate the number of troops engaged, especially when describing Roman enemies.^[75] Mithridates’ number of ships is more reliable. He had a navy of 300 cataphracts (decked ships) and 100 dikrotai (ships with two banks of oars),^[76], which gave him "immense naval superiority" throughout the war.^[77]

While Rome was on a defensive stance, the attacking role was given to Nikomedes. The king of Bithynia personally led all his troops, which outnumbered the Pontic army in the area, commanded by the brothers Archelaus and Neoptolemus.^[78] The first battle of the war took place near the River Amnias. Nikomedes initially had the upper hand, but was caught off-guard by Scythian chariots at the service of Mithridates and was soundly defeated. He retreated through the path he had come to the Roman camp of Aquillius, from which he rapidly fled at the news of the advancing Pontic army.^[79][80]

David Magie notes that the Romans' plan of letting Nikomedes do the attack was a "folly" as that they recklessly divided their forces into three armies posted too far from each other. The plan ended in a "total failure" as a result.^[81]

Pontic counter-offensive

In a subsequent cavalry clash near Mount Scorobas, 100 Sarmathians defeated 800 Bithynians,^[82] which prompted Aquillius to retreat westwards. While on the move, Aquillius' army was defeated by Neoptolemus at the battle of Protopachium, with the loss of 10,000 soldiers. Aquillius then went all the way back to Pergamum, the capital of the province of Asia.^[83][84][85] Cassius, joined by Nikomedes, was unable to properly train more troops, and likewise retreated to Apameia, while Oppius moved back to Laodicea.^[86] Cassius in turn was abandoned by Nikomedes, who fled to Pergamum and then to Italy, where he stayed for the remainder of the war.^[87]

Mithridates rapidly exploited the void left by the Romans' departure and captured Bythinia without opposition. Pontic armies went as far as the Bosporus, where they received the surrender of the Roman ships guarding the straits, thus opening the Aegean Sea for the Pontic navy.^[88] In Phrygia, Cassius could not hold Apameia as its defences had been weakened by an earthquake and fled to Rhodes. Then, Mithridates promised the citizens of Laodicea that he would not harm them if they brought him Oppius, leading to his capture.^[89][90] This swift conquest of Asia through Phrygia took place in early 88.^[91]

Mithridates had a generous policy towards the cities he took, by offering them war reparations and setting free their prisoners.^[92] Even Oppius was apparently well-treated and remained in Mithridates' court throughout the war.^[93] The Asian Greeks swiftly ditched Roman rule mainly because of the publicans, the Roman tax-collectors whose greed was deeply resented by the locals.^[94] However, while Mithridates received the support of many cities during his triumphal march, his sweeping conquests did not extend to southwestern Asia, where many cities are mentioned resisting him. He had to fine and place a garrison in Stratoniceia; Archelaus was wounded while taking Magnesia on the Meander;^[95] Tabai in Caria, Telmessus and Patara in Lycia resisted the entire war.^[96][97][98] The Pontic king also took the island of Kos in the Aegean sea, where the Ptolemaic queen Cleopatra III had left her treasury; likewise, he also captured the treasury of the Bithynian kingdom, the source of his debt-relief program.^[99]

The Ephesian Vespers (summer–autumn 88 BC)

Main article: Asiatic Vespers

Map of the known massacre locations.

While he was in Ephesus, Mithridates devised the massacre of the Romans and Italians living in Asia, including women, children, and freedmen.^[100] In late summer or early autumn 88, he gave orders to his overseers to attack the Italians on a day set in advance.^[101][102] To encourage the slaughter, slaves killing their masters would receive manumission, people would be relieved of half their debt if they killed their Roman creditor, and assassins would share the wealth of their Roman victims with Mithridates.^[103] These orders were carried with fervour in many cities, as Roman publicans were universally loathed by the population after 40 years of extortion.^[104] Apart from Ephesus, the temporary residence of the king, Appian writes that massacres took place in Pergamum, Adramyttium, Tralles and Caunus, showing the extensive range of the event, from Troad to Caria.^[105][106] Romans were hunted even in the temples, normally places of shelter, apart from the temple of Asclepius in Kos.^[107]

The death toll was said to have reached 80,000, a figure that likely came from contemporary authors, such as the Memoirs of Sulla.^[108][109] Plutarch inflated that number to 150,000.^[110] Both numbers were likely exaggerated.^[111] The massacre was a clever way for Mithridates to bind these Asian communities to him, as they knew that Rome would never forgive them.^[112] Moreover, the wealth he took from the massacre further enhanced his rule, as it funded his generous philanthropic policies.^[113]

