Hezbollah's drone smuggling network

Hezbollah's drone smuggling network, uncovered by European authorities, involves the transnational procurement and logistics of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) components. Developed and operated by Hezbollah with support from Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the network extends across several countries, including Spain, Germany, and France, and the investigation led to multiple arrests and prosecutions.^[1][2]

Background

Hezbollah, the Iran-backed Lebanese Shiite militant and political organization, over the years has built a highly capable armed wing. A key component of its military arsenal includes unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs, or drones), used both for surveillance and as "kamikaze" explosive‑laden platforms. Hezbollah began experimenting with drones in the early 2000s, initially enabled by technology transfers from Iran.^[3][4] Following the 2023 Israel–Hezbollah conflict, intelligence assessments indicated that Hezbollah began rebuilding and expanding its UAV capabilities with Iranian assistance and Hezbollah-linked operatives in Europe.^[5][6] Over time, the group has evolved from relying on imported Iranian systems to gradually developing its own drone capacity.^[7][8]

Several IRGC units, including the Quds Force's Unit 700, are believed to oversee arms transfers and maritime logistics for Hezbollah.^[9] Hezbollah's internal logistics arm, Unit 4400, coordinates financial channels and smuggling operations that include UAV components.^[10]

Revelation of the smuggling network (2024–2025)

In April 2024, Spain's Guardia Civil first raised their concern after detecting suspicious purchases of drone-related components by Lebanese nationals using front companies registered in Spain.^[11][12] The investigation revealed that these materials included electronic guidance systems, propellers, gasoline and electric engines, as well as resins and chemical compounds used for drone airframes. Authorities estimated that the components intercepted could have enabled Hezbollah to assemble hundreds of UAVs capable of carrying several kilograms of explosives.^[13][7]

The smuggling network extended across at least four European countries. Spain served as the primary hub for initial procurement and front companies. In Germany, authorities arrested a Lebanese national involved in purchasing engines and other critical drone components. French prosecutors, working through the DGSI, arrested additional suspects in April 2025 on charges including terrorist conspiracy, while UK counter-terrorism authorities detained two individuals in London later that same month for financing the network. The geographic breadth of this operation highlighted both its logistical sophistication and its ability to exploit multiple European jurisdictions simultaneously.^{[7][1][2][13]}

Legal actions and key arrests

In July 2024, Spanish and German authorities carried out coordinated arrests targeting key figures in Hezbollah's European drone procurement network. ^[6][14] In Spain, Firas A.H., a Lebanese national, was arrested in Barcelona, accused of playing a central role in acquiring drone components through front companies. Simultaneously in Germany, Fadel Z. was detained in Salzgitter; German prosecutors reported that he had long-standing ties to Hezbollah dating back to 2016 and had procured drone engines for export to Lebanon. Authorities stated that Fadel purchased parts valued at approximately €1.4 million, and charged with buying more than 2,000 gasoline and electric motors, over 600 propellers, and other dual-use UAV parts often using shell companies to conceal Hezbollah's involvement.^[8][6]

The investigation continued into April 2025 with further arrests across Europe. On 1 April, Spanish authorities raided an apartment in Barcelona, detaining three additional suspects. In France, prosecutors charged an individual with terrorist conspiracy on 4 April, while on 3 April, UK authorities arrested two people in London on charges related to financing terrorism and organizational membership.^[15][7]

In November 2025, Fadel Z. went on trial in Celle, Germany, facing charges for supplying core drone components. German prosecutors asserted that by June 2024, Hezbollah had accumulated an arsenal of over 10,000 drones and that Fadel's network was critical to this buildup.^[8] They also stated that components supplied by Fadel had been used in specific attacks, including a Yom Kippur 2024 drone strike on a retirement center in Herzliya, Israel, which caused property damage but no casualties. The charges brought against him included affiliation with a terrorist group, violation of EU export controls, and aiding and abetting attempted murder.^[6]

Shipping and smuggling routes

Maritime routes

Much of the smuggled hardware was routed by sea from ports in Spain, Germany, and sometimes France toward Lebanon. IRGC backed operatives reportedly coordinated shipping schedules, with Hezbollah's Unit 4400 receiving and distributing shipments once they arrived at or near the Port of Beirut.^[16][6]

Air freight and parcel delivery

Some smaller components, including microelectronics and GPS modules, were shipped through commercial air cargo and parcel post systems to avoid detection.^[13]

See also

• Iran–Lebanon relations
• Smuggling
• Funding of Hezbollah
• Disarmament of Hezbollah