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Cyclical theory (United States history)
Model used to explain the fluctuations in politics throughout American history From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
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Cyclical theory refers to models used by historians Arthur M. Schlesinger Sr., Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. and others to explain the fluctuations in American history.[1][2] According to the Schlesingers, the United States' national mood alternates between liberalism and conservatism. Each phase has characteristic features, and each phase is self-limiting, generating the other phase. This alternation has repeated itself several times over the history of the United States. A similar theory for American foreign policy was proposed by historian Frank J. Klingberg.[3] He proposed that the United States has repeatedly alternated between foreign-policy extroversion and introversion, willingness to go on international adventures and unwillingness to do so. Several other cycles of American history have been proposed, with varying degrees of support.[4]
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Schlesinger's liberal-conservative cycle
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- Lib: Liberal
- Con: Conservative
The Schlesingers' periodization closely parallels other periodizations of United States history. The features of each phase in the cycle can be summarized with a table.[1][2][6]
The Schlesingers proposed that their cycles are "self-generating", meaning that each kind of phase generates the other kind of phase. This process then repeats, causing cycles. Arthur Schlesinger Jr. speculated on possible reasons for these transitions. He speculated that since liberal phases involve bursts of reform effort, such bursts can be exhausting, and the body politic thus needs the rest of a conservative phase. He also speculated that conservative phases accumulate unsolved social problems, problems that require the efforts of a liberal phase to solve them. He additionally speculated on generational effects, since most of the liberal-conservative phase pairs are roughly 30 years long, roughly the length of a human generation. The Schlesingers' identified phases end in a conservative period. In a foreword written in 1999, Schlesinger Jr. speculated about why it has lasted unusually long, instead of ending in the early 1990s, from how long previous conservative periods typically lasted. One of his speculations was the continuing Computer Revolution, as disruptive as the earlier Industrial Revolution had been. Another of them was wanting a long rest after major national traumas. The 1860s Civil War and Reconstruction preceded the unusually-long Gilded Age, and the strife of the 1960s likewise preceded the recent unusually-long conservative period.[2]
An alternative identification is due to Andrew S. McFarland. He identifies the liberal phases as reform ones and conservative phases as business ones, and he additionally identifies transitions from the reform ones to the business ones, with his Figure 1 roughly agreeing with Schlesinger's identifications.[7]
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Modelski's long cycles
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George Modelski devised a cyclical theory of world leadership.[8] Each cycle is about 100 years' duration and a new hegemonic power appears each time. The US is the current world power.
The five world leaders
Portugal 1492–1580; in the Age of Discovery
the Netherlands 1580–1688; beginning with the Eighty Years' War, 1579-1588
United Kingdom (1) 1688–1792; beginning with the wars of Louis XIV
United Kingdom (2) 1792–1914; beginning with the French Revolution and Napoleonic wars
the United States 1914 to (predicted) 2030; beginning with World War I and two.[9] [10]
The four phases of the cycle
1, Global War, which a) involves almost all global powers, b) is 'characteristically naval' [11] c) is caused by a system breakdown, d) is extremely lethal, e) results in a new global leader, capable of tackling global problems.[12] The war is a 'decision process' analogous to a national election.[13] The emerging global power typically enjoys a 'good war' with undamaged domestic infrastructure and a booming economy.[14]
The Thirty Years War, though lasting and destructive, was not a 'global war' [15]
2, World Power, which lasts for 'about one generation'.[16] The new incumbent power 'prioritises global problems', mobilises a coalition, is decisive and innovative.[17] For example, the UK after 1815 acted against the transatlantic slave trade and led the Congress system; the US after 1945 co-founded the UN, the IMF, GATT, and the Bretton Woods system.