Siege of Rhodes (88 BC)

Main article: Siege of Rhodes (88 BC)

Rhodes was the last significant power in the Aegean Sea that resisted Mithridates. It was an important Roman ally, where Cassius had also retreated with his army.^[114][115] In autumn 88, the Pontic forces landed on the island and besieged the city. The Rhodians however launched several sorties on both land and sea that were successful. Mithridates then built a huge siege engine named sambuca, but this bridge manned with catapults was too heavy and collapsed, which prompted him to lift the siege. He also failed to take the Lycian city of Patara on his return. In both occasion, Mithridates pretexted portents to explain his failures.^[116][117] From this point on, Mithridates avoided putting himself on the frontline, therefore risking his personal prestige, and let his generals, principally Archelaus, campaign in his name.^[118][119]

Mithridates then sailed back to Asia to establish his headquarters in Pergamum. He stopped to Mytilene, where Aquilius had sought shelter, and captured him. Appian says that after humiliating him, Mithridates killed Aquilius by pouring molten gold into his mouth, in order to advertise that Roman greed was the cause of the war.^[120][121] It is nevertheless possible that Aquillius was taken prisoner with Oppius and released at the end of the war.^[122]

Athens joins Mithridates (88 BC)

Tetradrachm of Athens, minted in 87 BC. The names of Mithridates and Aristion feature on the reverse, as well as the star within crescents, the symbol of Pontus, showing the new allegiance of the city.^[123]

Athens in the years preceding the war was dominated by a pro-Roman elite, especially by Medeius, who was uniquely elected eponymous archon three times in a row between 91 and 89, though he apparently lost his grip on the city in 88.^[124][125] The news of Pontus' victories was welcomed with enthusiasm in Athens.^[126] Following the fall of Medeius in 88, the ecclesia voted the dispatch of a delegation to Mithridates headed by Athenion, a peripatetic philosopher. Once in Asia, he sent letters to Athens praising Mithridates, saying that the king would restore civil order, democracy, and relieve debts, the three most pressing issues at the time in the city. Athenion made a triumphal return, and was elected hoplite general with a special power to choose all the other magistrates.^{[127][128][129]} Christian Habicht suggests that he appointed Mithridates as the eponymous archon, which, given the cultural importance of Athens, turned him into the symbolic leader of the Greek world.^{[130][131][132]} Athenion's election de facto meant a break with Rome, something that a minority of Athenian residents (citizens and foreigners) did not accept, such as the head of the Academy, Philo of Larissa, who moved to Rome.^[133][134] To prevent his opponents from leaving Athens, Athenion placed guards at the gates of the city, therefore transforming his government into an oppressive regime.^[135]

More serious for Athens was the defection of Delos, a small island in the middle of the Aegean Sea. A property of Athens, the island was the main slave-market of the Mediterranean Sea and a major trading post for Roman and Italian businessmen. The Delians refused to follow their metropolis and remained loyal to Rome, doubtless under the leadership of the local Italians.^[136][137] Athens was on its own to quell the revolt, since Mithridates had not yet sent any force across the sea, so Athenion tasked a fellow philosopher, Apellicon of Teos, with taking Delos back.^[138] The Athenians were however defeated just after having disembarked, by Orbius, the Roman prefect.^{[139][140][141]}

Pontic conquest of Greece

At this point, Mithridates directed a large army commanded by Archelaus to Greece, which stopped by Delos. As in Asia, the 20,000 Italians of Delos were murdered by the Pontic general Menophanes.^[142] He also captured the large treasure of the temple of Apollo and gave it to an Athenian from his entourage named Aristion, an epicurean philosopher. Since Athenion disappears from the sources after his defeat at Delos, several scholars have considered that Aristion and Athenion were the same person,^[143] but the majority consider them to be different.^{[144][145][146][147][148]} Archelaus sent Aristion to Athens with 2,000 men and the treasure of Apollo, which he used to become tyrant.^[149] He apparently purged the city from leading pro-Roman citizens, by either killing them or deporting them to Amisus, in Pontic territory on the southern coast of the Black Sea.^[150]

The arrival of Archelaus in Greece triggered a new wave of defections to Pontus, although his conquest was not as sweeping as that of Mithridates in Asia, as there are reports of resistance in several places. In the Peloponnese, he received the submission of Achaea, as well as Sparta after a battle.^[151] In central Greece, Boeotia went over to Mithridates, apart from Thespiae, which had to be besieged.^[152]

