The Party commands the gun

"The Party commands the gun" (Chinese: 党指挥枪) is a policy and slogan of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to emphasize its absolute control over the People's Liberation Army (PLA). It was first used by CCP leader Mao Zedong in his 1938 article Problems of War and Strategy. The original text reads "Our principle is that the Party commands the gun, and we will never allow the gun to command the Party."

Mao believed that the Chinese Communist Party could not achieve revolution through solely peaceful means. He also mentioned that during the First United Front with the Kuomintang, the CCP "ignored the struggle for the army and focused one-sidedly on the mass movement", and was eventually suppressed after the split with the Kuomintang. Mao then used the example of the Kuomintang's war history of controlling the army to illustrate that the CCP should "derive political power from the barrel of a gun" and put forward the principle of "the Party commands the gun, but never allows the gun to command the Party".

The CCP continues to uphold the party's absolute control over the military and views the military as a tool for maintaining political power, that is, "consolidating political power with the barrel of a gun", and opposes the nationalization of the military.

History

When the Chinese Communist Party congress was first established, it clearly stated in its first program that "the revolutionary army must work with the proletariat to overthrow the capitalist regime." Mao Zedong believed that the CCP could not win the revolutionary struggle through peaceful means, and that during the first cooperation between the Kuomintang and the CCP, it neglected the struggle for the army and focused one-sidedly on the mass movement, which led to armed suppression. Therefore, it was determined that the CCP must establish an army under the sole leadership of the party.^[1]

Afterwards, the Autumn Harvest Uprising suffered a serious setback, resulting in heavy casualties and demoralization. Mao Zedong, the leader of the uprising, reorganized the remaining personnel in Sanwan Village (Sanwan Reorganization) and implemented the "branch establishment in the company", thus realizing the party's direct control over the grassroots and soldiers from an organizational perspective. He once concluded in his article "The Struggle in Jinggangshan" on November 25, 1928, that the reason why the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army fought hard and did not disband was that "the branch was established in the company."^[2]

During the Long March, Zhang Guotao and Mao Zedong relied on military power to try to compete for the leadership of the CCP Central Committee. The CCP Central Committee split into two due to the disagreement between going north and going south. Later, Zhang Guotao, who suffered heavy casualties during the southward march, was ordered by the Communist International to cancel his "Second Central Committee". Mao stated in his article "Problems of War and Strategy" on November 6, 1938: "Communists do not fight for personal military power, but they must fight for the military power of the party and the people. Our principle is that the party commands the gun, and we will never allow the gun to command the party."^[2]

After the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War, the KMT and the CCP formed the Second United Front. The Nationalist government led by the KMT demanded that the CCP surrender its army and give up its military power. It also sent Kang Ze to the Eighth Route Army as deputy director of the Political Department, but was rejected by Mao Zedong. Within the party, Wang Ming advocated "establishing a unified national defense army". Mao Zedong therefore emphasized that the Communist Party would not allow the Red Army and all guerrilla forces to waver on the principle of "absolute independent leadership of the Communist Party". Based on this, the CCP restored the system of political commissars in the army and the name of the Political Department.^[2]

Content

The Chinese Communist Party upholds the party's absolute control over the military and views the military as a tool for maintaining its political power,^[3][4][5] that is, "consolidating political power with the barrel of a gun",^[6] and opposes the nationalization of the military.^[7][8][9]

Legal basis and implementation

Article 4 of Chapter 1 of the Regulations on Political Work of the People's Liberation Army stipulates that "The Chinese People's Liberation Army must be placed under the absolute leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. Its highest leadership and command authority belongs to the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and the Central Military Commission."^[10]

The absolute control of the CCP over the military is guaranteed by a series of core systems, including: the highest leadership and command of the military is concentrated in the Central Committee of the Party and the Central Military Commission, the military party committee system, the political commissar system, and the political organ system.^[11]

• The highest leadership and command of the army are concentrated in the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and the Central Military Commission: The Chinese People's Liberation Army must be placed under the absolute leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, and its highest leadership and command belong to the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and the Central Military Commission. The Constitution of the People's Republic of China stipulates that the armed forces of the People's Republic of China belong to the people, and the Central Military Commission of the People's Republic of China leads the armed forces of the country. The National Defense Law of the People's Republic of China stipulates that the armed forces of the People's Republic of China are under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. This legally establishes the basic system of the party leading the army, and at the same time clarifies the state's leadership over the army.
• Military Party Committee System: The system in which the Chinese Communist Party establishes Party committees (branches) at all levels in the People's Liberation Army. The Chinese Communist Party establishes Party committees in units above the regiment level and equivalent to those above the regiment level in the People's Liberation Army, grassroots Party committees in battalions and equivalent to those at the battalion level, and Party branches in companies and equivalent to those at the company level. Party committees (branches) at all levels are the core of unified leadership and unity of the units, and implement a system of division of labor and responsibility among leaders under the unified collective leadership of the Party committee (branch).
• Political commissar system: The system in which the Chinese People's Liberation Army establishes political chief officers in units above the company level. The Chinese People's Liberation Army establishes political commissars in units above the regiment level, political instructors in battalions, and political instructors in companies. The establishment of political chiefs in other units of equivalent levels is decided by the Central Military Commission or units authorized by the Central Military Commission.
• Political organ system: The system of the Chinese People's Liberation Army establishing political organs in units above the regimental level. A General Political Department is established in the entire army, a Political Department is established in units above the brigade level, and a Political Department is established in the regiment; the establishment of political organs in other units of equivalent levels is decided by the Central Military Commission or units authorized by the Central Military Commission. The political organs in the Chinese People's Liberation Army are the leading organs of the army's political work, responsible for managing the party's work in the army and organizing political work.

See also

• Civilian control of the military in communist states