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Iran–Turkey proxy conflict
Indirect conflict between Iran and Turkey From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
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The Iran–Turkey proxy conflict refers to the indirect conflict originating from the regional rivalry between Iran and Turkey in the Middle East, mainly during armed conflicts and struggles for influence.
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Background
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The conflict has its roots in a period of tense relations between Iran and Turkey after the Iranian Revolution. Despite the two countries cooperating in a wide variety of fields (especially against the establishment of an independent Kurdish state), Iran and Turkey have competed for geopolitical influence since the 1990s. In September 2011, Turkey hosted the establishment of a NATO missile shield, causing a crisis with Iran. While criticising the missile shield, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has also stated that Turkey should rethink many of its regional policies.[7][8]
A commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, Yahya Rahim Safavi, accused Turkish authorities of "acting in line with the goals of America", and that if Turkey did not change its policies, Iran, Iraq, and Syria would be "reassessing their political ties."[7]
The proxy conflict was worsened due to the active involvement of Turkish government in regional disputes in Iraq and Syria as well as its relations with Azerbaijan. Iran suspected that Turkey with the support of the United States, seek to expand its influence in the Zangezur corridor, a move that is likely to undercut Iranian influence in the north and in the Caucasus. [9][10]
The proxy conflict has continued despite Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's rhetoric in politically shifting away from the West and towards Russia and Iran.[11]
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Involved parties
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Syria
During the Syrian civil war, Iran intervened in support of Ba'athist Syria, while Turkey intervened in support of the opposition. Both Iran and Turkey were militarily involved. Turkey backed the Syrian National Army, while Iran backed the Syrian Arab Army, as well as Hezbollah, and other Shia militias. Hezbollah had clashed with the Turkish military in Syria.[12] Turkish media organisations like Yeni Akit and Yeni Şafak also spread Anti-Iranian sentiment due to the Iranian role in Syria.[13] Turkey and Iran continued to oppose each other during the Syrian civil war.
Shared ethnic and cultural ties between Kurds and Iran were a factor in establishing relations between Iran and Kurdish groups in Iran and Syria, which Iran had supplied weapons to on many occasions.[14][15][16][17] Tensions between Iran and Turkey with regard to the Kurds were significant.[18] In addition, Iran condemned all the military operations launched by Turkey against Kurdish forces in Syria.[19][20][21]
Iran had also secretly cooperated with various Syrian Kurdish groups such as the People's Protection Units (YPG) and the Kurdistan Workers' Party to some extent, both of which Turkey considered terrorist groups, and Turkish sources often linked Iran to the PKK and the YPG.[22][23]
In 2019, Turkey launched an offensive in northern Syria, against the Syrian Democratic Forces and Syrian Arab Armed Forces, causing Iran to criticize Turkey.[24] Iranian foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif claimed that it was a violation of Syria's sovereignty.[25] Ali Larijani also canceled his trip to Turkey.[26]
In 2022, Iran criticized Turkey's Operation Claw-Sword in northern Iraq and Syria. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei gave a warning to Turkey. Stating that a military conflict would "harmful" for Turkey and Syria and the entire region.[27] Throughout 2022-2024, Turkey tried to normalize ties with Bashar al-Assad in respect to Astana Talks.[28][29] Erdoğan stated that he could invite Assad to a meeting in Turkey at any time.[30] Iran remained critical of any Sunni and Turkish influence in Syria, according to a senior Turkish government official, Tehran was "antagonistic" toward Turkey in Syria and that it was Russia that pushed Turkey toward reconciliation, not Iran, but that there was "no progress at all."[31] Syrian–Turkish normalization ultimately failed as both Assad regime and Iran remained critical of Turkish influence.
