Regime change in autocracies

Regime change in autocracies, like the Iranian revolution of 1979, The revolution in Argentina that followed the Falklands war in 1982, The Romanian revolution in 1989, the revolution in Egypt, Libya,Tunisia, and Syria, which started in 2011, and others, has been a central topic in comparative politics, encompassing both transitions to democracy and shifts to new authoritarian rulers or systems. Scholars have advanced numerous theories to explain why and how autocratic regimes break down. These explanations can be grouped into structural-economic factors, elite dynamics and institutions, mass mobilization and opposition strategies, and international influences.

Economic and structural drivers of change

A consistent finding is that higher levels of socioeconomic development correlate with a greater likelihood of democratization.^[1] Empirical studies show that authoritarian regime transitions (of all kinds) are more common during economic downturns.^[1]

It has been argued that autocracies endure when elites can credibly appease the masses' demands without surrendering power; democratization occurs when that balance collapses.^[2] In their model, democracy can emerge as a commitment device by which threatened elites concede future policy influence to the public (via elections) to avoid immediate revolt.^[2] High inequality makes elites fear democracy (since it portends redistribution at their expense).^[2] Therefore, extreme inequality often leads to intransigence and possibly violent repression rather than voluntary transition. By contrast, moderate inequality or changes in the asset structure (e.g., the economy shifting from land, which is easily expropriated, to capital, which is more mobile) can lower elite resistance to democratization.^[2] Modernization theory similarly posits that as countries urbanize and industrialize, growing middle classes and more educated urban workers are better able to organize collective action against authoritarian rule.^[2] Indeed, the rise of cities and civil society often helps overcome the collective action problem that normally protects autocracies. Acemoglu and Robinson (2005) also argue that in agrarian societies, by contrast, populations are geographically dispersed and less capable of sustained, coordinated protest.^[2]

Some oil-rich regimes become generous welfare providers when elites sense "subversive threats" from below, using welfare as a means of mass co-optation.^[3] Oman is an example: in the 1970s the regime utilized booming oil revenues to rapidly expand public services and raise living standards in response to a communist insurgency, thereby helping to undercut revolutionary fervor.^[3]

Elite coalitions, institutions, and regime types

Not all dictatorships are alike: military juntas, one-party states, personalist autocracies, and hybrid regimes have different internal dynamics, affecting how they fall.^[1] Military regimes, for instance, "carry within them the seeds of their own disintegration".^[1] Because the officer corps values the unity and integrity of the military institution above clinging to political office, splits within military juntas often lead the army to collectively withdraw from power ("return to the barracks") rather than risk fratricidal conflict.^[1] As a result, military dictatorships are typically the most fragile type: Geddes found that post-WWII military regimes survived on average only about 9 years, compared to 15 years for personalist regimes and 35 years for single-party regimes.^[1] When faced with popular protests or elite factionalism, military rulers are relatively prone to negotiating an exit and restoring civilian rule.^[1] Indeed, most transitions from military rule (e.g., Latin America in the 1980s) were negotiated and nonviolent, yielding either democratization or, at the very least, a peaceful transfer to a new regime.^[1] In contrast, single-party regimes, where a dominant party penetrates the state and society, have more cohesive elite networks and institutional mechanisms to manage dissent. Rival factions in ruling parties can be placated by the circulation of elites or policy concessions, so leadership struggles usually do not result in regime collapse.^[1] Hence, one-party autocracies have proven remarkably durable (many communist and some postcolonial regimes lasted decades), often ending only after external shocks or gradual internally-driven reforms.^[1] Personalist regimes (centered on an individual dictator and a clique of cronies) fall somewhere in between: lacking the institutional safety valves of parties or the professional loyalty of militaries, personalist regimes tend to resist relinquishing power until forced and often end in coups or violent overthrow.^[1] As Geddes observes, personalist dictators "circle the wagons" when crises hit, preferring repression over compromise, which makes "violent overthrow much more likely" in such regimes.^[1]

It has been argued that the stability of any regime rests on the size of the core group whose support keeps the leader in power relative to the pnumber of people with some say in choosing the leader. In autocracies, winning coalitions are typically small (e.g., top military officers, party barons, or family members). Leaders survive by delivering private goods to these insiders, lucrative posts, kickbacks, and monopolies, rather than broad public goods.^[2] This implies autocrats can endure even with disastrous public policies so long as the core coalition is content. However, if the ruler can no longer pay the coalition (due to economic crisis or sanctions) or if insider factions feel excluded, conspiracies may form to replace the leader. coups d’état have been historically common in certain autocracies, essentially elite-led regime changes.^{[citation needed]}