Pre-modern communities become dependent on the hegemonic power [18]
3, Delegitimation. This phase can last for 20–27 years; the hegemonic power falters, as rival powers assert new nationalistic policies. The leader's moral authority is challenged by rival states. [19] [20]
4, Deconcentration. The hegemony's problem-solving capacity declines. It yields to a multipolar order of warring rivals. Pre-modern communities become less dependent.[21]
The role of the 'challenger'
In the deconcentration phase a rival state or challenger, isolated and fearing encirclement [22] , appears. Spain challenged Portugal; Louis XIV and France challenged the Netherlands; Napoleon Bonaparte sought to bring down the UK; Germany under Kaiser Wilhelm II and Hitler brought an end to British hegemony for a second time. Writing in 1987, Modelski forecast that the USSR would challenge American power from 2030, in a new global war.[9]
Why challengers have failed
World leader nations tend to have: 'insular geography' and a strong naval power providing 'global reach'; a stable, open society; a strong economy; strategic organisation, and strong political parties. By contrast, the 'challenger' nations have: closed systems; absolute rulers; domestic instability; continental geographic locations; and weaker naval power.[23]
Causes
1, Modelski writes, 'a similar more modest process may have occurred in Italy from 1000-1500 which then grew from a regional to a world level'.[24] A similar regional cycle may have been present in China since 1,000, but ended with the death of Cheng Ho in 1435.[25]
2, The cycle is driven by generational change.[26]
In the Global War phase of 25–30 years, world order under a hegemon is preferred but unavailable; in the World Power phase, order is both preferred and available; in the 3rd phase, Delegitimation, order is present but unpopular; in phase 4, Deconcentration, order is both unwanted and unavailable, leading to further disputes and a new global war.[27]
Origins and evolution
According to Modelski, the cycle originated in about 1493 through a) the decline of Venetian naval power, b) Chinese abandonment of naval exploration, and c) discovery of sea routes to India and the Americas.[28] It has developed in parallel with the growth of the nation-state, political parties, command of the sea, and 'dependency of pre-modern communities'.[29] The system is flawed, lacking in coherence or solidarity; it also fails to address the North-South divide.[30]
Function
Modelski wrote that the cycle is a 'learning process' and a 'motor of modernity', providing leadership on a global scale.[31] The cycle ushers in new waves of innovation in orderly fashion. Awareness of the cycle provides a balanced perspective, and a counter to the widespread belief in global anarchy.[32]
Forecasts
Modelski speculates that US deconcentration might be replaced by a power based in the 'Pacific rim' or by an explicit coalition of nations, as 'co-operation is urgently required in respect of nuclear weapons'.[33] It is possible for the US to become world leader a second time, as Britain did in the 19th century.[34]. By 2100, Modelski suggested in 2012, progress may lead to global leadership 'anchored in a community of democracies'. [35]
Critical response
Modelski 'dismisses the idea that international relations are anarchic'. His research, influenced by Immanuel Wallerstein, was 'measured in decades... a major achievement' says Peter J. Taylor[36]
Colin Flint saw several flaws in the argument. It is deterministic, incapable of prediction; 'Portugal's 16th century history does not determine the US's 21st century future.' Modelski took a state-centric view which focused on rich countries and ignored the Global South. Flint also questions whether naval power is still relevant in a time of cruise missiles, satellites and drones.[37]
Rosecrance (1987) raised the omission of the land wars in 17th century Europe, and whether Spain was at least as powerful as Portugal in the 16th century. Modelski and Thompson in 1988 addressed these points. [38] [39]
Chinese leaders reject the idea of hegemony, and use the word as an insult.[40]
Joshua S Goldstein says however that long cycles are not mechanistic or deterministic, but 'evolutionary and dynamic' and therefore do have predictive power.[41]
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Huntington's periods of creedal passion
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Historian Samuel P. Huntington has proposed that American history has had several bursts of "creedal passion".[4][7][42][43] Huntington described the "American Creed" of government in these terms: "In terms of American beliefs, government is supposed to be egalitarian, participatory, open, noncoercive, and responsive to the demands of individuals and groups. Yet no government can be all these things and still remain a government." This contradiction produces an unavoidable gap between ideals and institutions, an "IvI" gap. This gap is normally tolerable, but it is a gap that sometimes leads to bursts of "creedal passion" against existing systems and institutions, bursts that typically last around 15 years. He identified four of them:
- 1770s: Revolutionary era
- 1830s: Jacksonian era
- 1900s: Progressive era
- 1960s: S&S: Sixties and Seventies (Huntington's name)
Huntington described 14 features of creedal-passion eras.[43] Nine of them describe the general mood:
- "Discontent was widespread; authority, hierarchy, specialization, and expertise were widely questioned or rejected."