In December 2024, after the Syrian opposition offensives, Abbas Araghchi had a heated argument with Hakan Fidan, claiming that Turkey had allowed the offensive.[32][33] Concurrently, Erdoğan stated that Assad failed to understand the value of the hand extended by Turkey.[34][35]
In January 2025, Turkey claimed that Iran had sent over 1,500 drones to the SDF, which the SDF had denied.[36]
In March 2025, Iran and Turkey both summoned the ambassadors after Hakan Fidan accused Iran of supporting Kurdish militias. His statements caused outrage in Iran.[37] Many interpreted the Turkish statements as threats to support Iranian Azerbaijani separatists if Iran did not cut support for Kurdish militias in Syria.[38]
Iraq
After the Islamic State was defeated, Iran backed Shia Turkmen interests, while Turkey backed Sunni Turkmen interests. They often came in conflict.[39] Iran and Turkey backed opposing political factions in Iraq. They also backed opposing militant groups. In During the 2017 Iraqi–Kurdish conflict, Shia militias captured Sinjar from the KDP Peshmerga.[40] The Shia militias also entered a tactical alliance with the YBŞ and the PKK.[41] Turkey turned against the Shia militias, as it supported the Kurdistan Region, especially the KDP, and opposed the PKK. The conflict escalated in October 2020, after the Sinjar agreement mediated by the United Nations between the KRG and Iraq, which mandated the withdrawal of both the PKK and PMF.[42] In 2021, various Shia militias began attacking Turkish presence in Iraq after Turkey launched operations against the PKK in Iraqi Kurdistan. After the Fall of the Assad regime, Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba warned about the existence of a Turkish-backed "operations room" in Iraq which planned on launching an attack similar to the 2024 Syrian offensives, and stressed that the United Kingdom was leading the operations room, with intelligence participation from NATO and Israel.[43]
Yemen
During the Yemeni civil war, Iran and Turkey supported rival groups, causing official arguments between Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Mohammad Javad Zarif. Erdoğan stated that "Iran and the terrorist groups must withdraw", while Zarif stated that "Turkey makes strategic mistakes".[44] Turkey was also accused of providing intelligence and aid to Saudi Arabia against the Houthis in Yemen.[45]
Libya
During the Second Libyan conflict, Iran was accused by Israel of providing support to the anti-Turkish Khalifa Haftar and supplied his forces with anti-tank missiles.[46][47][48]
However, Iran in 2020 voiced support for the Turkish-backed Government of National Accord.[49]
Saudi-Turkish rapprochement after the end of the Qatar diplomatic crisis further complicated the situation against Iran. Turkey has successfully improved its relations with Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, while Iran remains isolated.[50][51][52][53] Saddam Haftar, the son of Khalifa Haftar, has made multiple visits to Turkey about military cooperation.[54][55] Haftar aligned Libyan House of Representatives decided to form a committee to study the maritime agreement signed with Turkey by Government of National Accord.[56][57]
Iran
In the 1990s, Iranian Azerbaijani secularists who were frustrated with both religion and the Iranian government became the basis of Pan-Turkism and Pro-Turkey politics among Iranian Azerbaijanis.[58] From 1993 to 1995, Turkey provided support to the KDPI and Komala.[59] With the spread of Turkish media after the 2000s, nationalism increased among Iranian Azerbaijanis, with the Iranian government attempting to counter it. Tractor S.C. acted as a base for extreme nationalism, as well as racism particularly towards Persians and Kurds.[60] Supporters also carry the flag of the Republic of Azerbaijan inside the stadium.[61] In 2020, Suleyman Soylu claimed that there were 100 PKK fighters present in Iran with the tacit approval of the Iranian government.[62]
Turkey
Before PJAK became a threat for Iran, the Iranian government was a staunch supporter of the PKK.[63] However, the Turkish government accused Iran of continued support for the PKK in various forms of support.[64] The Turkish government also alleged that Iran financed and trained the Kurdish Hezbollah, and accused Iran of planning to use the Kurdish Hezbollah against Turkey.[65][66][67] In March 1993, after Abdullah Öcalan left Syria, the Turkish government accused Iran of organising a ceasefire between the Kurdish Hezbollah and PKK.[68] A Turkish parliamentary report also revealed Kurdish Hezbollah operatives had trained in Iran.[69]
Although the majority of Alevis in Turkey embraced secular values, were loyal to Turkey, and supported the Republican People's Party, Iran attempted to grow its influence over Alevis, while also attempting to convert them into the mainstream Twelver Shi'ism practiced in Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Bahrain, and Azerbaijan. Some Turkish Alevi representatives had complained about Iran undermining Alevism.[70][71] The Turkish government uncovered a secret plot by the Quds Force in June 2012. The investigation led the Turkish government to uncover a plot by the Quds Force and its assets, aiming to grow Iranian influence in Shia, Alevi, and ethnic Kurdish communities in Turkey. The plot aimed to religiously motivate the Shias and Alevis to start an uprising against Turkey. It also aimed to ethnically motivate the Kurds to start a separatist insurgency in Turkey. In both of these planned insurgencies, Iran would have provided support for the secessionists. Iranian attempts at converting Alevis to Shia Islam were also in the plot. In 2014, the Turkish government intervened in the case when senior aides of Erdoğan were involved in the plot.[72]
