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SDF–Syrian Transitional Government clashes (2025–present)
Sporadic clashes between the SDF and Syrian Government in 2025 From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
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The SDF–Syrian Transitional Government clashes describe a series of ongoing armed confrontations between the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the HTS-led Syrian Army along the internal border between the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) and the Syrian Transitional Government (STG). As of September 2025, the clashes have been mostly sporadic and limited to exchanges of artillery shelling and small- to medium-arms fire in Dayr Hafir, Manbij, al-Khafsah, Sheikh Maqsood, Deir ez-Zor, and their surrounding areas.[23]
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Arab tribal forces and local gunmen led by the Syrian Army's 86th Division also participated in the clashes in the Deir ez-Zor Governorate.[24][25]
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Background
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10 March agreement
During the fall of the Assad regime, a period marked by instability and uncertainty, Turkey and its affiliated militant group, the Syrian National Army (SNA), launched various offensives against Kurdish-controlled areas east of the Euphrates. Following months of fighting, which stalled near the Tishrin Dam, and an SDF counteroffensive in December 2024, SDF leader Mazloum Abdi and Syrian government leader Ahmed al-Sharaa signed the U.S.-backed 10 March agreement[f], which implemented a country-wide ceasefire and laid out principles for the integration of the AANES into the new Syrian government.[23][26][27] It envisaged equal representation for minorities in the political process and proposed integrating the SDF’s military and civilian structures into the new Syrian state, while allowing the SDF to retain de facto control over border posts and oil fields in Kurdish areas.[28] A follow-up agreement in April, which was reportedly also brokered with American involvement, established a joint security framework for the Kurdish enclaves in Sheikh Maqsood and Ashrafiyeh, Aleppo.[14]
Diplomatic tensions
Delays in implementing the 10 March agreement, with both sides accusing each other of obstruction, along with the cancellation of the SDF–STG talks in Paris on 25 July and again on 9–10 August, heightened hostilities between the AANES and the Syrian government, which, according to Hawar News and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), was facing increasing Turkish pressure.[29][30][31][32] This pressure stemmed from Ankara’s long-standing opposition to an autonomous Kurdish entity on its border, fearing it could fuel Kurdish nationalism in Turkish Kurdistan. Since 2015, Turkey has waged military campaigns against Kurdish forces in Syria and has, after the formation of the new Syrian Transitional Government, repeatedly threatened further invasions unless they integrate into the state institutions.[23][32][33]
Integration of SNA militias
The integration of SNA militias into the Syrian Army, along with the appointment of their commanders, was heavily criticized by the SDF, as the two sides had fought earlier in the year and throughout the Syrian Civil War as adversaries.[34] Kurds within the AANES were particularly critical, as SNA factions had been reported to engage in kidnappings of civilians, looting, beatings, and other human rights violations against Kurds, further leading to tensions between the sides.[35][36][37]
Government abuses and decentralization demands
The New Arab and The Insider also stated that the increasing tensions between the SDF and the Syrian government were exacerbated in part by the Western Syria clashes and Southern Syria Clashes, in which government affiliated forces conducted a series of war crimes and massacres against Alawite, Christian and Druze civilians.[28][20][38] This, in turn, damaged both the domestic and international standing of the government and intensified calls from various groups for minority rights and federalization.[28] The Transitional Government was also criticized for failing to ensure minority representation, a key stipulation of the March agreement. Few government officials, and no senior military or security commanders, were drawn from minority communities.[39] In response, the AANES organized the “Unity of Components” conference in Hasakah, during which Kurdish, Druze, Alawite and Arab tribal leaders, including Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri and Sheikh Ghazal Ghazal, expressed support for a decentralized Syria.[40][41] The conference was criticized by the government and was cited as a reason for the cancellation of the SDF–STG talks in Paris.[39][41] The crisis in Suwayda reportedly "cracked Damascus-SDF relations."[28]
Blockade of Sheikh Maqsood and Ashrafiyeh
At the beginning of July, tensions in Aleppo increased when government forces blocked fuel supplies from reaching the Kurdish-majority neighborhoods of Sheikh Maqsood and Ashrafiyeh. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) described the blockade as a continuation of “old regime tactics.”[42] In August, Nouri Sheikho, Deputy Head of the General Council of Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafiyeh, told Kurdistan24 that tensions had risen in recent days following the “Unity of Components” conference in Hasakah.[43]
Postponed elections
In August, government officials confirmed that al-Sharaa was determined to pursue a centralized government, contradicting the federalization framework set out by the Kurds as a prerequisite for integration.[28] Later that month the STG announced that elections would not be held in the Druze-controlled governorate of Suwayda and areas under the control of the AANES, namely Hasakah and Raqqa, for "safety reasons".[44][45] In response the AANES affirmed that the planned elections are not democratic and "do not in any way reflect the will of the Syrian people". It criticised the characterization of areas under AANES control as "unsafe" and argued that it would "justify the policy of denial" against more than five million Syrians. Further it called on organisations like the United Nations not to recognize these elections.[46]