- "Political ideas were taken seriously and played an important role in the controversies of the time."
- "Traditional American values of liberty, individualism, equality, popular control of government, and the openness of government were stressed in public discussion."
- "Moral indignation over the IvI gap was widespread."
- "Politics was characterized by agitation, excitement, commotion, even upheaval — far beyond the usual routine of interest-group conflict."
- "Hostility toward power (the antipower ethic) was intense, with the central issue of politics often being defined as 'liberty versus power.'"
- "The exposure or muckraking of the IvI gap was a central feature of politics."
- "Movements flourished devoted to specific reforms or 'causes' (women, minorities, criminal justice, temperance, peace)."
- "New media forms appeared, significantly increasing the influence of the media in politics."
The remaining five describe the resulting changes:
- "Political participation expanded, often assuming new forms and often expressed through hitherto unusual channels."
- "The principal political cleavages of the period tended to cut across economic class lines, with some combination of middle- and working-class groups promoting change."
- "Major reforms were attempted in political institutions in order to limit power and reshape institutions in terms of American ideals (some of which were successful and some of which were lasting)."
- "A basic realignment occurred in the relations between social forces and political institutions, often including but not limited to the political party system."
- "The prevailing ethos promoting reform in the name of traditional ideals was, in a sense, both forward-looking and backward-looking, progressive and conservative."
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Party systems and realignment elections
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The United States has gone through several party systems, where in each system, the two main parties have characteristic platforms and constituencies. Likewise, the United States has had several realigning elections, elections that bring fast and large-scale changes. These events are mentioned here because their repeated occurrence may be interpreted as a kind of cycle.
Opinions differ on the timing of the transition from the fifth to the sixth systems, opinions ranging from the 1960s to the 1990s. Some political scientists argue that it was a gradual transition, one without any well-defined date.
Other dates sometimes cited are 1874, 1964 (Lyndon B. Johnson), 1968 (Richard Nixon), 1992 (Bill Clinton), 1994, 2008 (Barack Obama), and 2016 (Donald Trump).
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Skowronek's presidency types
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Political scientist Stephen Skowronek has proposed four main types of presidencies, and these types of presidencies fit into a cycle. He proposes that the United States has had several political regimes over its history, regimes with a characteristic cycle of presidency types. Each political regime has had a dominant party and an opposition party. Presidents can be in either the dominant party, or the opposition party.[4][44][45][46][47][48][49][50][51]
The cycle begins with a reconstructive president, one who typically serves more than one term. He establishes a new regime, and his party becomes the dominant one for that regime. He is usually succeeded by his vice president, his successor is usually an articulation one, and that president usually serves only one term. This president is usually followed by a preemptive president, and articulating and preemptive presidents may continue to alternate. The cycle ends with one or more disjunctive presidents. Such presidents are typically loners, detached from their parties, considered ineffective, and serving only one term.
- Rec: Washington
- Dis: Adams, J.
- Rec: Jefferson
- Art: Madison
- Art: Monroe
- Dis: Adams, J. Q.
- Rec: Jackson
- Art: Van Buren
- Pre: Harrison, W. H.
- Pre: Tyler
- Art: Polk
- Pre: Taylor
- Pre: Fillmore
- Dis: Pierce
- Dis: Buchanan
- Rec: Lincoln
- Pre: Johnson, A.
- Art: Grant
- Art: Hayes
- Art: Garfield
- Art: Arthur
- Pre: Cleveland
- Art: Harrison, B.