Some Islamists in Turkey take pro-Iranian views against Turkish government. Felicity Party has been critical of Erdoğan and some elements of Turkish foreign policy in favor of Iran. Felicity Party supported Bashar al-Assad in Syria against American intervention.[73][74][75] New Welfare Party has also been critical of Turkish government over Israel–Turkey relations. Many Pro-Iranian networks took pro-opposition stance during the 2025 Turkish protests and blamed Erdoğan.[76]
Turkey and the United States are both members of NATO. Despite strained relations, they continued to cooperate against Iranian interests.[77] Turkey supported various US policies against Iran, notably the assassination of Qasem Soleimani in Baghdad, in which Turkey secretly agreed to remove the Iranian obstacle to its ambitions.[78][79][80][81][82]
Azerbaijan
In the 1990s, with the fall of the Soviet Union, Armenia and Azerbaijan declared independence from the Soviet Union. Iran and Turkey quickly recognized the independence of both countries, but Iran wanted to transform Azerbaijan into a similar theocratic Islamic regime, and it went so far as to try to fund the Azerbaijani armed forces and send men to fight for them in the Nagorno-Karabakh war.[83][84][85] However, Azerbaijani leadership instead cooperated with Turkey and not Iran.[86] In 1992, the Azerbaijanis elected Abulfaz Elchibey, whose pro-Turkish and anti-Iranian rhetorics alienated Iran.[87][88] Turkey provided Azerbaijan with military equipment, as well as assisted Azerbaijan in the war with Armenia, while Turkish members of the Grey Wolves publicly participated in the First Nagorno-Karabakh War on the Azerbaijani side. Iran cooperated with Armenia and provided aid to Armenia and Artsakh.[89][90][91]
Iranian activities in Azerbaijan since the end of the war have also been the subject of tensions between Iran and Turkey due to Azerbaijan's strong alliance with Turkey.[92] Turkish and Azerbaijani support of Turkish nationalist separatism in Iranian Azerbaijan had been the source of tensions between Azerbaijan, Turkey and Iran.[93][94] Iranian repressive policies towards Iranian Azeris often put relations between Iran and Turkey in question.[95][96]
At the same time, after the victory of the Armenians in the war of the 1990s, Iran and Armenia became major trading partners while Armenia's relations with Turkey were hampered by the denial of the Armenian Genocide in Turkey. Iran was accused of preferring its Armenian minority over its Azerbaijani minority.[97][98][99] Iran had frequently deployed trucks in the Karabakh region to assist Artsakh, drawing condemnation from Azerbaijan.[100]
During the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, Iran criticised Turkey, claiming that all Turkey did was add "fuel to the fire".[101] Iran also criticised the presence of "terrorists" near its border, referring to alleged use of Syrian jihadists by Turkey and Azerbaijan in Nagorno-Karabakh.[102] Iran arrested several pro-Azerbaijan activists in Iranian cities, including some Turkish citizens.[103] On December 12, Turkey summoned its Iranian ambassador due to the "aggressive" reaction from Iran to the poem read by Erdoğan.[104] Iran boycotted Turkish products due to the poem.[105] After the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, Iranian influence in the South Caucasus diminished with Turkey emerging dominant.[106] Turkey continued to work with Russia due to Russia's change in policy towards Azerbaijan, while Iran was left out.[107] Iran was furious over Russia's policy shift on Zangezur corridor in favor of Azerbaijan.[108] The Iran-backed Husseiniyoun claimed that their goal was to repeat the Iranian revolution, but in Azerbaijan.[109][110][111]
Pakistan
Pakistan had been a close ally and is a strategic partner of Turkey, and had tensions with Iran due to their support of opposing groups in the 1992-1996 Afghan Civil War, in which Iran supported the Northern Alliance while Pakistan supported the Taliban. Turkey supported the anti-Taliban Abdul Rashid Dostum, although it did not interfere with its good relations with Pakistan.[112][113][114] After 2000, Iran attempted to lure Pakistani Shias to wars in Syria and Iraq against the Turkish interests, sparking outrage in Pakistan demanding that the Pakistani authorities investigate Iran's interference in the country.[115][116][117] Pakistan also lodged complains to Iranian authorities over the usage of Indian consulate general in Zahedan, which Pakistani intelligence had suspected of India using it as an intelligence ground to conduct insurgent activities inside Pakistan. Pakistan was aligned with Turkish interests in the conflicts in the Caucasus and Syria.[118]
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References
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