Increasing military deployments
At the same time, government-aligned Arab tribes in Deir ez-Zor called for mobilization against the SDF, while increased Islamic State (ISIS) activity prompted additional SDF deployments along the Euphrates. The Alma Research and Education Center explained that the SDF sent "massive" military reinforcements to the Deir ez-Zor area to “fill the security vacuum” left as a result of the extensive withdrawal of American coalition forces. This was seen by some as "a move that directly contradicts the spirit of the [10 March] agreement", Alma Research says.[9] Regional reports also claimed that Damascus had amassed as many as 50,000 troops near Palmyra, with "orders to advance on Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor unless the SDF cedes control",[47] further heightening tensions along the SDF–STG contact line.[23][48][49] Government reinforcements were also regularly deployed to the vicinity of Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafiyah in what was described as a “show-of-force operation” intended to raise fears of a possible field escalation.[50]
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Clashes
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In the months following the agreement, the STG engaged in several armed clashes with the SDF, primarily in Deir ez-Zor province, which is divided between the two sides along the Euphrates River, and near the town of Dayr Hafir, where a 20-meter-wide canal separates SDF and STG forces to the north.[51] In turn both parties accused each other of violating the 10 March agreement.[23][52][53]
August
The first clashes were reported on 2 August 2025 near Dayr Hafir and al-Khafsah.[23][54] Syria’s state-owned Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA) claimed that four Syrian Army soldiers and three civilians were injured during the fighting, and made the SDF solely responsible for the incident.[19]
On 4 August, the SDF accused government-linked factions of attacking four of its positions in the village of Al-Imam, near Manbij.[55][56][57]
On 12 August, one Syrian Army soldier was killed in clashes with the SDF near Dayr Hafir.[26][17][15] In addition the government's Ministry of Information claimed that two civilians were killed and three injured.[58] Coinciding with the clashes the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) warned of a 'wider conflict' if the US does not remain fully engaged in preventing the collapse of the March agreement.[23]
On 13 August, the Internal Security Forces (Asayish) claimed that an “interim government-affiliated” drone attack wounded two of its forces in the Kurdish enclave of Sheikh Maqsoud, Aleppo. Syria’s Ministry of Defense denied the accusations.[14] That same day the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) reported on a "wide deployment of armoured vehicles, and medium and heavy weapons" by the Syrian Army along the frontline, while the SDF raised its military readiness and reinforced its positions as well.[59]
On 14 August, clashes broke out between the SDF and STG forces in Deir ez-Zor city, amid reports of Syrian armour heading eastwards. Machine guns and mortar fire were reported, injuring some Syrian soldiers as well as local fishermen.[20] The pro-government news outlet Enab Baladi reported that one civilian was killed.[25] On the same day the SOHR reported on tribal fighters, lead by Abu Hatem Shaqra's 86th Division, which abducted 6 off-duty SDF fighters in a pharmacy in the town of Gharanij. The following clashes, which included mortar fire coming from government-controlled areas, lead to the death of 1 tribal fighter and injury of 3 more, while one SDF vehicle was seized. Two kidnapped members were released later on the same day, while the four others were freed on 16 August. The SDF increased its military presence in the region with over 100 military vehicles and YAT special forces after the events.[12][24][60]
On 24 August, the SDF reported that "armed groups affiliated with the Damascus government" launched an attack on a military post of the al-Kasra Military Council in the town of al-Junaynah, Deir ez-Zor's western countryside, violating the ceasefire.[61][5]
On 31 August, another round of clashes was reported in Tel Ma'az, near Dayr Hafir, between the SDF and the Syrian Army.[62]
September
Around September, Turkey staged its first airstrikes in months on Kurdish positions, and the Kurds dug new defensive tunnels. Mottassem Abbas, commander of the Syrian Army's 80th Divison, said to Reuters in an interview: “We’re sending more men and weapons to reinforce [the contact line with the SDF]."[3]
On 10 September, tensions flared,[63] as the SOHR reported mutual shelling in Maskanah between the SDF and the Turkish-backed Suleiman Shah Brigade, a militant group that had been integrated into the Syrian Army as the 62nd Division. No casualties were reported.[4][64][65] The FDD reported that clashes on the same day caused the death of two civilians and injury of three more.[33]
On 14 September, clashes broke out between the SDF and STG-forces near the al-Asharah-Darnaj bridge. According to a statement by the SDF, the "assault by armed groups linked to the Syrian government" was aimed at securing river crossings for smugglers, a claim confirmed by local sources cited by the SOHR.[66][67][68]
On 18 September, local sources reported that the STG and SDF exchanged small arms fire near al Baij, Aleppo Governorate. No military casualties have been reported. Another local source reported that a Turkish drone flew over Dayr Hafer approximately two hours before the engagement in nearby al Baij, possibly conducting reconnaissance.[1]
Dayr Hafir massacre
