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Hwasong-11A
North Korean short-range ballistic missile From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
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The Hwasong-11A[a] (Korean: 《화성포-11가》형; lit. Mars Artillery Type 11A),[b] also known as KN-23 under the United States’s naming convention,[8] is a North Korean single-stage, solid-fueled short-range ballistic missile.
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Design
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The Hwasong-11A bears an external resemblance to the Russian Iskander-M and South Korean Hyunmoo-2B short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), being distinguished by its elongated cable raceway, different jet vane actuators and smooth base. Like the Iskander-M, it flies in a quasi-ballistic trajectory, flattening out below an altitude of about 50 km (31 mi) where the atmosphere is dense enough so the missile's fins can change course along its flight path.[8][9][10]
It is believed to have a range of about 240–900 km (150–560 mi), putting all of South Korea within range. It is possible that the missile can have a better range with a reduced payload. The missile's warhead section has enough space for up to 1,500 kg (3,300 lb) of high explosives compared to 700 kg (1,500 lb) for Hwasong-5 (Scud-B) and 800 kg (1,800 lb) of 9K720 Iskander. With a 500 kg (1,100 lb) warhead, the missile has an estimated range of 450 km (280 mi). The warhead can be conventional, likely unitary or submunition, or nuclear. The Hwasong-11A is also capable of carrying Hwasan-31 tactical nuclear warhead. Its active steering capability could make it accurate to within 35–200 m (115–656 ft) CEP, depending whether the missile uses satellite guidance or INS alone.[8][9][10][11][12][13][14]
The Hwasong-11A's launch platform is diverse. It can be launched from wheeled (four-axle) or tracked transporter erector launcher (TEL), as well as railway car and silo.[15][16][17] The four-axle truck used in test-fires is different from the truck used to carrying Hwasong-11A during 8 February 2018 military parade.[18]
It is significantly larger than the Iskander, with estimated length and diameter to be 7.5–8.7 m (25–29 ft) and 0.95–1.1 m (3 ft 1 in – 3 ft 7 in) respectively. The missile likely using the same 1.1 m (3 ft 7 in) diameter motor as the Pukguksong-1. The motor is somewhat lengthened, having only one stage, compared to the Pukguksong-1. The motor has a very different structure, compared to the Iskander. Its TEL has more space for the missile, as it lacks the structure immediately after the cab.[8][19][20]
The missile is likely to replace older liquid-fueled North Korean SRBMs, like the Hwasong-5 and Hwasong-6. Being road-mobile and solid-fueled, it can be moved and fired more rapidly, making it more difficult for an opposing force to locate and target before firing. Once launched, the missile's low apogee, short overall flight time, and ability to conduct a terminal "pull-up" maneuver makes it harder to detect and be intercepted by traditional missile defense systems. Its increased accuracy also reduces the number of missiles that would be needed to destroy a single target.[8][9][10]
The Hwasong-11A is likely to feature some form of foreign involvement such as parts, as when compared to the later developed Hwasong-11B (KN-24), the Korean Central News Agency focuses mainly on the deployment of the missile, with little coverage on its research. While the Hwasong-11B are called 'Juche projectiles', it is never mentioned for the Hwasong-11A. The focus on the combat-readiness of the system suggests that it had been deployed for a while but not tested, like the Hwasong-10.[21] It still bears significant differences from the 9K720 Iskander.[22]
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History
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North Korea first displayed the Hwasong-11A publicly in a military parade on 8 February 2018. The first flight test was on 4 May 2019. Five days later, North Korea test-fired another two missiles.[8][9]
On 17 May 2019, the missile was designated by the United States Forces Korea as KN-23. Further test-fires were carried out on 25 July and 6 August 2019, as well as in 2021, 2022 and 2023. Except for two tests on 6 October 2022 and 19 March 2023, which had one missile launched, all tests of Hwasong-11A had two missiles test-fired.[8][9][23]
After the confirmation of KN-24's official designation (Hwasong-11B) in October 2021, it was suggested that the official designation of the missile, then known by its United States’s designation (KN-23), could be Hwasong-11A.[24] During the “Weaponry Exhibition-2023” military exhibition held in July 2023, North Korea confirmed this designation.[25]
According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), as of 2025, North Korea is possessing more than 17 Hwasong-11A launchers, in road- and rail-mobile variants.[26]: 268