It has been noted that many autocrats are ousted by insiders (e.g. by a palace coup), after which surprisingly little changes in terms of the regime's rules.^[4] For example, Argentina's military president, General Viola, was ousted in 1981 by fellow officers, yet the military regime itself persisted for another two years.^[4] Similarly, when party elites remove a communist party boss, often the authoritarian regime continues under new leadership (as happened in many Soviet-aligned states before 1989). Such insider-led ousters usually amount to rotational elitism. The regime survives by sacrificing a leader to preserve the broader coalition.^[4]

Research on post-Soviet states also emphasizes the role of elite capacity and state institutions in regime outcomes.^[5] He introduces the concept of "pluralism by default," noting that in Ukraine, Moldova, and other weak states, competitive politics emerged in the 1990s not due to strong democratic forces but because incumbents were too weak to monopolize power.^[5] In these cases, regimes faced the "inability of incumbents to maintain power or concentrate control by preserving elite unity, controlling elections, and/or using force against opponents".^[5] In countries where rulers failed to fully co-opt or repress all opposition, a degree of pluralism resulted almost unintentionally. Conversely, in Belarus and Russia, leaders such as Lukashenko and Putin built up strong coercive and party machines, preventing meaningful opposition and ensuring authoritarian stability.^[5] Way (2005) notes that the degree of state-building by autocrats influences regime change: strong states can suppress or manage opposition (often remaining authoritarian), whereas weak states more easily slip into political competition or even collapse.^[5]

Mass mobilization and opposition strategies

It has been posited that revolutions are not simply the result of conscious insurgent organizing but rather emerge from structural crises in state and class relations.^[6] One analysis of the French, Russian, and Chinese revolutions found that an international or fiscal crisis (often induced by war or economic competition) can weaken a centralized state to the point of breakdown.^[6] This crisis undermines elite cohesion and creates a power vacuum that insurgent groups can exploit.^[6] However, whether a full-scale social revolution occurs also depends on the patterns of class dominance and alliances in society.^[6] Skocpol noted that peasant rebellions, guided by distinct class interests and often sparked by the state's collapse, were pivotal in these revolutions.^[6] For instance, in Russia in 1917, World War I had pushed the Tsarist state into crisis. When regime repression faltered, peasant and worker uprisings filled the void, leading to a socialist revolution. These conditions are rare, which is why successful social revolutions are comparatively infrequent but epochal in impact .^[6] The outcomes of such revolutions vary depending on further factors, like international context and the revolutionary coalition's nature, e.g., France ended with liberal-capitalist order, Russia with Bolshevik dictatorship, China with a mass-mobilizing party-state.^[6] The key point is that mass revolutions are most likely when autocracies face state breakdown, not just dissent: it is the combination of a faltering regime and mobilized "revolts from below" that produces sweeping regime change.^[6]

People's power can dislodge entrenched elites, as seen in the wave of democratic transitions in the late 20th century (e.g., the "Third Wave" in Southern Europe, Latin America, and Eastern Europe).^[7] Conversely, Hellmeier and Bernhard also caution that mass mobilization is a double-edged sword: there are instances of pro-autocratic mobilization, populist or reactionary movements, that demand more authoritarianism or the restoration of a former autocrat.^[7] It is possible that that such mobilization in favor of authoritarian ideals or leaders can undermine democracies and help hardliners to power.^[7] In other words, crowds in the street do not always chant for freedom. Sometimes, they call for a "strongman" or the suppression of minority rights, and those cases often presage democratic backsliding.^[7] The authors' broader point is that one must examine who the mobilization supports, democracy or autocracy, to gauge its effect on regime change.^[7]

It has been claimed that unified oppositions present a far bigger threat to dictators than fragmented ones.^[8] Using data on protests in Putin-era Russia, Armstrong et al. find that cooperation between different opposition factions is most likely when issues arise that transcend their divides and resonate widely with their supporters.^[8] However, the regime's co-optation strategies are effective when the state has granted systemic opposition parties certain privileges or stakes (such as parliamentary seats and funding), those parties are less inclined to join forces with non-systemic dissidents in protest.^[8] In Russia, for example, nominal opposition parties often stayed away from anti-Putin street protests to avoid losing their sanctioned status. The study illustrates the "precarious position" of semi-loyal opposition in autocracies - they are pressured to show fealty to the regime yet must retain credibility with their base.^[8]