In the north, a second Pontic army moved to Greece through the land route, but the timeline of this army is not clear from ancient sources; it was commanded by Arcathias, a son of Mithridates.^[153] This army had conquered Thrace and Macedonia, maybe by using Thracians as allies or mercenaries. It captured Abdera en route and besieged Amphipolis, which possibly resisted until 87, when Taxilles replaced Arcathias who had died of illness at Tisaeum in northern Thessaly.^[154][155] The northern Pontic army likely defeated in an unknown location the two legions of Sentius, the propraetor of Macedonia, who disappears from the sources at this point.^[156] A detachment of the northern Pontic army commanded by Metrophanes had to use force to conquer Euboea and Magnesia, centred around the fortress of Demetrias.^{[157][158] [159]} Many other islands were conquered, but Thasos in the northern Aegean Sea resisted Mithridates for the entirety of the war.^[160]

The Roman resistance in Greece was organised by Quintus Braetius Sura, a legate appointed by Sentius, who hindered the Pontic army from progressing in spite of his small forces.^[161] He defended the Athamanians, the Greek tribe in the mountains bordering Thessaly to the west.^[162] Sura also defeated Metrophanes in an unspecified location and blocked Archelaus and Aristion in Chaeroneia for three days.^[163]

The reason behind Mithridates' intervention in Greece is not clear, as it would have been easier for him to only defend Asia rather than overextending his forces over the Aegean Sea. Modern scholars have suggested a number of possibilities. Perhaps he wanted to avoid fighting on his own soil and carry the war to Greece, or he felt compelled by his own propaganda presenting him as the new Alexander to act as the liberator of Greece.^[164] A hostile tradition among ancient authors ascribed to him a grand design of conquering Italy, but this seems improbable.^[165] It seems that Mithridates only decided to conquer Greece once he received the request from Athenion, which he saw as a unique opportunity.^[166] Greece would have also been a great bargaining chip in negotiations with Rome.^[167]

Phase 2: Sulla's campaign in Greece

Civil war in Rome (88–87 BC)

Main articles: March on Rome (88 BC) and Bellum Octavianum

Because of the Social War in Italy, Rome had been unable to stop Mithridates' swift advance in the Greek East. The Italian allies were mostly subdued by 88, notably thanks to Sulla, who won several important victories during the war.^[168] These successes helped him to get the consulship for 88, at the beginning of which he was additionally given the command of the war against Mithridates with the six legions he had led during the Social War.^[169] However, his old rival Gaius Marius engineered his removal from the Mithridatic command with the help of the tribune of the plebs Publius Sulpicius, who used an armed gang to coerce the citizens’ assembly into voting the transfer of Sulla's command to Marius.^{[170][171][172]} Sulla reacted by marching on Rome with his army of loyal veterans, who easily captured the city. Sulla’s soldiers supported his coup because they feared they would be deprived of the booty that a victory against would bring them.^[173] He then killed Sulpicius and forced Marius and some other of his enemies to go into exile.^[174] Moreover, he enacted several constitutional reforms and stayed in Rome until the end of the year in order to influence the elections, all of which further delayed his departure to Greece.^[175]

Sulla finally left in early 87, but in Rome, tensions rapidly escalated between Cinna and Octavius—the new consuls of 87—over Sulla's settlement. A civil war followed, from which Cinna emerged victorious, with the help of Marius, back from exile with his own veterans. Marius and Cinna violently purged Rome from their enemies, murdering Octavius and some of Sulla's friends.^[176] Sulla was declared enemy of the state and his command given back to Marius. ^[177] He nevertheless ignored the order and continued the campaign as planned, even though he had by now entered in rebellion.^[178]

In his Life of Sulla, Plutarch writes that Sulla was followed in his private campaign by so many senators that he could constitute a counter-senate around him, but this story is likely based on his Memoirs, and intended to give some kind of legality to his rebellion.^[179] Ernst Badian showed that very few nobiles followed Sulla, who actually lacked senior officers around him.^[180] The most prominent of his supporters was Lucullus, the only member of his staff that stayed with him during his March on Rome, who received the most important missions. Other names include Aulus Gabinius, Lucius Minucius Basilus, Lucius Licinius Murena, Gaius Scribonius Curio, Lucius Hortensius, and a Sulpicius Galba, the only name from a great family.^[181][182] In fact, many Roman aristocrats remained in Rome for the whole troubled decade, and even those who fled from Italy went to other Roman provinces: Gaul, Africa, and Spain, but not to Sulla.^[183][184] The March on Rome and his subsequent rebellion had provoked a strong rejection of Sulla within the Roman elite.^[185]