Nearly two years since the revelation of the official designation, on 9 May 2025, North Korea named Hwasong-11A in state media for the first time as part of their coverage for a missile test that occurred on the previous day.[4]
Usage during Russian invasion of Ukraine
The missile was highly likely used during the Russian invasion of Ukraine. An unknown number of North Korean ballistic missiles were transferred to Russia in October 2023, according to declassified US intelligence informations. Based on debris left by Russian attacks on Ukrainian targets on 30 December 2023, the ring housing the control vanes have been identified as the characteristics of Hwasong-11A and Hwasong-11B missiles.[27] The barometer on the missile was found to have a Hangul character, and various parts of the missile were stamped with the possible factory name.[20]
According to the Conflict Armament Research, 75% of components in the guidance control system for the Hwasong-11A fired at Kharkiv are based on American parts.[28] They also indicated that some of the missiles were newly produced.[29]
During the Kharkiv strikes of 2 January 2024, Ukrainian authorities noted that the missiles used were of North Korean origin, noting that the shape and design were different than that of Iskander missiles. On 29 April 2024, the UNSC confirmed that the munitions used during the strike were that of Hwasong-11A missiles.[30][31]
On 7 May 2024, Ukrainian sources reported that the missiles have a high failure rate. According to these officials, half of the North Korean missiles lost their programmed trajectories and exploded in the air.[32]
According to Ukraine, at the start of 2025, North Korea had supplied Russia 148 Hwasong-11A and 11B missiles. Ukraine also claimed that Russia launched Hwasong-11A in the 23 April 2025 Russian attack on civilians in Kyiv.[33]
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List of tests
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Variants
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Along with the base version, Hwasong-11A has some variants:
Railway-borne missile
Design and development
On 15 September 2021, North Korea test-fired two missiles from a modified railway car, rather than the typical road-mobile launcher. These missiles appeared to be baseline Hwasong-11A versions. They flew much further than any previous flight of the weapon, and went an even greater distance than the larger variant tested earlier in 2021. Such excess range could indicate it hadn't previously been tested out to its maximum range, or that the design underwent modifications such as a reduced payload or flight profile improvements. The launch railcar used two side-by-side erector/launcher mechanisms like the side-by-side arrangement used in the TEL. The use of a rail-mobile system is unusual for an SRBM, as road-mobile launchers are easier for deploying and hiding relatively small missiles, while railway missiles are restricted to the rail network. Adding railway launchers may be an effort to further increase and diversify the country's SRBM missile force, since modifying existing railcars to fire missiles could be a way to supplement a limited number of launch trucks, or possibly to test the concept before applying it to intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). A rail-borne ICBM would have advantages over one carried by a wheeled TEL, as such large liquid-fueled missiles carried in railway cars would be able to move more places and be kept in a higher readiness state.[16][44]
On 14 January 2022, North Korea again tested railway-launched Hwasong-11A. The next day, the Korean Central News Agency released photos of the test.[45]
List of tests
Silo-based missile
Design and development
On 19 March 2023, North Korea test-fired a baseline Hwasong-11A from an underground silo that is located within Sohae Satellite Launching Station. The silo was constructed for less than two months. This is the first time North Korea has launched a missile from silo.[17][23]
The usage of a silo can help North Korea to fire missiles with little warning while avoiding outside surveillance.[48]
List of tests
Larger variant
Hwasong-11C is the larger version of Hwasong-11A, claimed to have a 2.5 tons warhead.[1]
A variant with 4.5 tons warhead, called Hwasong-11C-4.5, was tested on 1 July 2024 and 18 September 2024.[50][51]
Smaller variant
Hwasong-11D is the smaller variant of Hwasong-11A, with reduced range.[1]
It was tested on 16 April 2022, 2 November 2022, 9 March 2023 and 17 May 2024.[23][46]
SLBM variant
Hwasong-11S is the underwater-launched version of Hwasong-11A.[1]
It was tested two times, on 19 October 2021 and 25 September 2022.[23]
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See also
- Hwasong-11B – (North Korea) (KN-24)
- 9K720 Iskander – (Russia)
- Hyunmoo-2 – (South Korea)
Notes
References
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