There is evidence from Communist Poland that communities more exposed to secret police agents saw more protest organizations, even as they witnessed less underground sabotage,^[9] andthat pervasive spying created widespread anger and a sense of injustice among citizens.^[9] Rather than cowering silently, many Poles responded by openly demonstrating as a way to "reveal their true loyalties" and defy the regime.^[9] In effect, the intrusive repression eroded the regime's legitimacy and prompted people toward collective action (while dissuading smaller covert acts like sabotage).^[9] Once on the streets, protesters also moderated their tactics, refraining from violence or sabotage, to signal that their motives were political, not criminal.^[9]

When dictators fall due to mass revolts, the regime is far more likely to undergo fundamental change. In contrast, if insiders or the military ousts a dictator without popular pressure, the regime often remains essentially the same.^[4] In about 85% of cases where a leader was toppled by a popular uprising, the authoritarian regime itself collapsed with the dictator.^[4] This often paves the way for democratization or at least a new political order. By contrast, when a coup removes a dictator, roughly half the time the broader regime continues under new leadership.^[4] The difference is that mass protests can delegitimize not only the ruler but the ruling system, especially if the army or portions of it side with the people or remain neutral. The example of the ousting of Egypt's Hosni Mubarak in 2011 followed millions of protesters gathering in Tahrir Square. The military ultimately refused to shoot protesters and maneuvered Mubarak out, opening space (albeit brief) for democratization.^[10] In Tunisia in 2011, likewise, the security forces' restraint and the sheer scale of demonstrations forced President Ben Ali to flee, and former regime elites then negotiated a democratic transition.^[10] In such cases, notes Kendall-Taylor (2014), the old regime's pillars are sufficiently weakened or delegitimized, allowing a new system to take root.^[4] By contrast, when a dictator is replaced by a general (as in many coups), the underlying power structure endures.^[4]

Data shows that while pro-democracy mobilizations generally improve the odds of transition, they do not guarantee success.^[7] Cases like the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests in China or the 2020 uprising in Belarus show that if the ruling elite and security forces remain cohesive and willing to use unlimited repression, they can survive major protest waves.^[7] Hellmeier and Bernhard (2023) emphasize that timing and trigger events also matter. Sometimes, a seemingly small incident such as the self-immolation of a fruit seller in Tunisia) can ignite a wave of protests because of underlying grievances. Once protests grow, maintaining nonviolent discipline and broadening the coalition (e.g., incorporating workers' strikes, student rallies, and middle-class participation) are key to sustaining momentum. The influence of social media and transnational diffusion in recent movements is also notable. The Arab Spring demonstrated how protests in one country can inspire those in another, as activists share slogans and tactics. Hellmeier and Bernhard refer to this as the transnational dimension of mobilization, where successes or failures in one place affect morale and strategy elsewhere.^[7]

International context and diffusion

Interntional forces, ranging from great-power pressure to demonstration effects that cross borders, can significantly influence regime stability or change.^[11] One major international factor is the leverage and linkage to Western democracies, as highlighted by Levitsky and Way (2010).^[11] In their study of "competitive authoritarian" regimes after the Cold War, Levitsky, and Way found that countries with high linkage to the West (characterized by extensive diplomatic, economic, and media ties) were more likely to democratize because Western governments and transnational networks applied pressure for reforms and empowered domestic opposition.^[11] For example, many Eastern European hybrid regimes democratized in the 1990s under the pull of EU and NATO membership (high linkage), whereas regimes in regions with lower Western linkage (like much of the former Soviet Union or Africa) often remained authoritarian or even became more repressive.^[11] Levitsky and Way argue that where linkage is low, the fate of competitive authoritarian regimes depends more on incumbent organizational power: if the ruling party or state apparatus is strong, the regime can endure (e.g. Malaysia, Russia); if weak, it may face repeated unstable transitions or even collapse into chaos without democratization (e.g. Zambia or Madagascar experienced turnover but not consolidated democracy).^[11] This reinforces the earlier point about state capacity. Still, with an international twist, the post-Cold War world saw a shift in international norms against outright dictatorship, meaning that many autocracies maintained a façade of elections. Whether those elections led to genuine regime change or were mere window-dressing often depended on international scrutiny and support for the opposition.^[11]