On 20 September, the SOHR reported mutual shelling and drone strikes in Dayr Hafir, following an attack on SDF positions by the Syrian Army using drones.[54] In turn, the SOHR reported on the same day that three civilians were injured by shelling from members of the Syrian Army. According to the SDF, the assault on their positions began with drone strikes, followed by heavy artillery shelling that directly targeted homes, killing seven civilians, including women and children, and wounding four others. The SDF held the Syrian Ministry of Defense directly responsible for the 'massacre' and considered its statements of refute "a killing of the truth and a blatant attempt to evade responsibility."[69][70] The group added that it also repelled a separate drone attack by “Damascus government gunmen” on one of its positions in Dayr Hafer, forcing the attackers to retreat.[71] On 21 September, the SOHR updated its casualty figures, reporting that five women and two children were killed, while four others, including three women, were injured in the attacks by the Syrian Army.[72] On 22 September, the SOHR updated its casualty figures once again, as an injured infant succumbed to his wounds, bringing the total number of civilians killed by the Syrian Army to eight.[73]
On 22 September, the General Command of the Asayish said in a statement, that they thwarted an assault on the Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafieh neighborhoods in Aleppo by "rogue factions affiliated with the Ministry of Defense of the Damascus Government." The Asayish claimed to have killed one and injured three of the attackers and to have seized their vehicle, while also downing a drone.[21][74][22] The SOHR supported the SDF’s account, describing the government’s assault as a “sneak attempt [...] to attack a military checkpoint of [the] SDF.”[15] On the next day the SOHR reported that the injured, who were taken as captives by the SDF, were released following an agreement between the two sides.[75]
On 23 September, the SOHR reported that four children were seriously wounded after Syrian government forces shelled the village of Zubeida, near Dayr Hafir, with indiscriminate artillery fire.[76] Later that same day one SDF fighter was killed, while another was injured by two kamikaze drones belonging to governmental forces.[10][13][77]
On 24 September, two fighters of the Syrian Army's 80th Division were killed by SDF sniper fire, according to reports from both the SOHR and SANA.[16][11][18]
On 27 September, the M15 highway between Aleppo and Raqqa, as well as roads leading to Dayr Hafir, were closed by forces affiliated with the STG, coinciding with the entry of Turkish trucks and convoys into Kuweires Military Airport.[78]
On 28 Septeber, SDF drones targeted two government positions in Al-Qashlah village, eastern Aleppo countryside, after both sides exchanged artillery fire near the Tishrin Dam earlier.[79] Areas west of the dam had been handed over to the STG by the SDF earlier in the year under the March agreement, which was intended to prevent further SNA attacks, allow for joint patrols with the SDF, and neutralize the dam as a military target.[80][81]
October
By the beginning of October, Kurdish news outlets reported that the Syrian Army had escalated measures by constructing earthen barriers and blocking roads on the outskirts of Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafiyah, as well as barricading streets and establishing positions inside residential buildings.[82][83][84] The SOHR confirmed the STG's military buildup near the neighbourhoods.[85] Furthermore the Syrian Ministry of Defence sent a convoy of reinforcements, comprising dozens of vehicles carrying weapons and soldiers, to frontlines with the SDF around Dayr Hafer and the Tishrin Dam. The SOHR added that the reinforcements included non-Syrian fighters.[8]
On 1 October, clashes broke out near the Tishrin Dam after pro-government forces attempted to infiltrate SDF military positions. The attack was repelled, forcing the assailants to withdraw. The locality was shelled by government forces earlier that day.[86][87]
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Diplomacy
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STG–SDF
In the first week of September, SDF representatives met with Syrian government officials in the AANES with the aim of reviving the March agreement and reducing tensions. The parties agreed to suspend military reinforcements, establish joint committees, and implement measures to protect civilians and promote stability.[9] Later that month the SOHR said there were "ongoing negotiations" between the SDF and STG to stand down from the state of high alert.[75]
While attending a gathering in New York, Ahmad al-Sharaa warned of potential military action if the SDF did not disband, suggesting that neither Damascus nor Turkey would permit the SDF to continue operating. An intact SDF “may lead to a large-scale war” and put “Iraq and Turkey at great risk, as well as the Syrian state”, he added.[88]
At the end of September, Enab Baladi said that the talks between both sides have stalled.[89] SDF spokesperson Ferhad Shami stated that the SDF, as a “military, social, political, and administrative organization,” could not simply be “absorbed” into the Syrian state if the STG continued to act like the former Ba’ath regime by “focusing solely on security and military matters.”[89]
In October, a new round of talks between the SDF and the Syrian government, scheduled to take place in Damascus under U.S. mediation, collapsed. A source close to the SDF told Al-Arabiya Al-Hadath that the Syrian government had “refused to meet” with SDF officials for negotiations.[90]
Turkey
The Institute for the Study of War assessed that constant Turkish invasion rhetoric both directly threatens the SDF and encourages the Syrian government to increase political and military pressure on it.[91]
Reactions
United States: The National reported that the U.S. "renewed a diplomatic push to resolve critical differences between Syria's new central authorities and the [...] Syrian Democratic Forces that threaten to spark an all-out conflict [...], as violence between the two sides escalate[d]."[92]
Notes
References
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