Sulla's siege of Athens, summer 87 – early 86 BC

Main article: Siege of Athens and Piraeus (87–86 BC)

Sulla's army took Athens on the Kalends of March,^[186] in the consulship of Gaius Marius and Lucius Cornelius Cinna, February 12, 86 BC. The siege of Athens was a long and brutal campaign, and Sulla's rough battle-hardened legions, veterans of the Social War, thoroughly besieged and stormed Athens. Soon afterwards he captured Athens' harbor of Piraeus, looting and demolishing this area, most of which was destroyed by fire, including architect Philon's famous arsenal.^[187]

Caius Scribonius Curio Burbulieus was put in charge of the siege of the Acropolis of Athens, and it was "some time" before Aristion and his followers surrendered when their water ran out^[188] (perhaps the late spring). Athens was punished severely, in a show of vengeance that ensured Greece would remain docile during later civil wars and Mithridatic wars.

Chaeronea campaign

Even after Sulla seized Piraeus, Archelaeus persisted in exploiting his command of the sea lanes, holding position off Mounychia with his fleet and preventing any food or materiel reaching the city or the Roman army by sea.^[189] By the early spring Archelaos' strategy was biting hard. Rocky Attica provided good security for operations against the large Pontic cavalry forces massed in Macedonia, but it was infertile and notoriously incapable even of fully supporting the population of the astu, let alone the large Roman army in addition, with no imports coming in by sea.^[190]

Early in the spring of 86 BC, Taxiles concentrated most of his troops, sent word to Archelaos to join him in the Magnetic ports, and marched south from Macedonia into Thessaly. Archelaos rejected the suggestion. He was the senior officer and preferred to persist with his blockade of Attica. Thessaly was only held by a modest Roman observation force under the legatus Lucius Hortensius, elder brother of Quintus Hortensius the orator. But despite his great energy and reputation as an experienced vir militaris, there was little Hortensius could do against the enormous disproportion of the forces descending upon him, other than gather together some Thessalian auxiliary units he had been commissioned to recruit, and fall back southwards.

In about April 86 BC, beginning to run short of supplies and increasingly anxious about Lucius Hortensius' safety, Sulla took the bold decision to quit Attica and march into the fertile plains of Boeotia to feed his army, but also expose it to the great cavalry strength of the Pontic army.^[191] This move gave Archelaeus little choice but to sail northward and link up with Taxiles.

In Boeotia, Sulla met and defeated Archelaeus in the Battle of Chaeronea (86 BC). Archelaeus gathered his remaining forces on the island of Euboea where he was reinforced by Mithridates with 80,000 men from Asia Minor. He then returned to mainland Greece where he was again defeated by Sulla, this time at the Battle of Orchomenus. Greece was fully restored to Roman rule.

Flaccus mission

By now, Rome had also sent a force under Lucius Valerius Flaccus, to apprehend Sulla and deal with Mithridates. Flaccus' army passed through Macedonia, crossed the Hellespont and landed in Asia, where many of the Greek cities were in rebellion against Mithridates. This rebellion was prompted in no small part by Mithridates' harsh treatment of the islanders of Chios, whom he ordered into slavery after they allegedly kept back loot collected from the previously massacred Romans of the island.

After crossing the Hellespont, Flaccus was killed in a mutiny led by Flavius Fimbria, who went on to defeat Mithridates and recapture Pergamum. However, his lack of a navy allowed Mithridates to escape immediate danger by sea, as Lucullus, Sulla's admiral, refused to collaborate with Fimbria to prevent Mithridates sailing away from the port. Mithridates met with Sulla at Dardanus later in 85 BC, and accepted terms which restored all his gains in Asia, Cappadocia and Bithynia to their original rulers, but left him his own kingdom, in return for a huge indemnity and the loan of 70 ships to Sulla to return to Rome and face his enemies.

Following this and realizing that he could not face Sulla, Fimbria fell on his sword. This left Sulla to settle Asia, which he did by imposing a huge indemnity (Treaty of Dardanos) on the Greek cities there, along with demands for five years of back taxes, thus leaving the Asian cities heavily in debt for a long time to come.