Foreign intervention is another pathway. Some regime changes occur through external military force, as in Iraq in 2003, when a U.S.-led invasion deposed Saddam Hussein's autocracy (ushering in a troubled attempt at democracy-building), or in more minor cases like Panama 1989.^[12][13] While military interventions are relatively rare and controversial, the Arab Spring saw a version of this in Libya: NATO airstrikes in 2011 decisively tilted the balance in favor of rebels, leading to Gaddafi's overthrow.^[14][15] External actors can also influence outcomes by imposing sanctions that cripple an autocrat's patronage networks or by offering exile guarantees to dictators, persuading them to leave (e.g., the negotiated exit of Yemen's president in 2012 involved significant involvement from the Gulf Cooperation Council).^[16][17] Way (2005) notes that democratization in some post-communist states was aided by Western democracy assistance and the attraction of European integration. In contrast, in places like Belarus, the absence of such carrots and the countervailing influence of Russia helped the autocrat persist.^[18]

Finally, regional diffusion and demonstration effects play a role. The Arab Spring (2011) is an example of contagion: seeing a neighboring country's people overthrow a dictator can inspire similar movements at home.^[7] Authoritarian elites are keenly aware of this threat; hence, they often coordinate regionally to blunt its diffusion (as Gulf monarchies did by coordinating responses to the Arab Spring protests).^{[citation needed]} International media and social networks accelerated the diffusion: satellite TV and the internet beamed images of jubilant crowds in Tunis and Cairo across the Arab world, undermining the aura of invincibility surrounding other autocrats. Data, encompassing both pro- and anti-democratic mobilizations globally, suggest that each successful popular uprising shifts perceptions of what is possible.^[7] However, diffusion can cut both ways: successful crackdowns or the descent of one country's uprising into chaos (e.g., Libya's post-revolution turmoil or Syria's civil war) can discourage protesters elsewhere or justify more brutal repression by neighboring regimes.^[7]

The final stage of collapse

Elite defection and fragmentation

Autocrats survive by distributing rents and maintaining loyalty within a minimal winning coalition.^[19] Reuter and Szakonyi (2020) argue that elite defections function as credible signals to other members of the regime's inner circle, triggering a bandwagon effect.^[20] In their study of Russia, they demonstrate how local elites facing electoral uncertainty or waning patronage were more likely to break ranks.^[20] Similarly, Way (2005) identifies elite fragmentation as a precursor to color revolutions in post-Soviet states.^[5]

Security apparatus breakdown

It has been argued that security forces will defect when they are institutionally independent of the ruling elite, perceive reputational costs to repression, or lack access to material resources.^[21]

The Tunisia military's refusal to repress mass protests and its institutional separation from Ben Ali’s inner circle were decisive.^[22] In Egypt, the military's decision to remain "neutral" during the 2011 uprising ultimately pressured Mubarak to resign.^[23]

Mass mobilization and protest escalation

Nonviolent protests involving more than 3.5% of the population almost always lead to regime change.^[24]

Mohamed Bouazizi’s self-immolation on December 17, 2010, ignited nationwide protests in Tunisia. Within four weeks, the scale of unrest rendered the regime unsustainable.^[25]

The role of digital communication in coordinating large-scale mobilization, even under censorship, thereby shortening the timeline between unrest and regime collapse is important.^[26]

Symbolic collapse of authority

Symbolic acts of defiance, such as burning the dictator’s portraits, seizing public buildings, and occupying state TV as "preference cascades", a process where private opposition becomes public once perceived regime stability dissolves, as a process often precede or coincide with regime collapse.^[27]

The opening of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989, was both a logistical and symbolic collapse of East Germany.^[28]

Leader’s exit or removal

The very final stage involves the removal, resignation, flight, or execution of the autocrat. In most cases, this occurs within days of elite and security fragmentation.^[1][4][10]

In Tunisia, President Ben Ali fled to Saudi Arabia on January 14, 2011, after losing military support. Al Jazeera. (2011, January 14). Tunisian president forced to flee.^[29] In Romania (1989), Nicolae Ceaușescu was captured and executed within four days of mass protests spreading to Bucharest and the army switching sides.^[30]

Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir was removed by a military coup in April 2019 after months of nonviolent protest and internal dissent. Reuters. (2019, April 11). Sudan’s Bashir toppled by military.^[31]

See also

• Coup d'état
• List of heads of state and government deposed by foreign powers in the 20th and 21st century
• Revolution
• Revolutions in autocracies after military defeats