- Art: McKinley
- Art: Roosevelt, T.
- Art: Taft
- Pre: Wilson
- Art: Harding
- Art: Coolidge
- Dis: Hoover
- Rec: Roosevelt, F. D.
- Art: Truman
- Pre: Eisenhower
- Art: Kennedy
- Art: Johnson, L. B.
- Pre: Nixon
- Pre: Ford
- Dis: Carter
- Rec: Reagan
- Art: Bush, G. H. W.
- Pre: Clinton
- Art: Bush, G. W.
- Pre: Obama
- ?: Trump
- ?: Biden
- Some of the articulating and preemptive presidents' types have been inferred from their party affiliations. George Washington is classified here as a reconstructing president because he was the first one. One source[44] lists Theodore Roosevelt as a possible reconstructing president and not just an articulating one.
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Turchin's long-term cycles
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Biologist and quantitative historian Peter Turchin works on secular or long-term cycles in large-scale societies that have occurred over recorded human history.[52] In summary:
- Integrative phase
- Expansion: Common people well off, population increases, elites small and undemanding, state united, may conquer territory.
- Stagflation: Elites rise, take more from the common people, immiserating them.
- Disintegrative phase
- Crisis: Elites fight each other over the limited number of top positions, population declines, state may lose territory.
- Depression / intercycle: attempts to rebuild the state.
Most of this work has been done for preindustrial societies, but he has extended that work to an industrialized nation, the United States. He has found a similar sort of cycle, though a faster one, about a century long instead of typically three or four centuries.[53][54] His data on common-people well-being and elite overproduction,[55][56] as well as on sociopolitical violence,[57] show correlations similar to what one finds for preindustrial societies:
- CPWB: common-people well-being: relative wage, labor supply, date of first marriage, physical health
- EOP: elite overproduction: top fortune, elite-university tuition, political polarization
- SPV: sociopolitical violence: terrorism, lynching, riots
In 2010, Peter Turchin extrapolated conditions in the US and Western Europe, and he predicted an era of social violence in the 2020's.[58][59] By the 2020's, some people considered that prediction to have come true,[60][61][62] including he himself.[63][64]
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Frank J. Klingberg foreign-policy cycle
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Historian Frank J. Klingberg described what he called "the historical alternation of moods in American foreign policy", an alternation between "extroversion", willingness to confront other nations and to expand American influence and territory, and "introversion", unwillingness to do so. He examined presidents' speeches, party platforms, naval expenditures, wars, and annexations, identifying in 1952 seven alternations since 1776. He and others have extended this work into more recent years, finding more alternations.[2][3][65][66][67]
- Ext: Extroversion
- Int: Introversion
- (none): no events listed in the sources
Arthur Schlesinger Jr. concluded that this cycle is not synchronized with the liberal-conservative cycle, and for that reason, he concluded that these two cycles have separate causes.[2]
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Criticism
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in his 2012 book The Lost Majority, Sean Trende (senior elections analyst at RealClearPolitics), who argues against realignment theory and the "emerging Democratic majority" thesis proposed by journalist John Judis and political scientist Ruy Teixeira, states: "Almost none of the theories propounded by realignment theorists has endured the test of time... It turns out that finding a 'realigning' election is a lot like finding an image of Jesus in a grilled-cheese sandwich – if you stare long enough and hard enough, you will eventually find what you are looking for."[68] In August 2013, Trende observed that U.S. presidential election results from 1880 through 2012 form a 0.96 correlation with the expected sets of outcomes (i.e. events) in the binomial distribution of a fair coin experiment.[69]
In May 2015, statistician and FiveThirtyEight editor-in-chief Nate Silver argued against a blue wall Electoral College advantage for the Democratic Party in the 2016 U.S. presidential election,[70] and in post-election analysis cited Trende in noting that "there are few if any permanent majorities". Both Silver and Trende argued that the "emerging Democratic majority" thesis led most news coverage and commentary preceding the election to overstate Hillary Clinton's chances of being elected.[list 1]
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Further reading
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